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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
RETHINKING THE NATIONAL QUESTION: ANTI-STATIST DISCOURSES 
WITHIN THE KURDISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT 
by 
Ozum Yesiltas 
Florida International University, 2014 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Co-Major Professor 
Professor Rebecca Mae Salokar, Co-Major Professor 
Why and under what conditions have the Kurds become agents of change in the 
Middle East in terms of democratization? Why did the Kurds’ role as democratic agents 
become particularly visible in the 1990s? How does the Kurdish movement’s turn to 
democratic discourse affect the political systems of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria? What 
are the implications of the Kurds’ adoption of democratic discourse for the transnational 
aspect of the Kurdish movement?  
Since the early 1990s, Kurdish national movements in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria have undergone important political and ideological transformations. As a result of 
the Kurds’ growing role in shaping the debates on human rights and democratization in 
these four countries, the Kurdish national movement has acquired a dual character: an 
ethno-cultural struggle for the recognition of Kurdish identity, and a democratization 
movement that seeks to redefine the concepts of governance and citizenship in Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq and Syria. The process transformation has affected relations between the 
Kurdish movements and their respective central governments in significant ways. 
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On the basis of face-to-face interviews and archival research conducted in Turkey, 
Iraq and parts of Europe, the present work challenges the current narrative of Kurdish 
nationalism, which is predominantly drawn from a statist interpretation of Kurdish 
nationalist goals, and argues instead that the Kurdish question is no longer a problem of 
statelessness but a problem of democracy in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. 
The main contributions of this work are three fold. First, the research unfolds the 
reasons behind the growing emphasis of the Kurdish movement on the concepts of 
democracy, human rights, and political participation, which started in the early 1990s. 
Second, the findings challenge the existing scholarship that explains Kurdish nationalism 
as a problem of statelessness and shifts the focus to the transformative potentials of the 
Kurdish national movement in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria through a comparative lens. 
Third, this work explores the complex transnational coordination and negotiations 
between the Kurdish movements across borders and explains the regional repercussions 
of this process. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In Iraq, we are not struggling for independence, but for our liberty. We 
will continue our struggle until we obtain humane living conditions. Our 
struggle only serves for defending ourselves. The Arabs, with whom we 
commonly form the Iraqi State, have engaged in a battle to exterminate us. 
They denied our existence. We maintain this struggle to make ourselves 
recognized.1 
 
In 1968, after seven years of fighting with the Iraqi army, this was the answer that 
Molla Mustafa Barzani gave to the Turkish journalist Hulusi Turgut who asked him about 
the Iraqi Kurdish movement’s stance on the establishment of an independent Kurdish 
state in the Middle East. By the late 1960s, the Kurdish revolt in northern Iraq was 
viewed as a dangerous experiment of Kurdish self-rule by Baghdad as well as by Ankara, 
Tehran and Damascus. The emergence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 
insurgency in Turkey after roughly a decade further exacerbated the claims regarding the 
right and ability of the Kurds to run their own affairs and led to a great deal of discontent 
in the neighboring countries. These events left a major mark on the literature about the 
Kurds throughout the 1990s during which the question of Kurdish statehood intrigued a 
large number of scholars. Accordingly, the reasons behind the Kurds’ historical failure to 
achieve statehood, their lack of political unity, and the cultural, political and economic 
suffering imposed by the host country policies upon the Kurdish populations in Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq and Syria have been widely discussed in the literature. 
                                                      
1 Turgut, Hulusi (1969). Barzani Dosyası (Barzani File), Istanbul: Hasmet Matbaası, 33-34. 
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Although the Kurdish question has been predominantly studied in the context of 
the discourse of statehood both in the academic and policy circles,2 throughout the history 
of Kurdish struggle for national liberation, “independent statehood” was referred to only 
rarely by the major actors and political parties that shaped the Kurdish national 
movement in all four parts of Kurdistan.3 Although there has been a notable increase in 
Kurdish aspirations for independence at a mass level since the early 1990s, particularly 
following the emergence of Iraqi Kurdistan as a de-facto autonomous region, political 
independence was rarely stated explicitly at the elite level. Rather, the Kurdish demands 
were often defined within the framework of the broader term “the right to self-
determination” with a focus on various decentralization projects, recognition of cultural 
rights and increased democracy in the host countries. 
The acceptance of the constitution of 2005 in Iraq, which strengthened the 
position of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) within both domestic and 
regional politics, introduced “federalism,” a new administrative concept, with far-
reaching implications for both Iraq and the entire Middle East.4 On the other hand, as the 
struggle between young Turkish conscripts and Kurdish militants in the mountains of 
                                                      
2 I am using the phrase “discourse of statehood” in the meaning of having an independent sovereign state – 
defined as the exercise of organized political power, without intervention by a superior authority, over a 
territory and people (Baty 1930: 9-10). The existing scholarship approaches the “Kurdish question” 
predominantly as a problem of “statelessness” which is viewed as the root cause of the suppression and 
denial of the Kurds.  
3 Contemporary use of Kurdistan refers to large parts of eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, northwestern Iran 
and northeastern Syria. Kurdistan covers small portions of Armenia as well and may also include the Kurds 
living in Russia and Azerbaijan. The Kurds living in Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are not included in 
the present study mainly because of their insignificant numbers and marginal influence they have on their 
respective political environments.   
4 Ahmed, Mohammed M. A. (2007). “Laying the Foundation for a Kurdistani State in Iraq: 1991-2006” in 
The Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism edited by Mohammed M. A. Ahmed and Michael Gunter, Costa 
Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 184. 
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southeastern Turkey gradually moved into the more mundane settings of local 
government offices, the national parliament, and civic organizations since the early 
1990s,5 the pro-Kurdish political parties of Turkey have increasingly become the major 
locomotives of the internal policy debates on political decentralization, constitutional 
change and democratization in Turkey. Furthermore, as the so-called process of the Arab 
Spring has dramatically transformed the political landscape in the Middle East since late 
2010, the Syrian Kurds have appeared as crucial actors in shaping both the future of Syria 
and the Kurdish question in general. As the terminology and focus dedicated to the recent 
political transformations in the Middle East remained largely “Arab” and little has been 
written over the role of non-Arab minorities have in shaping the future of the region, the 
Syrian Kurds’ radical change of discourse from achieving citizenship and cultural rights 
to struggling for the establishment of a federal and democratic Syria has only enhanced 
the academic and policy significance of the Kurdish role in the Middle East.  
In this context, the present work is an attempt to challenge the current narrative of 
Kurdish nationalism, which is predominantly derived from a statist interpretation of 
Kurdish nationalist goals,6 and to explore, instead, the Kurds’ growing role in shaping the 
debates on governance, human rights and democratization in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. 
As opposed to the analyses of Kurdish nationalism from the viewpoint of the official state 
discourses, the present work is a deliberate effort to present the Kurdish viewpoint and 
focus on Kurdish nationalism as a movement in its own right and not just a reaction to the 
                                                      
5 Watts, Nicole F. (2010). Activists in Office: Kurdish Politics and Protest in Turkey, Seattle, WA: 
University of Washington Press, 3-4. 
6 The “statist” interpretation of the Kurdish question refers to the notion that every nation is supposed to 
have a state of its own and that nationalism is mainly a struggle for maintaining or attaining statehood. 
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processes of modernization and state-building in the Kurds’ host countries. From this 
perspective, the Kurdish question is no longer defined as a problem of “statelessness,” 
but a problem of “democracy” in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Accordingly, I argue that 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria do not suffer from a “Kurdish problem,” but rather a 
“democracy problem.” 
Analysis of the Kurdish question in the context of democratization in the Middle 
East is a recently developing subject of inquiry, yet the analyses that consider the Kurds 
as the “agents” of democratization remain relatively scarce. The literature does not offer 
any detailed study of the Kurds’ role in the democratization processes in Iran or Syria. 
The studies that investigate the Kurdish role in Iraqi politics, on the other hand, usually 
have a stronger tendency to focus on the issues of partition or a possible Kurdish 
secession than to examine the Kurds as a force for the development of a democratically 
pluralistic Iraq.7 Since 2005, the establishment of a federal system in Iraq has led to the 
emergence of a growing literature on the issue of federalism and democratization in the 
Middle East.8 The pro-Kurdish democratic movement in Turkey has started to attract 
scholarly attention only recently.9 However, the major deficiency in these studies is that 
                                                      
7 See Özcan, Nihat Ali (Spring 2004). “Could a Kurdish State Be Set Up In Iraq?,”Middle East Policy, 11 
(1): 119-122; Rafaat, Araam (Fall 2007). “An Independent Kurdish State: Achievable or Merely a Kurdish 
Dream?,” The Journal of Social Political and Economic Studies, 32 (3): 267-304; Dawoody, Alexander 
(2006). “The Kurdish Quest for Autonomy and Iraq’s Statehood,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, 41 
(5-6): 483-505. For a discussion of the Iraqi Kurds’ commitment to new forms of national affirmation 
beyond statehood see Salih, Khaled (Spring 2004). “Kurdish Reality in an Emerging Iraq,” Middle East 
Policy, 11 (1): 122-126. 
8 See O’Leary, B., McGarry, J., Salih, K. (2005). The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press; Stansfield, G., Anderson, E. (2010). Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and 
Emergent Democracy, London and New York: Routledge; Visser, R., Stansfield, G. (2007). Iraq of Its 
Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy?, New York: Columbia University Press. 
9 Demir, Eyüp (2005). Yasal Kürtler (Legal Kurds), İstanbul: Tevn Yayınları; Watts, Nicole F. (2010).  
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although they discuss the demands raised by the pro-Kurdish political parties and the 
structural conditions that facilitate the emergence of pro-Kurdish legal activism, they do 
not present how those demands are articulated within the Kurdish movement’s wider 
discourse of democratization and political change in Turkey and how they challenge the 
established notions of democracy and political representation.  
Why and under what conditions do the Kurds become democratic agents? Why do 
the Kurdish demands become tied to the broader problem of democracy in Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq and Syria? Why do the Kurdish politicians argue that the problems of governance, 
democracy and human rights in these four countries are closely linked to the solution of 
their respective “Kurdish problem?” The existing scholarship is not well equipped to help 
answer those questions because of the emphasis placed on the independent state 
discourse, which is predominantly informed by a modernist understanding of nationalism 
and the tendency to view the nation as a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain 
kind of modern territorial state, the nation-state. Driven by this particular theoretical 
stance, the Kurdish scholarship, more often than not, offers structural analyses of the 
issue that explores the trajectory of the Kurds either through modernist state discourses, 
that is, in terms of “failure” “lack” or “fragmentation” or through narratives of 
victimhood which treat the Kurdish case as a form of reactive nationalism that is shaped 
by the suppression and denial of Kurdish identity. This situation discounts the important 
changes the Kurdish movement has undergone over the last two decades and their impact 
on both domestic and regional politics. The present study aims to shift the attention to the 
proactive characteristics and transformative potentials of the Kurdish movement in the 
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context of the debates on human rights and democratization in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria since the early 1990s. 
Discussing the Kurdish national movement as a democratic agent and 
transformative force does not mean that Kurdish nationalists are a monolithic, unitary 
community whose strategies unfold similarly in every context. The Kurdish movements 
in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria maintain quite distinctive internal dynamics in 
organizational, ideological and strategic terms. As emphasized numerously in the 
literature, Kurdish movements in each of the four countries in question act in diverse 
political environments, which largely affect how Kurdish nationalism is defined in each 
political context and what strategies are chosen to achieve the set goals. In this respect, 
the political structures of the Kurds’ host countries play a major role in determining how 
the Kurdish political action is constrained and facilitated at different time frames and in 
various ways.10 However, while reacting to the constraints and opportunities they face, 
the Kurdish actors also affect and reshape the legal and institutional structures and 
political alignments within their respective polities in diverse ways. This situation creates 
a typically fluid, reciprocal and unpredictable relationship between the Kurdish 
movements and the political systems in which they act. 
Nor does the focus of the present study on the anti-statist discourses11 within the 
Kurdish national movement serve to deny the Kurdish aspiration for statehood or to 
                                                      
10 Natali, Denise (2005). The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity, New York: Syracuse 
University Press. 
11 The dictionary meaning of the prefix “anti” is “against”, “hostile to” or “counteracting”. However, I use 
the term anti-statist mainly to place an emphasis on the Kurdish political elite’s articulation of the Kurdish 
demands outside the dominant paradigm that identifies nationalism with the goal of seeking sovereign 
statehood. In that sense, the purpose of using of the term “anti-statist discourses” is not to make a point that 
Kurdish national movement is against or hostile to the idea of a Kurdish nation-state.   
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dismiss the discourse of independent statehood as a scholarly perspective in studying the 
Kurdish question. Rather, the purpose is to challenge the long-established perceptions 
regarding the Kurdish nationalism that has been continuously reproduced in the literature 
as a state-seeking movement. First, the concrete articulations of the Kurdish demands 
expressed through the statements of the Kurdish political elite do not match up to this 
narrative, and second, such an approach provides persistent ground for the regional states 
to legitimize their security-oriented policy making in dealing with the Kurdish question. 
Furthermore, this approach overlooks the complex and dynamic nature of the 
phenomenon of ethnic mobilization by over-emphasizing the host states’ capacity and 
propensity for repression as factors that determine the rise and fall of cycles of Kurdish 
protest and political action, and considers the Kurdish movement simply as a 
phenomenon that derives from the negative and positive incentives offered by the Kurds’ 
respective central governments. 
The discourse of decentralization and cultural rights promoted by the Kurdish 
political elite has significant implications for the processes of democratization in Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq and Syria. Nevertheless, a statist reading of the Kurdish nationalist goals 
immediately eliminates the context through which these implications could be discussed. 
The statist approach deprives the Kurds of their agency and fails to capture the fluid and 
reciprocal relationship of Kurdish movements with their respective political systems. 
From this perspective, the Kurds’ capacity to effect political change becomes exclusively 
tied to the establishment of a Kurdish nation-state whose absence, in turn, leads to a 
failure to undertake any serious accounting of movement-initiated changes in the political 
structures of the countries in which they live. 
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The present work undertakes three tasks: 
(1) Unpacking the reasons behind the growing emphasis, since the early 1990s, of the 
Kurdish movements on democracy, human rights, and political participation and 
explaining the new ways through which the notions of a united Kurdistan, 
Kurdish rights and independence were reinterpreted in the context of political 
change and the protection of territorial integrity in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. 
(2) Challenging the work that restricts Kurdish nationalism as a reactive force against 
suppression and denial, and focusing instead on the transformative potentials of 
the Kurdish national movement by discussing movement-initiated legislative 
change and other forms of change designed to restructure the legal and 
institutional basis of the political systems in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.  
(3) Explaining the complex transnational coordination and negotiations between the 
Kurdish movements in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria as major factors that account 
for the still unfolding process of strategic convergence among the Kurdish 
political demands across borders, and investigating the regional repercussions of 
this process. 
Kurdish Nationalist Goals Revisited 
In 1970, while the negotiations between the commission headed by Saddam 
Hussein and Mullah Mustafa Barzani were still going on in order to settle the Kurdish 
issue in Iraq, Masoud Barzani, son of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, asked Saddam Hussein 
how Baghdad would solve the democracy problem in greater Iraq. Saddam Hussein said, 
9 
 
“The system that we govern the rest of Iraq is none of your business. You will have 
autonomy in Kurdistan. Why do you care about this?”12  
The 1970 autonomy agreement between Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) and the Baath government did not lead to implementation of genuine autonomy in 
Iraqi Kurdistan. Nevertheless, Masoud Barzani’s question gained additional meaning 
after the 2003 American invasion of Iraq and became even more significant after the 
withdrawal of the U.S. forces at the end of 2011. As the centralization efforts of the 
Baghdad government, headed by Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, increasingly caused 
friction between the KRG and Baghdad after the U.S. forces left Iraq, the political 
scenarios established on an approaching declaration of political independence by the 
KRG proliferated rapidly, while relatively little attention was paid to the policies of the 
Al-Maliki government as a threat to the unity of Iraq.13  
The predictions concerning a possible Kurdish secession from Iraq have been 
compounded by the breakdown of authority in Syria after the start of the Syrian uprising 
in March 2011, and the creation of a Kurdish enclave along much of the country’s border 
with Turkey by July 2012. As the Kurds have advanced in several Kurdish-populated 
towns and cities in northern Syria, a potential union of the Kurdistan region in northern 
Iraq with the Kurdish territories in Syria around the common cause of an independent 
                                                      
12 Galbraith, Peter (2006). The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End, 
New York: Simon and Schuster, 63. 
 
13 For the centralization policies of the Maliki government and the resulting conflict between the KRG and 
Baghdad see Özpek, B. B. (Summer 2012). “Democracy or Partition: Future Scenarios for the Future of 
Iraq,” Insight Turkey, 14 (3): 127-140; Stansfield, G., Anderson, L. (Spring 2009) “Kurds in Iraq: The 
Struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,”Middle East Policy, 16 (1): 134-145.  
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Kurdish state quickly came on to the agendas of the scholarly communities as well as the 
political analysts.14  
Despite the considerable attention paid to the discourse of independent statehood 
in the political analyses concerning the Kurdish question, there is a significant mismatch 
between the focus of these analyses and how the Kurdish politicians articulate their 
demands in public sphere. Twenty years after Masoud Barzani’s question to Saddam 
Hussein, in 1991, the Persian Gulf War triggered another Kurdish uprising in the north of 
Iraq. Following the uprising, Barzani explained the goal of the Kurdish movement with 
the motto, “Autonomy for Kurdistan, democracy for Iraq.” 
At this stage in our struggle, what we want is clear: We want real 
autonomy in Kurdistan and democracy for Iraq. However, our struggle in 
Iraqi Kurdistan is also part of the Kurdish movement in general. It’s 
inevitable for the Kurdish nation to obtain its legitimate rights like all the 
other nations. Through what stages would this become a reality? How our 
struggle would progress in time would determine that.15  
 
Although many scholars regarded the KRG as a de facto state,16 Barzani 
continued to underscore the Kurds’ commitment to a unified Iraq after the autonomous 
status of the Kurdistan region gained constitutional recognition in 2005. In 2012, when 
the centralization policies of the Maliki government started to deepen the tensions 
                                                      
14 See Mansour, Renad. “The Role of Iraqi Kurdistan in the Syrian-Kurd Pursuit of Autonomy,” Aljazeera 
Center for Studies, September 19, 2012; Arango, Tim. “Kurds Prepare to Pursue More Autonomy in a 
Fallen Syria,” New York Times, September 19, 2012; Weiss, Stanley. “It’s Time for an Independent 
Kurdistan,” Huffington Post, November 5, 2012; Cafiero, Giorgio. “The Dreams and Dilemmas of Iraqi 
Kurdistan,” Foreign Policy in Focus, January 24, 2012. 
15 Ballı, Rafet (1991).  Kürt Dosyası (Kurdish File), İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 444-445. 
16 See Romano, David (2010). “Challenges of Autonomy in the Wake of U.S. Withdrawal,” International 
Affairs, 86 (6): 1345-1359; Gunter, M. (2011). “Arab-Kurdish Relations and the Future of Iraq,” Third 
World Quarterly, 32 (9): 1623-1635. 
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between Baghdad and Erbil, Barzani reiterated the KRG’s commitment to the unity and 
integrity of Iraq provided that Iraq remains federal and democratic: 
Unfortunately, after many years the situation is being changed and turned 
into the previous version. We don’t accept the return of dictatorship and 
we are only partner in governance by name. We cannot accept Kurds or 
any other community to be marginalized. The problem here is not only the 
Kurds, it is with all Iraq. If Iraq was democratic, federal and plural then it 
will be one and united. We don’t threaten the unity of Iraq; it is 
dictatorship that threatens the unity of Iraq.17 
 
The Kurdish question in Syria has usually been a marginal issue not only in the 
media but also in the academic research dedicated to either Syria or the Kurdish question. 
The Qamishli Revolt of 2004 marked the beginning of a new era for the Syrian Kurds by 
giving rise to a dramatic upsurge of Kurdish national feelings that shook the Syrian 
government and brought the Kurdish issue to the forefront of the debate about the future 
of Syria.18 However, the major breakthrough in Syrian Kurdish politics took place as a 
result of the spread of the uprisings known as the Arab Spring into Syria in March 2011, 
after which the prospects for greater Kurdish autonomy in the country became a crucial 
part of the discussions on how events should unfold after the toppling of the President 
Bashar al-Assad.  
As of October 2011, a total of fourteen Kurdish parties exist in Syria and none of 
them formally demand an independent Syrian-Kurdish state or the inclusion of the Syrian 
                                                      
17 “President Barzani: We don’t threaten the unity of Iraq; it is dictatorship that threatens the unity of Iraq” 
May 8, 2012. Available at http://www.malpress.com/english/news/302-president-barzani-we-dont-threaten-
the-unity-of-iraq-it-is-dictatorship-that-threatens-theunity-of-iraq.html (Accessed June 4, 2012). 
 
18 Lowe, Robert (2007). “Kurdish Nationalism in Syria” in The Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism edited by 
Mohammed M. A. Ahmed and Michael Gunter, Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 287. 
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Kurdish regions in a united Kurdistan.19 On May 14, 2011, the Kurdish parties in Syria 
presented their demands publicly for the first time since the beginning of the uprising. 
Among the eight items listed as demands of the Kurds, one states that the solution of the 
Kurdish question in Syria can be achieved through “the implementation of a just and 
democratic solution to the Kurdish question by recognizing in the constitution that the 
Kurds are an integral part of the Syrian people and by guaranteeing their national 
rights.”20 
The same document also puts forward the position of the Kurds towards the 
broader minorities question in Syria, seeking “the protection and guarantee of the cultural 
rights of ethnic and religious minorities in Syria.”21   
On June 11, 2012, a joint session of the Kurdish National Council and the 
People’s Council of West Kurdistan, the two main Kurdish opposition groups in Syria, 
took place in Erbil, Iraq. The meeting led to the signing of a cooperation agreement on 
July 12, 2012, the Erbil Accords, which created the Kurdish Supreme Committee as a 
governing body of all Kurdish-controlled territories in Syria. The goal of the Committee 
was explained as follows: 
. . . work towards the overthrow of the dictatorship in Damascus, the 
construction of a democratic, pluralistic state, and the creation of a new 
Syria with many ethnicities. This new Syria will satisfy the aspirations of 
                                                      
19 KurdWatch (December 2011). “Who is the Syrian Kurdish Opposition? The Development of Kurdish 
Parties, 1956-2011,” Report 8, 13-15. 
 
20 KurdWatch Newsletter, May 23, 2011. http://www.kurdwatch.org/newsletter/newsletter_en_230511.html 
(Accessed February 12, 2012). 
 
21 Ibid. 
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our people by recognizing its existence as an original people in the 
constitution. The Kurdish question must be solved democratically.22 
 
As the Syrian Kurds buried their internal differences and gained control of several 
towns in northern Syria, the idea of decentralized rule as the most appropriate solution for 
the future of minorities in a post-Assad era became increasingly called for by the Kurdish 
leaders. This situation, combined with the ongoing conflict between the KRG and the 
central Iraqi government, has led to much speculation that the birth of an independent 
Kurdish state might be at hand.  
Salih Muslim Muhammad, the leader of the most powerful Kurdish party in Syria, 
the Democratic Union Party (PYD), made the Kurdish position in Syria’s revolution clear 
in a statement dated July 25, 2012: 
We do not follow any separatist policies. We have no demand for 
independence. We want our demands to be fulfilled in the context of 
democratic rights and territorial integrity of Syria. We have been working 
on a project for four years which is based on the constitutional recognition 
of the Kurdish nation, and acknowledgement of their national rights such 
as education in mother tongue.  We call this democratic autonomy. This 
project is not only for the Kurds but may be applied to all the other regions 
in Syria in case there is a consensus.23  
 
After the joint session in Erbil, Shelal Keddo, a member of the Kurdish National 
Council, issued a statement declaring that federalism is the most viable and convenient 
solution for the Syrian issue in general and the Kurdish issue in particular: 
Federalism could be considered a guarantee for the unity of Syrian land 
and preservation of the rights of each component of the Syrian 
                                                      
22 Meeting Minutes of the Erbil Agreement, http://www.kurdwatch.org/pdf/KurdWatch_D027_en_ar.pdf 
(Accessed September 16, 2012). 
23 “PKK ile organik değil ideolojik bağ var” (“There is an ideological, rather than an organic bond, with the 
PKK”), BBC Turkish’s Interview with the PYD leader Salih Muslim Muhammad. May 27, 2012. 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1095199&CategoryID=81 
(Accessed September 22, 2012). 
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community. As it has been successfully achieved in many countries 
around the world, we should take the idea of federalism for Syria into 
consideration and study it seriously, and try to look into the possibilities of 
achieving it in order to prevent any potential civil war in the country after 
the collapse of the current tyrannical regime.24 
 
Until today, the only major Kurdish organization that openly adopted the 
discourse of independent statehood with the goal of establishing a united Kurdish state as 
part of its official program is the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has carried out 
armed struggle mainly in the southeastern Turkey since the late 1970s. Nevertheless, the 
PKK abandoned its objective of establishing an independent united Kurdish state by the 
early 1990s, and engaged in a comprehensive reorganization of its entire program 
throughout the 2000s, on the basis of democratic transformation in Turkey as the ultimate 
solution to the Kurdish question.  
Since the capture, in 1999, of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, the discussion on 
the future of the Kurdish question in Turkey has shifted towards an alleged radical break 
in the PKK’s objectives. The conventional view in the literature is that the PKK began to 
disintegrate and lost its way after the capture of Öcalan and gave up the ideal of an 
independent united Kurdistan.25 However, the political-ideological change PKK has 
undergone since the early 1990s was, in fact, more complex than a simple tactical retreat, 
and it has received very little recognition in the literature thus far. This situation played a 
significant role in the continuation of the “separatist” taboo surrounding the Kurdish 
                                                      
24 “Kurds See Federalism as Best Solution for Syria,” Rudaw, August 17, 2012. 
25 Özcan (2006), for example, concludes that the PKK gave up the struggle for an independent Kurdistan 
after Öcalan’s arrest. Likewise, Eccarius-Kelly (2011) explains the PKK’s turn to democratic demands 
primarily by referring to Öcalan’s capture in 1999. However, both the PKK dissidents and Öcalan himself 
have argued for a negotiated settlement of the Kurdish question in Turkey long before the arrest of Öcalan 
in 1999 (Beşikci 1992; Güneş 2012). 
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question in Turkey and the persistent dominance of security-oriented policymaking 
within the state. 
Öcalan refers to the “nation-state” mainly as an outdated model, and he sets forth 
an in-depth critique of the concept of state by arguing that liberation cannot be achieved 
by means of state-building, but rather by the deepening of democracy. In his defense 
texts, he particularly aims to disassociate democracy from nationalism, and independence 
from statehood, and he criticizes the national condition of modernity as exclusive and 
intolerant. Within this framework, Öcalan concludes the nation-state concept itself is 
antagonistic and destructive to the liberation of peoples, be they Kurdish or otherwise. He 
envisions a “democratic confederalism” in which numerous “self-governing bodies 
throughout Kurdistan” (all the territories where the Kurds live) operate through the 
autonomy of the citizens of local communities rather than state authorities.26 In that 
sense, he considers democratic confederalism not only a mechanism for the unification of 
Kurdistan and the Kurds, but also a model for the resolution of Middle East’s problems 
originating from ethnic and religious differences.  
The Kurdish experience in Iran, although it usually appears weaker than its 
counterparts in either Iraq or Turkey, is blessed with the fact that it was in Iran the first 
and only (to this date) independent Kurdish Republic, Mahabad, existed from 1945 to 
1946. According to Nader Entessar, The Republic of Mahabad still stands as a beacon of 
light for Kurdish movements throughout the region.27 In September 1945, the Kurdistan 
                                                      
26 Öcalan, Abdullah (2008). War and Peace in Kurdistan, Cologne: International Initiative Freedom for 
Öcalan – Peace in Kurdistan, 32. 
27 Entessar, Nader (1992). Kurdish Ethnonationalism, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 23. 
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Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) was established, replacing the Kurdish nationalist 
organization Komala that had been active since 1942. Two months after its formation, the 
KDPI issued a statement specifying its program of policies, and calling for “the Kurds to 
be free and independent in the management of their local affairs and to receive Kurdish 
independence within the borders of Persia.”28 
Shortly after the establishment of KDPI, on January 22, 1946, the Republic of 
Mahabad was proclaimed. According to its Manifesto, some of the aims of the Republic 
were mentioned as “autonomy for the Iranian Kurds within the Iranian state; the use of 
Kurdish as the medium of education and administration; and the election of a provincial 
council for Kurdistan to supervise state and social matters.”29 Although the Republic of 
Mahabad was crushed by the central Iranian government in less than a year after its 
establishment, it is still considered as the first and only Kurdish republic in modern 
history and the most significant event in the imagination of all nationalist Kurds. 
Nevertheless, despite the Republic’s ambiguous posture between autonomy and 
independence as well as the explicit demands for the recognition of the Kurds’ cultural 
rights in Iran, the ultimate aims of the Kurdish Republic did not attract much scholarly 
attention. Instead of treating the Republic as a genuine effort by the Kurdish people to 
achieve their national rights within the framework of the Iranian state, the scholarly 
analyses that recount the history of the Kurdish Republic of 1946 explain it largely in 
                                                      
28 Koohi-Kamali, Farideh (2003), The Political Development of the Kurds in Iran, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 106. 
 
29 Entessar, 25. 
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terms of the power politics of the Cold War era and as an extension of Soviet 
expansionist policy in the Persian Gulf.30  
The KDPI continued to be the main vehicle of Kurdish political efforts in Iran in 
the following decades. The party mainly embraced the protection of the interests of the 
people of Kurdistan-Iran, and of all the national movements throughout Iran, as the main 
defining principle of its general course of action. Within this framework, autonomy for 
Kurdistan within a democratic Iran and the struggle for obtaining the national rights of all 
the oppressed peoples of Iran remained to be the party’s principal objective until 2004.31 
In the 13th congress of the party in July 2004, the previous platform of “democracy for 
Iran, autonomy for Kurdistan” was replaced by the proclamation of federalism for Iran 
and national rights for the Kurds and other nationalities.32   
An examination of the general goals of other prominent Kurdish parties in Iran 
does not indicate major programmatic differences. The Komala Party of Iranian 
Kurdistan places democracy as the main theme of its political agenda and identifies its 
mission as fighting for Kurdish rights, for a regime change in Iran, and for a democratic 
secular pluralist federal Iran.33 The Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), which is a 
                                                      
30 See Entessar (1992); Eagleton, William (1963). The Kurdish Republic of 1946, London: Oxford 
University Press; Koohi-Kamali, Farideh (2007) “The Kurdish Republic in Mahabad: Formation of a 
National Movement” in The Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism edited by Mohammed M. A. Ahmed, 
Michael Gunter, Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers. For a detailed theoretical and conceptual analysis of 
the formation and development of Kurdish nationalism in Iran from 1905 to 1947 see Vali, Abbas (2011). 
Kurds and the State in Iran: The Making of Kurdish Identity,  London & New York: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd.  
31 Ghassemlou, A. R. (1981). Report of The Central Committee to The Fifth Congress of The Kurdistan 
Democratic Party of Iran, Paris: PDKI, 28-29. 
32 KDPI Program and Internal Regulations Adopted in the 13th Congress, July 3-7, 2004.  
http://pdki.org/english/program-and-internal-regulation/ (Accessed October 2, 2012). 
33  Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Party Program. http://www.komala/org/english/sidor/2011/2011/ 
Introduction_eindex.htm (Accessed October 3, 2012). 
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relatively new party known for its active use of armed strategies since 2004, defines its 
goal as the establishment of a democratic organization of people as well as practice of the 
democratic values to achieve a radical type of democracy and to launch a democratic 
confederacy in eastern Kurdistan.34  
The Regional Context 
Besides the critical role the Kurdish movement plays in the domestic politics of 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, particularly regarding these countries’ paths towards 
meaningful democratization since the early 1990s, there has been also an emerging 
Kurdish dynamic at the regional level since the Gulf War of 1991. After the creation of 
an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq, the Kurdish question has become an 
increasingly important issue in Middle Eastern and international politics. The war to 
remove Saddam Hussein from power in 2003 furthered this discussion. More recently, 
the uprisings in the Arab world unexpectedly pushed the Kurds to the forefront of 
regional politics after the breakdown of authority in Syria, which generated an 
unprecedented degree of unity and transnational cooperation among the Kurdish political 
groups.  
Since the partition of Kurdistan in the aftermath of World War I, the aspirations 
of Kurdish people in one country have directly affected the aspirations and actions of the 
Kurdish populations across the borders. For several decades, the Kurds had to endure 
different socio-political circumstances and pressures in four different countries. However, 
despite the diverse political experiences and strategic trajectories followed by different 
                                                                                                                                                                 
  
34 Party of Free Life of Kurdistan, Party Program. http://pjak.org/eng/about.php (Accessed October 3, 
2012). 
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Kurdish groups in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, transnational politics have always been an 
integral part of Kurdish nationalism.  
Relations between Syria and Iraq worsened significantly in the 1980s when 
Damascus sided with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. Following that, the relations between 
the Kurdish parties, which were dominating northern Iraq, and the Syrian regime 
strengthened. The Syrian regime turned a blind eye to the recruitment of hundreds of 
Syrian Kurds to the ranks of peshmergas (Kurdish guerilla forces in Iraqi Kurdistan), 
mainly in Barzani’s KDP.35 After the establishment of KRG in 1992, the economic 
stranglehold of a double embargo and the political isolation of the Iraqi Kurds made 
contacts with Damascus even more crucial for the Iraqi Kurdish political groups. The 
KDP and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) kept offices in the Syrian 
capital and in Qamishli until 2003, which allowed them to secure outside contacts.36 
The tensions between Turkey and Syria derived from border disputes as well as 
conflicts over water supplies. Strained relations between the two countries pushed the 
Syrian regime to provide open support for the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey 
led by the PKK throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, lived in 
Syria for two decades until his arrest in 1999, and northern Syria became a major 
organizational ground for the PKK militants. Similar to the cross-border dynamics 
between the KDP, the PUK and the Kurds in Syria, considerable militant engagement by 
the Syrian Kurds in the ranks of the PKK also took place until the late 1990s.  
                                                      
35 Tejel, Jordi (2009). Syria’s Kurds: History, Politics, and Society, New York: Routledge, 72-73. 
36 Ibid. 74-75. 
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Despite interruptions by regional power struggles, notably the Iran-Iraq war, the 
Kurdish nationalist parties of Iran and Iraq have traditionally supported each other. 
Particularly after the establishment of the KRG, cross-border contacts between the 
Iranian and Iraqi Kurdish communities increased through political party representations. 
Since the 1990s, Iranian Kurdish nationalist parties such as the KDPI and Komala have 
established offices and communication networks in northern Iraq to advance their 
nationalist claims.37 This enabled the Iranian Kurdish groups to not only coordinate 
activities with their supporters inside Iran, but to also engage in activities such as issuing 
press releases, training militants, and sponsoring military campaigns, actions that would 
otherwise have been prohibited in Iran.38  
Similar to the literature on the relationship of the Kurdish movements to their 
respective central governments, the scholarly accounts of the transnational aspects of the 
Kurdish question also reflect the limits of adopting a structural/statist approach in 
explaining Kurdish political action at the regional level. Rather than providing an 
understanding of the strategies pursued by Kurdish political actors to gain leverage in the 
regional states, these accounts portray the Kurds as victims of regional power politics and 
essentially conclude that lack of political and cultural unity among the Kurds across 
borders made it easier for the host states to manipulate the Kurdish political groups 
according to their own domestic and regional interests. 
                                                      
37 Natali, 177. 
38 Ibid. 
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For example, Denise Natali argues that “asymmetrical transnational space39 has 
created greater complexity and diversification in Kurdish nationalist sentiment across 
borders. This diversification, alongside distinct historical trajectories that have emerged 
in conjunction with different states, limits the likelihood of a unified Kurdish nationalist 
project from emerging at the local, regional, or international level.”40 Likewise, Abbas 
Vali asserts that because of the diversity of the general political and cultural processes of 
denial and exclusion of Kurdish identity in their respective national territories, Kurdish 
national identity has been deeply fragmented since its inception.41 He argues that: 
. . . the transnational ethos of Kurdish nationalism has its structural 
limitations in the internal conditions and diverse development of Kurdish 
societies. These conditions have seriously debased the transnational 
character of Kurdish nationalism, effectively undermining its centripetal 
tendencies . . . .  Deprived of its structural, political and cultural unity, it is 
reduced to local autonomist movements riven with parochial interests and 
clientelist relations.42 
 
. . . when they are patronized, maintained and used in cross-border politics 
by neighboring sovereign states against their own fragmented self, as is 
often the case in the region; the autonomist movements seriously obscure 
the political and cultural boundaries separating ethnic and national 
identities.43 
 
                                                      
39 Natali explains transnational space as the externally based opportunity structures such as diasporic 
networks, international nongovernmental organizations, host-country democratic systems, and advanced 
telecommunication system that provide new forms of support or constraints to Kurdish nationalist projects. 
By “asymmetrical transnational space” she refers to the uneven consequences of these processes for 
different Kurdish nationalist projects in different countries. She concludes that due to the asymmetrical 
nature of the transnational space, while Iraqi Kurds have gained a monopoly on Kurdish autonomy, their 
counterparts in Turkey and Iran have barely acquired political rights (Natali, 160-161). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Vali, Abbas (1998). “The Kurds and Their ‘Others’: Fragmented Identity and Fragmented Politics”, 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 18 (2): 82. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 82-83. 
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Although they principally recognized the cross-border character of the Kurdish 
question, these scholarly accounts primarily take the fragmentation of Kurdish society as 
their point of departure and conclude that the transnational space works “against” rather 
than “in favor” of the consolidation of Kurdish nationalist movement and leads to further 
diversification among the Kurdish political groups. Vali and Natali’s discussion on the 
diverse development of Kurdish societies draws attention to the linguistic, religious, and 
tribal divisions among the Kurds that were deepened by the fragmentation of the Kurdish 
national movement after the post-World War I partition of Kurdistan. Nevertheless, while 
they focus on the Kurds’ religious, tribal and linguistic differences and the distinct 
internal political conditions they had to face, these accounts do not take into 
consideration how the Kurds contest these local differences through the political 
discourses they develop both at the domestic and regional level. Since the 1990s, and 
particularly after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 2003, trans-border 
activities increasingly brought the Kurdish groups’ political consciousness together 
around the overarching discourse of human rights, democracy and political 
decentralization. This common democratic discourse not only transcends the tribal, 
linguistic and religious divisions, but also creates a unified Kurdish political dynamic on 
a regional level that continues to develop alongside the separate Kurdish nationalist 
projects in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.  
In order to explain this discursive convergence among the separate Kurdish 
movements, one needs to move beyond a structural/statist approach to Kurdish 
nationalism. The argument that Kurdish movements in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria 
followed distinct historical trajectories and were shaped by diverse processes of exclusion 
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and denial contains much truth. Nonetheless, it falls short of shedding light on how the 
collective Kurdish entity is defined by the Kurdish political actors themselves and 
incorporated into the domestic as well as cross-border political engagements by the 
Kurdish groups in the contemporary period. Although the exact sense of “imagined 
community” could differ from one Kurdish community to another, it has been the 
common notion of membership rather a common understanding of what membership 
means that has throughout the history of Kurdish resistance, played an important role in 
sustaining the broader Kurdish movement, which encompasses Kurdish activists from 
multiple countries in the context of a complex transnational network.  
The Syrian government’s policy of providing Kurdish groups fighting against 
Turkey and Iraq with relative freedom of action from the 1970s onwards originated 
mainly from the regional ambitions of the Assad regime, which aimed to push its own 
Kurdish problem on to its neighbors. Accordingly, the PKK, KDP and PUK were allowed 
to pursue activities in Syria only on the condition they would keep the Syrian Kurdish 
movement under control. However, Hafiz Assad gradually lost control of his own game 
as a result of the strengthening of the Kurdish identity and Kurdish nationalist sentiments 
among the Syrian Kurds who were affected by the cultural and political activities of the 
PKK, KDP and PUK in Syria. This situation paved the way for the Syrian Kurds to 
eventually break out of their muted existence in the 1990s, and laid the foundation for the 
emergence of the Kurdish movement as an important political oppositional force in Syria 
by the early 2000s. This increasing political consciousness and organizational 
development among the Syrian Kurds from the 1990s onwards played a significant role 
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in the swift organization of the Syrian Kurdish parties as a separate oppositional bloc 
during the Syrian uprising of 2011. 
By the 1990s, transnational relationships among the Kurds also developed 
considerably as a result of the escalation of the PKK’s activities in the region. As the 
traditional Iranian Kurdish political parties were mostly absent from Iranian Kurdistan, 
many Kurdish activists saw the PKK as an organization that could express their 
nationalist and revolutionary aspirations.44 After the arrest of Öcalan in February 1999, 
Kurdish demonstrators in Sanandaj, Mahabad and Urmiya took to the streets and staged 
mass protests against the Islamic regime in support of Öcalan.  After the structural and 
ideological changes it experienced in the aftermath of Öcalan’s capture, the PKK shifted 
its activities to include Iran and Syria by establishing independent political parties in 
these countries. The PJAK, which was established in 2004, soon attracted attention and 
showed considerable potential for organizing social and cultural activities and also for 
carrying out armed struggle against the Islamic regime.45 Likewise, the PYD, which was 
founded in Syria in 2003, strengthened its position as the successor of the PKK whose 
sphere of influence among the Syrian Kurds diminished after Damascus handed over 
Öcalan. Although the leaders of both PJAK and PYD emphasized on numerous occasions 
that they are distinct parties and have no organic ties to the PKK, both parties 
acknowledge they share the same leadership, membership and ideological orientation 
with the PKK.  
                                                      
44 Ahmadzadeh, Hashem (2010). “Kurdish Political Mobilization in Iran” in The Kurdish Policy Imperative 
edited by Robert Lowe and Gareth Stansfield, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 189. 
45 Ibid. 189-190. 
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There is no doubt the establishment of the KRG in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1992 
increased the regional significance of the Kurdish question and inspired Kurds in other 
parts of Kurdistan in their search for autonomy and cultural rights. Given its concern for 
establishing working relationships with its neighbors, the KRG principally followed a 
cautious attitude towards the Kurdish militant groups fighting against the Turkish and 
Iranian governments. Although the KRG has been careful to distance itself from the PKK 
and PJAK in order not to antagonize Turkey and Iran, Iraqi Kurdistan continued to be a 
safe haven for various Kurdish groups including the Iranian Komala and KDPI.  
Despite constant pressure from both Turkey and Iran to crackdown on the Kurdish 
groups operating in northern Iraq, the KRG traditionally avoided armed confrontation 
with these groups mainly because of the massive support base these groups have among 
the Iraqi Kurds. The regional government in northern Iraq was fragile and facing an 
uncertain future in the early 1990s, which was exacerbated by disastrous episodes of civil 
war between the KDP and PUK in the mid-1990s. Nonetheless, since the end of internal 
fighting in 1997, and particularly after the constitutional recognition of the KRG in 2005, 
both the KDP and PUK became more consistent in their statements about their support 
for a political solution to their neighbors’ respective Kurdish problems and declared the 
regional government would not participate in military solutions. 
While the academic discussions on the growing significance and legitimacy of 
Kurdish nationalism increased considerably after the Gulf wars of 1991 and 2003, these 
discussions led to the emergence of a perspective that reduces the regional dimension of 
the Kurdish question to the study of the autonomous status of the Iraqi Kurds and the 
politics of the KRG. Since the early 1990s, such a stance created a tendency to assign a 
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primary status to Iraqi Kurdistan in order to explain the course of events of the Kurdish 
movements in Turkey, Iran and Syria and the cross-border character of the Kurdish issue.  
Ofra Bengio states that: 
. . . the traditionally marginalized Kurds of Syria have found new energy 
in the cauldron of the Syrian uprising and are now demanding a federal 
system in which they would gain significant autonomy in a post-Assad 
Syria. The extremely restive Kurds of Turkey are pressing for what they 
call democratic autonomy. The Kurds of Iran, typically unremarked upon 
in the media, are stirring beneath their blanket of obscurity. But most 
important of all these are the Kurds of Iraq. Iraq was the epicenter of the 
Kurds’ great leap forward in the early 1990s: the establishment of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which is a euphemism for a de 
facto Kurdish state. It is to the KRG experience that Iranian, Syrian and 
Turkish Kurds increasingly look for lessons and guidance, and rightly so.46 
 
In a similar vein, Jordi Tejel argues that: 
 
The acceptance in the constitution in 2005 of federalism as the new Iraqi 
state’s system of organization only served to strengthen the centrality of 
the Iraqi Kurds, both in Iraq and in the Kurdish arena in the Middle East. 
Almost immediately, demands for administrative autonomy following the 
Iraqi model were made with varying degrees of intensity in Turkey, Iran, 
and even Syria, confirming the cross-border character of the Kurdish 
issue.47 
 
It is true that the Kurdish autonomy in Iraq has become a major inspiration for 
Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan mainly because of the fact that the autonomy of the 
KRG has survived longer and been more meaningful than any other Kurdish autonomous 
experiment in recent history.48 However, it would be a misleading approach to consider 
this fact as grounds for assigning centrality to the Iraqi Kurds in analyzing the broader 
                                                      
46 Bengio, Ofra (November/December 2012). “Will the Kurds Get Their Way?,” The American Interest. 
47 Tejel. 80. 
48 Bengio, Ofra (2005). “Autonomy in Kurdistan in Historical Perspective” in The Future of Kurdistan in 
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Kurdish phenomenon in the Middle East or to consider the Kurdish demands in Turkey, 
Iran and Syria as originating directly from the politics of the KRG. The growing 
international legitimacy enjoyed by Iraqi Kurdistan gave greater voice to the Kurdish 
cause in the international arena. Nevertheless, this situation also created an opportunity 
for the regional states to disregard their respective Kurdish problems by pursuing a policy 
of identifying the regional dimension of the Kurdish question solely with the 
developments concerning the status of Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey, Iran, and Syria sought 
military and political support from the KRG for their policies towards the Kurdish 
movements within their own borders in exchange for granting recognition to the 
autonomous status of Iraqi Kurdistan. In other words, for Turkey, Iran and Syria, 
conducting diplomacy with the Iraqi Kurds emerged as a useful political strategy to 
increase their control over their respective Kurdish movements.  
As rarely recognized in the literature, the demands for autonomy and cultural 
rights have been on the agenda of the Kurdish movement in Turkey since the early 1990s. 
The demand for democratic autonomy was officially declared for the first time in July 
2011, and developed as a consequence of a complex ideological, strategic and 
organizational transformation of the Kurdish movement in Turkey that took place over 
the past two decades. Autonomy for Kurdistan within a democratic Iran, on the other 
hand, has been the core political concept of the Kurdish movement in Iran since the 
1970s. Even the experience of the Mahabad Republic of 1946, which is often viewed as 
the symbol of Kurdish independence in the 20th century, was in fact informed by a 
specific reading of the Iranian Constitution, which emphasizes political pluralism, 
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decentralization of power, provincial and local administrative and cultural autonomy, and 
respect for religious and ethnic differences.49  
The revival of the Kurdish movement in Syria was affected largely by the Kurdish 
experience in Iraq. According to one Syrian Kurdish political figure, the overthrow in 
2003 of Saddam Hussein liberated the Syrian Kurds from a culture of fear and created a 
strong motivation for changing the status of the Kurds in Syria.50 However, it is often 
overlooked that besides the impact of the achievements of the Iraqi Kurds on the Kurds in 
Syria, there has also been a significant influence of the Kurdish movement in Turkey on 
the Syrian Kurds, particularly in ideological and organizational terms. Especially since 
the beginning of the Syrian uprising in March 2011, most of the popular representations 
of the events in Syrian Kurdish politics in media and scholarly accounts adopted a 
tendency to portray the situation as a battleground between the pro-PKK PYD and the 
pro-KRG Kurdish National Council.51 These accounts principally serve the goal of 
reinforcing the status of the KRG as the central force in Kurdish regional politics while 
marginalizing the influence of the PKK. Whereas, the Kurdish efforts to act as a united 
front in Syria and the KRG’s mediating role, which included negotiations with the PYD 
at the risk of antagonizing Turkey, have received relatively little attention. 
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The actions of the major Kurdish political actors in the Middle East, particularly 
the PKK, KDP and PUK, have been mostly evaluated from the perspective of the 
regional power struggles and the political ambitions of the states and international powers 
that affected the evolution of the Kurdish question. In this context, Kurds are often 
viewed as victims of changing power relationships among the regional states as well as 
the status-quo oriented approach of the international powers towards regional matters. 
Notwithstanding the significance of these factors in shaping the Kurdish politics in the 
Middle East, another crucial determinant of the regional dimension of the Kurdish 
question has been the diplomatic capacity of the Kurdish political groups themselves. 
These groups observe and review these regional power relations and position themselves 
as non-state actors vis-à-vis the regional, as well as international, actors in order to 
strengthen their political leverage and negotiating power. In this respect, incorporation of 
the “Kurdish viewpoint” into the regional debate on the Kurdish issue is another task that 
the present study undertakes.  
Methodology 
The present work is based on extensive archival research that incorporates a wide 
variety of primary and secondary sources. The sources were collected during a six-month 
period from multiple sites in Turkey, Iraq, parts of Europe and the United States. The 
written sources include Turkish, Kurdish and English language newspapers and 
periodicals; political party programs; parliamentary debates; newsletters published by 
various non-governmental organizations; human rights reports; municipal reports; policy 
papers published by think tanks; speeches and statements; election data; and personal 
memoirs. The documents were gathered from the National Library and Parliamentary 
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Library (Ankara, Turkey); the Kurdistan Parliament (Erbil, Iraq); the political party 
offices of Peace and Democracy Party (Istanbul, Turkey), Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(Erbil, Iraq), Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Sulaymaniah, Iraq), the Goran Movement 
(Sulaymaniah, Iraq), Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (Erbil, Iraq), Kurdistan Islamic 
Union (Erbil, Iraq); Bilkent University Library (Ankara, Turkey) and Salahaddin 
University Library (Erbil, Iraq); Kurdish Human Rights Watch (Erbil, Iraq); the Kurdish 
Human Rights Project (London, UK); the Kurdish Institute of Paris (Paris, France); 
Kurdistan Regional Government – Representation in the USA (Washington D.C., the 
US); internet web sites; and individuals.  
Throughout the field work, I supplemented these written sources with in-depth 
interviews conducted with members of Parliament; party leaders; pro-Kurdish majors, 
journalists and lawyers; activists from human rights organizations; and representatives of 
think tanks and civil society organizations working in the field of Kurdish rights. I was 
not able to travel to Iran and Syria to collect archival data because of time constraints and 
personal safety concerns. To compensate for this deficiency, I conducted interviews with 
the leaders of the Syrian Kurdish opposition parties and the Democratic Party of Iranian 
Kurdistan in Erbil, Iraq,52 in order to gain first-hand information about the recent 
developments concerning the Kurdish movements in Iran and Syria.  
All interviews were done face-to-face, directly by me in Turkish, English and 
Kurdish (with a translator available). The interviews were conducted to fill gaps in the 
existing literature, which predominantly views the Kurdish issue as a question of 
                                                      
52 Since the beginning of the uprising in Syria, most of the Syrian Kurdish opposition parties are operating 
from northern Iraq. The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan is outlawed in Iran. Its headquarters is 
located in Erbil, Iraq. 
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statelessness and a case of reactive nationalism rather than a problem of democracy. In 
my attempt to depart from structural explanations that trace the evolutionary trajectory of 
the Kurds’ history as one of victimization, suppression and denial, I seek to uncover the 
aspects of the Kurdish movement that transformed it into a powerful force for social and 
political change. Within this framework, the present study focuses primarily on the 
reasons behind the articulation of Kurdish demands within the scope of a wider 
democratic movement for change, how these demands are communicated to the state and 
the society in general, and what role this process plays in the transformation of both 
Kurdish identity and political goals, and the established notions of democracy, 
governance and citizenship within the Kurds’ respective polities.   
Why I chose the political elite as my target group instead of the non-elite is 
related directly to my research question and methodology. The main questions my 
research seeks to answer relate to the transformation of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq and Syria and the diverse ways through which this process shapes Kurdish 
identity and national demands as well as domestic and regional politics in the Middle 
East. I draw mainly on a critical analysis of the modernist school of nationalism and the 
discourse analysis framework that is based on the underlying premise that “our ways of 
talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations but, rather play an 
active role in creating and changing them.”53 In the field of politics, the discourse 
analysis framework becomes particularly relevant given that engaging in politics often 
involves engaging in discursive practices. In this regard, political discourse can be briefly 
                                                      
53 Phillips, Louise, Jørgensen, Marianna W. (2002). Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, London: 
Sage Publications, 1. 
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defined as the text and talk of politicians and political institutions that are the principal 
actors of political discourse.  
Despite their crucial position in political science as the main actors of political 
discourse and political practices, politicians and political institutions are not the only 
participants in the domain of politics. Whether or not they actively engage in discursive 
practices, the non-elite, the “masses” are also involved in political discourse as the 
primary recipients of the political communicative events. However, given my research 
question, which seeks to provide an understanding of a particular discursive articulation 
of Kurdish political goals – the democratic discourse, the practices of the major political 
entrepreneurs in the movement (politicians, opposition groups, rights-based 
organizations, journalists, lawyers, activists, etc.) are given methodological priority.  
Rogers Brubaker draws attention to the methodological drawbacks of what he 
calls “groupism” in the study of the ethnicity, race and nationhood, and in the study of 
ethnic, racial and national conflict in particular.54 He speaks of the tendency to treat 
ethnic groups, nations and races – Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Jews, Blacks, Hispanics and 
Kurds, for example – as if they are internally homogeneous, even unitary collective 
actors with a common purpose. In order to go beyond groupism, Brubaker suggests, 
“ethnicity, race and nation should be thought not in terms of substantial groups or 
entities, but in terms of practical categories, discursive frames, organizational routines, 
institutional forms, political projects and contingent events.”55 In this respect, he 
suggests: 
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55 Ibid. 167. 
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Although participants’ rhetoric and common sense accounts treat ethnic 
groups as the protagonists of ethnic conflict, in fact the chief protagonists 
of most ethnic conflict are not ethnic groups as such but various kinds of 
organizations, broadly understood and their empowered and authorized 
incumbents. These include states, their organizational components, law 
enforcement agencies, armed forces units, political parties, ethnic 
associations, social movement organizations, churches, newspapers, radio 
and television stations and so on.56 
 
As it is with every society, Kurds are also diverse people in terms of their political 
preferences. Therefore, the debate over whether the pro-Kurdish parties and organizations 
represent all the ethnic Kurds57 is not directly relevant to the current study, which seeks 
to explain primarily the articulation of Kurdish nationalism beyond the narrowly scoped 
framework of ethnic nationalism. In this respect, rather than the question of “what is 
Kurdish nationalism,” the current study endeavors to answer the question of “how and 
with what consequences is Kurdish nationalism institutionalized and constituted as a 
political and cultural form informed by the discourse of democracy.” This approach 
opens up a large space for the consideration of human agency.  
Discourse analysts, such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, submit that all 
forms of identity are contingent and constructed within political discourse.58 They depart 
from the idea that discourse constructs the social world in meanings that can never be 
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permanently fixed. The overall idea of the Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is that 
social phenomena are never finished or complete, which opens up the way for constant 
social struggles about definitions of society and identity, with resulting social effects.59 
Likewise, Brubaker and Craig Calhoun, treat nationalism mainly as a form of 
“discourse” that comes into being as the conscious creation of a body of people.60 Instead 
of adopting a conventional developmental treatment of nations, Brubaker and Calhoun 
focus more on the temporality of nationalism and the contingent nature of nationness. 
Emphasizing the active participation of people in creating and making sense of 
nationalism, they explain the nation as an entity that is created and sustained by active 
engagement of a relevant body of people into processes of thought and interchange.  
Calhoun proposes we treat nationalism first as a discursive formation, which 
means it should be examined as a way of thinking and comprehending the world.61 He 
contends the system of nations is basic to our mental picture of the contemporary world 
and political practice. This picture is reproduced through words and images as well as 
through maps, systems of communication and other cultural and political practices, which 
depict the world as compartmentalized into discrete nations with well-defined 
boundaries. Calhoun sees it as a useless effort to explain nationalism by a single 
explanatory variable such as state building, industrialization, unequal economic 
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development or resentment. What is important for him is only the discourse of 
nationalism.62  
Brubaker rejects the understanding of nations as enduring collectivities and 
emphasizes instead the necessity of determining how the nation is constituted in various 
times and places, often via competing discourses of the same nation. According to 
Brubaker, explaining the process through which a particular discursive articulation of the 
nation becomes momentarily, yet powerfully realized in practice should be central to the 
work of the analysts of nationalism.63  
Academic discussions on the Kurds are often interested in historical-sociological 
explanations about the rise and development of Kurdish nationalism.64 These studies 
focus mainly on the development of Kurdish nationalism in the 20th century as an ethnic 
stateless reaction against the official state nationalisms of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. 
Although they discuss in detail the social, economic and political conditions that gave 
rise to the politicization of Kurdish identity and the struggle between the Kurds and their 
respective governments, these analyses remained largely reliant on a single explanatory 
variable – coercive state policies – while accounting for the evolution of Kurdish 
nationalism. In that sense, how and why these processes were interpreted as “oppression” 
and “assimilation” by the Kurds themselves and implicated in their conceptions of 
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democracy, national identity, citizenship and governance did not attract much scholarly 
attention. 
Instead of taking a developmental stance, the present study elaborates on the 
dialectical relationship between the competing political discourses raised by the Kurds 
and their states, and discusses how the democratic discourse of the Kurds becomes 
institutionalized and challenges the official state discourses on democracy and 
governance both at the domestic and regional levels.  
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF KURDISH NATIONALISM  
 
Considering how the broader goals of democratization, decentralized rule and 
achievement of cultural rights were incorporated into the Kurdish nationalist agenda over 
the past two decades, the question of why the discourse of independent statehood 
continues to be prominent in the academic as well as policy-oriented analyses of the 
Kurdish question is intriguing. The fact the Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the 
world living in a geographically compact area with no nation-state of their own has been 
viewed as problematic in the context of a modern world system defined by sovereign 
nation-states. Most studies on the modern history of the Kurds examine the struggle 
between the Kurds and their central governments with a particular focus on the 
oppression of the Kurds as victims of assimilationist policies, and the resultant failure of 
the Kurdish desire for an independent state. Nevertheless, the Kurdish nationalist 
demands no longer fit this narrative given the proactive nature of the Kurdish movement, 
which has been gradually unfolding since the 1990s, as well as the shifting discourse of 
Kurdish nationalism towards an emphasis on democratization under the existing state 
framework of the Middle East. In this respect, it is imperative to revisit those analyses 
about the Kurdish question that are driven by a particular theoretical stance, which puts 
the concept of nationalism exclusively in a state-centric framework. 
There has been a remarkable increase in the volume of the academic writing on 
nationalism, particularly since the end of the Cold War because of the proliferation of 
ethnic conflicts in many parts of the world. Despite the lack of a scholarly agreement on 
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how to define the concepts of nation and nationalism, there has been a growing consensus 
that nationalism as an ideology and movement is a modern phenomenon that emerged 
and developed as a result of the major socio-economic processes of modernity such as 
industrialization, capitalism and the rise of the modern state.  
Though Elie Kedourie’s Nationalism (1960) stimulated some discussion in the 
beginning of the 1960s, Ernest Gellner’s essay on nationalism in Thought and Change 
(1964) is recognized by many as the mark of the real beginning of the modern study of 
nationalism. In the 1970s, the sequential work of Anthony D. Smith (1971, 1976, 1979) 
not only made a substantial contribution to the conceptual development of nationalism as 
a social phenomenon, but also laid the groundwork for the core debate within the field: 
the divide between ethnicists and modernists. By the 1980s, the body of writing on 
nationalism flourished further through the works of John Alexander Armstrong (1982), 
Benedict Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983), Anthony D. Smith (1983, 1986) which were 
followed by the works of Eric Hobsbawm (1990), Walker Connor (1993), and John 
Breuilly (1994) during the 1990s. This large body of work produced from the 1970s 
onwards generally investigates when and how nationalism developed and why it has 
remained so significant. 
Modernists and ethnicists differ mainly over the “when” and “how” of 
nationalism. Although scholars of both camps agree nationalism is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, dating from the late eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries, significant 
differences of opinion arise over the issue of whether the roots of nationalism can be 
traced back to previous eras. Ethnicists challenge the modernist view primarily on the 
grounds that while nations may be modern, their origins are not, and that the origins of 
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nations can be traced back to earlier periods.65 In this regard, the arguments of the 
ethnicists have important implications for understanding the role played by ethnic 
identity and shared cultural traits in the emergence of ethnic nationalist challenges to 
state authority. The modernist view, on the other hand, contributes greatly to the 
understanding of how shared characteristics become politically activated and give way to 
nationally conscious polities through its focus on the economic and political changes 
caused by the process of modernity. 
The theoretical divide between the modernists and ethnicists is often overstated. 
What unites both camps is their emphasis on the territoriality of the nation and the link 
between the rise of national consciousness and the constitution of independent political 
entities in the form of states in the modern era. Despite their lack of a specific 
engagement with the relationship between state and nation, ethnicists acknowledge that, 
under the right stimulus, groups sharing distinctive religious, linguistic, or racial 
characteristics will arrive at a corresponding group consciousness, a consciousness that 
typically manifests itself in the nationalist desire for a state belonging to the group in 
question.66 Modernists, however, consider the cultural aspects of nationalism only as a 
means to accomplish political goals defined primarily in terms of achieving statehood.   
Modernists vs. Ethnicists: A False Dichotomy? 
The modernist stance emphasizes the state in addressing the national question. 
Achievement of statehood is seen as vital for the survival and maintenance of the nation. 
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The modernists’ main model, nation building, credits the existence of nations largely to 
the deliberate, rational agency of elites promoting collective or individual interests. As 
modernization disrupts traditional ties and means of subsistence, the nation serves to 
mobilize the commitment and sacrifice necessary for socioeconomic development. As a 
territorially sovereign political community featuring a culture of mass civic participation, 
the nation subordinates all other allegiances of its members (gender, family, class, etc.) to 
national consciousness. It constitutes the sole medium for development and social 
redistribution and serves as the main actor in the international arena. 
Gellner submits that nationalism is a sociologically contingent phenomenon that 
possesses time- and context-bound roots.67 He argues that nations and nationalism are 
sociologically necessary in modern, industrial societies where the intimate structures of 
traditional society erode.68 Industrialization brings about a basic convergence towards 
certain essential technical and occupational norms, and thus requires a homogeneous 
culture with mass literacy, standardized knowledge and context-free communication. 
Such a culture, according to Gellner, is possible only through a state-sponsored mass, 
public education system. National identity constitutes the identification with such a 
culture, and nations are its expression. In a characteristically modernist outlook, Gellner 
states that nations are not cultures waiting to be awakened, but products of nationalism, a 
functional movement inherent in and necessary for modernity. In this respect, he views 
nationalism as a political principle that primarily refers to the congruence between the 
political and the national unit.  
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In the same vein, Eric Hobsbawm explains nationalism as a political project 
aimed mainly at statehood. He sees nations primarily as the products of nationalism and 
affirms that nation, as a social entity, belongs exclusively to a particular, historically 
recent period.69 For Hobsbawm, nation becomes the perfect means for a new socio-
cultural integration of modern societies and for creating the cohesion and stability 
necessary in such a society.70 In this respect, nationalism becomes politically significant 
principally due to its state-making and economy-forming power. To control rapid social 
change and the mass influx of enfranchised citizens, state capitalist elites resort to the 
construction of emotionally and symbolically charged signs of group memberships. 
These symbolic, ritualistic practices, which Hobsbawm calls “invented traditions,” 
provide the inculcation of values and norms of behavior. Therefore, according to 
Hobsbawm, it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except in so far as they relate 
to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the nation-state.71  
Anthony Giddens and John Breuilly demonstrate a more distinctive approach to 
state-oriented nationalism by endorsing the view that nations and nationalism are mainly 
the properties of the modern states. Giddens defines the nation as “a collectivity existing 
within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to a unitary administration, 
reflexively monitored both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states.”72 
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However, rather than nationalism per se, it is the nation-state in its unique administrative, 
military and territorial properties that commands Giddens’ attention.73 He accords 
nationalism a sociological significance only insofar as it is linked to the state. It is the 
state’s centralization and administrative expansion that distinguishes the nation-state 
from other polities and nationalism from other group identities.  
Breuilly also sees nationalism as a political movement defined mainly by its 
relationship with the state and/or goal for statehood. For him, nationalism is 
inconceivable without the state and vice versa, and the central nationalist goal is 
autonomy (usually meaning establishment of a sovereign state in the national territory) 
justified in the name of the “nation”.74 Nationalist arguments, according to Breuilly, are 
used to justify the quest for state power, and this is why theorists must focus on the 
movement’s political aspect. Breuilly especially opposes the notion that pre-modern 
ethnic identity necessarily has any bearing on modern nationalism. He criticized 
ethnicists on the grounds they exaggerate and distort the occasional use of terms 
concerning nationality in pre-modern states and they insufficiently appreciate that 
“ethnicity” is material used, indeed, often invented by modern nationalism rather than 
one of its essential conditions.75  
The proponents of the ethnicist view do not deny the argument that both nations 
and nationalism are, by and large, post-eighteenth century phenomena. Nevertheless, they 
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object to the modernists’ tendency to assume a sharp break between modernity and 
previous eras, which, according to ethnicists, leads to the neglect of the complex interplay 
between the modern nations and the collectivities that predated them. Ethnicists argue the 
modernizing processes such as industrialization, capitalism and the rise of the modern 
state may convert the ethnic cultures into national cultures, but cannot “invent” them. 
Although they do not have a particular tendency to conflate the nation with the state, 
ethnicists do share the modernists’ state-centric understanding of nationalism by 
emphasizing the relationship between the rise of ethno-nationalist consciousness and the 
establishment of independent political units in the modern era.  
Anthony Smith, who is a pioneering figure in the study of nationalism, argues that 
most nations, including the earliest, were based on ethnic ties and sentiments and on 
popular ethnic traditions, which have provided the cultural resources for later nation-
formation.76 Smith acknowledges nations are modern forms of community, yet he insists 
that nations and nationalism draw sustenance from a “living,” pre-modern ethnic past 
with ties to earlier ethnic communities (which Smith terms as ethnie), to their symbols, 
and to the memories of their values and exploits.77 He contends that although nations and 
nationalism are modern, a historic ethnic foundation is necessary for their survival and it 
is the ethnie that provides that foundation. 
Smith disputes the link that modernists highlight between the modern industrial 
era and the rise of nationalism, and argues that modern forces revitalize, in changed form, 
the social and cultural relations of past eras, and do not engender completely novel forms 
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of collective belonging. In this respect, he sees ethnicity – which modernists almost 
completely ignore – as a key explanatory variable in accounting for the origin of the 
nation-states. In his definition of nationalism, Smith underlines the rise of modern, state-
centered political consciousness as an important element for fostering nationalist 
sentiments. However, he rejects the notion that ethnicity is a by-product and vehicle for 
cultural homogeneity, statehood or socioeconomic emancipation. Rather, he attributes 
causal primacy to ethnicity in the formation of the nation and the nation-state model.  
Other prominent ethnicist scholars such as Walker Connor and John Hutchinson 
also emphasize the inherently ethnic character of nationalism. Connor argues that 
explaining nationalism simply as a rational quest for collective goods leaves no room for 
collective values, memories, symbols, and emotions, and such an account is not enough 
to explain the passion and wide appeal of nationalism. For Connor, what is crucial in the 
study of nationalism is the subconscious belief in the group’s separate origin and 
evolution, which is an important ingredient of national psychology.78 However, despite 
his emphasis on the ethnic character of nations, Connor eventually refers to certain 
aspects of modernization, such as the advances in mass communications and 
transportation, while explaining the process through which ethnic groups reach the level 
of consciousness as necessary for being a “self-aware” community. He asserts that the 
growth of ethno-nationalist consciousness gave rise to increasing political mobilization in 
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many parts of the world in the post-World War II period, and made political 
independence a viable option for many smaller ethnic groups.79 
In his criticism of the modernist scholars who confine the use of the term 
“nationalism” to a purely political movement and its capacity for state-making, 
Hutchinson makes a distinction between political and cultural nationalism. He defines 
political nationalism as a civic polity of educated citizens whose objective is to secure a 
representative state for their community, while the cultural nationalist perspective gives 
primacy to the distinctive civilization of the nation, which is the product of its unique 
history, culture, and geographical profile.80 Nevertheless, Hutchinson does not deny the 
importance of political nationalism and points out that its focus on the state and 
citizenship is regularly complemented by cultural forms of nationalism that seek a moral 
regeneration of the community and an inner renovation of ethnic base.  
The modernist-ethnicist divide within the contemporary debate on nationalism 
presents more a mutually complementary framework than a dichotomy. The ethnicist 
view begs the question of why some “objective” cultural groups fail to develop strong 
group consciousness while others with more tenuously shared characteristics emerge as 
fairly unified, ethnically conscious polities.81 The modernists’ emphasis on factors such 
as capitalism, industrialization, mass communications and elite politics provides an 
explanation regarding the stimuli through which shared cultural traits become politically 
                                                      
79 Connor, Walker (April 1972). “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” World Politics, 24 (3), 328-331; 
also see Connor, Walker (January 1993). “The Politics of Ethnonationalism,” Journal of International 
Affairs, 27: 1-21. 
80 Hutchinson, John (1987). The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation 
of the Irish State, London: Allen & Unwin, 12-13. 
81 Geertz, Clifford (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, New York: Basic Books. 
46 
 
activated and create a collective sense of belonging that manifests itself in the form of 
nationalism.  In other words, although the pre-modern ethnic ties and sentiments provide 
the cultural resources for later nation-formation, the saliency of ethnic identification as a 
political factor is determined by the social, economic and political changes evoked by the 
process of modernization.  
The modernist approach, on the other hand, overlooks the psychological aspects 
of nation-building process by putting the nationalist sentiments in a purely instrumentalist 
framework. Although the nation may be socially constructed, it cannot be pulled out of 
thin air. The standard rational choice accounts assume that ethnic kinship ties are 
fictional, and can therefore be seen instrumentally in the context of the leaders’ strategy 
to manipulate ethnicity for the sake of personal or collective economic or political gains. 
The difficulty with this account is that it fails to explain why ethnicity would be the basis 
for mobilization at all rather than other types of allegiances such as economic interest, 
class or gender. The modernist stance is not well equipped to answer this question mainly 
because it overlooks the “value-rational” micro-foundations of ethnic or national 
mobilization. For ethnicity to be instrumentally used by the leaders, ethnicity must exist 
as a valued good for some in the first place.  
The Limits of an Emerging Theoretical Synthesis  
A view that takes the various components of ethnicity (language, culture, shared 
origins and religion) as the building blocks from which national identification may be 
constructed resolves the modernist/ethnicist divide. Although the modernists and 
ethnicists account for two distinct aspects of nationalism – political and cultural, 
respectively, for both, the nation-state model represents the institutionalized form of the 
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nation. In other words, whether they see the pre-modern ethnic ties as fictitious or real, 
both views embrace the state as the main guarantor of collective identity and presuppose 
congruence between political and cultural boundaries. Thus, nationalism is considered 
primarily as the locus of the claim to popular sovereignty, which presupposes an ideal-
type of the nation-state, an entity in which all citizens will be members of its uniform 
community.82   
For the modernist, while nationalism provides the state with ideological 
legitimacy, the state guarantees the rights and freedoms of those it considers to be its own 
members and provides them with protection. This formula works perfectly in cases where 
the state and the nation align, as in Gellner’s terms, where there is congruence between 
state and culture. If this is not the case, the people who do not have the “right” cultural 
characteristics choose between assimilating, migrating or becoming irredentist 
nationalists in order to change their situation. The options of the state toward those who 
do not fit its local dominant characteristics range from assimilation to expulsion or 
“ethnic cleansing.”83 Indeed, the majority of the 20th century’s ethnic conflicts validate 
the premise that the cultural homogenization imposed by the elites is not sufficient for the 
sustenance of the nation, and that pre-existing cultures, including ethnic cultures, are an 
important basis for political mobilization in ethnically diverse societies.  
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For the ethnicist, the causal relationship between state and nation is based upon 
the primacy of ethnic unity as the necessary condition for the survival of the nation and 
the viability of the nation-state. As the politico-administrative reach of the governments 
was extended to the peripheral ethnic homelands in the modern era, these groups 
developed a desire to preserve their autonomous lifestyles, which hardened the 
attachments to ethnic identities. In this context, increased cultural awareness combined 
with uneven diffusion of modernity leads to the emergence of ethnic nationalism as a way 
to respond to the cultural disorientation and physical disruption of the traditional way of 
life. As perceived dependence and exploitation gives rise to ethno-nationalism, achieving 
self-determination, defined as political independence in the form of separate statehood, 
becomes a major goal for most of the politically mobilized ethnic groups.  In this context, 
alignment of the cultural boundaries of the pre-modern ethnic homelands with the 
political boundaries of the newly-established nation-states is viewed by the ethnicists as 
the primary condition that guarantees the sustainability of the nation.  
Although the ethnicists gain the upper hand in explaining the emergence of ethno-
nationalist movements, the state-based solution they offer in addressing the national 
question eventually creates a variant of modernist view insofar as they see cultural 
homogeneity as the major requirement of the nation-state. In other words, while 
criticizing the exclusive and intolerant character of the “national” condition of modernity, 
the perspective of the ethnicist serves to regenerate the state institution in its same 
exclusionary form, referring to a unique people identified with unique cultural 
characteristics. In that sense, both the modernist and ethnicist accounts of nationalism fall 
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short of dealing with the issues of cultural diversity and the broader minority questions in 
multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and religiously diverse societies.  
The contemporary debate on nationalism is largely silent on the question of 
cultural heterogeneity. Rather, the notion of nation built on a common culture is taken for 
granted, and the correspondence between the political and ethnic boundaries of the state 
is seen as essential for the legitimacy of the nationalist cause and the national state. 
Where cultural diversity poses a threat to the socio-political cohesiveness, political 
stability and territorial integrity of the state, proponents of both sides of the debate leave 
us with nothing but the options of either assimilation or the establishment of a new state 
that would provide the necessary protection for those who secede. Within this framework, 
the state is presented by both modernists and ethnicists as the main instrument of security 
for the members of the nation. This approach leaves no room for debating an alternative 
project that could entail the development of a profound unity respecting ethnic and 
cultural diversity under conditions where the state becomes a source of insecurity for 
certain segments of the population.   
If the nation-state secures the rights of its citizens, then surely it is a necessity; but 
if the nation-state relies on nationalism and invariably produces massive numbers of 
stateless people, it certainly needs to be opposed.84 The idea of human rights born during 
the Enlightenment was intended to be universal. Nonetheless, the evolution of the state 
into the “nation-state” and the corresponding tendency to conflate nation with state gave 
an exclusively national definition to the scope of the community whose rights were to be 
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enforced and protected. Such a stance fails to address core questions about how nations 
and states may engage in an ongoing social and political exchange in the configuration of 
both domestic and international life. Clarifying these tensions is an important 
precondition for developing politically more satisfying models.  
If the nation-state falls short of ensuring the rights of everyone under its 
jurisdiction and is to be opposed, the question then arises as to what will serve as its 
alternative. If the realization of fundamental human rights presupposes some particular 
state agency to guarantee rights and freedoms for those it considers to be properly its own 
members, a problem arises for those who are culturally different and lacking their own 
nation-state, notably the minorities. Feeling insecure, the more minority populations are 
excluded from rights, the more they tend to look for a reintegration into a national 
community of their own.85 Hannah Arendt argues the only way to make the state a safe 
repository of human rights for all its citizens is by taking the nation out of the nation-
state.86 The way to do this, according to Arendt, is by meshing the state to a web of 
federal relations, both below and beyond the state, thereby moving away from the state as 
a site of sovereignty. Insofar as nationalism is bound to the claim of national sovereignty, 
any reconfiguration of the state depends upon a liberation from the nationalist legacy.87  
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In her examination of the “Jewish question,”88 Arendt puts an emphasis on the 
opportunity for Jews to become a nation and elaborates on the structure of the state that 
might embody their nationhood and its principal condition.89 Within the framework of 
her well-known and much debated notion of “the right to have rights,” which she sees as 
the principal human right, she focuses on the right of a people to become a nation by 
founding a state whose institutions announce and guard the civil rights of its citizens.90 
However, while the foundation of a state, “a new kind of state,” was what Arendt saw as 
the goal of the Jewish people, she rejected the idea that the structure of this new state in 
Palestine should be that of a European nation-state. The binational Arab-Jewish state she 
envisions is based on a council system of governing. “Local self-government and mixed 
Jewish-Arab municipal and rural councils, on a small scale and as numerous as possible, 
are the only realistic political measures that could eventually lead to political 
emancipation of Palestine,”91 as Arendt puts it.  
There is no doubt the Kurdish efforts at self-determination principally derive from 
the failure of the states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria to safeguard the rights of their 
Kurdish citizens. According to the modernist and ethnicist accounts of nationalism, this 
situation automatically lends itself to the solution of establishing a Kurdish nation-state 
which would be the only entity that could provide the necessary protection. Nevertheless, 
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it is striking that the evolutionary trajectory of Kurdish political discourse poses a 
significant challenge to this assumption. In other words, the mainstream statist thought on 
nationalism is not able to explain the Kurds’ political position in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria.  
Building a “new state” had certainly become the main goal of the Kurdish 
nationalist movement in the late twentieth century. However, the manner in which this 
goal unfolds since the early 1990s suggests that the national liberation envisioned by the 
Kurdish political elite has less to do with establishing a separate Kurdish nation-state than 
becoming an effective oppositional force in pushing for political change within the 
borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Although the dynamics of the relationship 
between the Kurds and their respective central governments vary from one country to 
another, the Kurdish movements’ move toward democratization has made them important 
political players in each of the four states as they try to address such important issues as 
minority rights, democracy and federalism. In that sense, contemporary Kurdish 
nationalism warrants an objective scholarly investigation, not only as it impacts the 
crucial political developments within the states in which the Kurds live, but also as it 
shapes the Kurds’ interactions with each other across borders and with the regional and 
global players involved in restructuring state-society relations in the Middle East.   
Structural Approaches to the Study of Kurdish Nationalism 
Structural explanations are the backbone of the modernist thought that traces the 
origins, rise, and course of nations and nationalism to the consequences of uneven 
capitalism, industrialism and rise of the modern state. Although they attribute a relatively 
greater role to human agency in explaining nationalism by referring to shared ideas, 
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sentiments, meanings and definitions among the adherents of a given cultural or ethnic 
group, ethnicists also rely heavily on the process of modernization and the underlying 
structural changes in explaining the development of group self-awareness and 
politicization of ethnic identity. While the ethnicist approach defines nationalism on the 
basis of a uniform ethnic origin ever-present in history, the modernist approach deduces it 
from a mythical origin constructed by modernity. In both cases, the nationalist discourse 
has no autonomy; it is an effect or expression of either real or assumed national origin 
constituted by the objective structures of industrial capitalism and the culture of 
modernity.   
One of the main issues in treating the Kurdish question as a problem of 
democracy rather than a problem of statelessness strictly defined in ethnic terms is that 
one must maintain a distance from the structural analysis of the relationship between the 
Kurds and the state. Adopting such an approach is crucial in order to understand Kurdish 
nationalism from the perspective of the “Kurds.” It is the Kurdish political actors who 
define the Kurdish question as a problem of human rights, democracy, and political 
participation in the first place. Thus, any analysis that considers the Kurdish question in 
the context of the democratization process in Turkey, Iran, Iraq or Syria needs to open up 
a large space for the role of human agency rather than depending solely on the structural 
factors as the main determinants of Kurdish political action.  
The hegemonic representation of the Kurdish question as a case of “separatism” 
and “terrorism” in state discourses puts constraints on the development of academic 
debate and research on the Kurds throughout much of the 20th century. As the host 
governments frequently prohibited or placed restrictions on the publication and 
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dissemination of information on the Kurds, the “official” representation of the Kurds in 
state and popular media discourses remained largely unchallenged until the 1960s. From 
the 1960s to the 1980s, only a limited number of academic works were published in the 
field of Kurdish Studies and they were focused primarily on the Kurdish cause in Iran 
(Eagleton 1963; Ghassemlou 1965) and Iraq (Adamson 1964; Jawad 1981; Ghareeb 
1981). From the 1960s onwards, Turkey’s official state discourse on the Kurdish question 
started to face a challenge from the Kurdish activists who led to the emergence of the 
Kurdish movement as an influential political oppositional force in Turkey in the 1970s. 
Accordingly, from the 1980s onwards, the increase in Kurdish political activism 
witnessed a corresponding increase in the number of books and articles on Kurdish 
identity and nationalism in Turkey. The Kurdish factor in Syria, on the other hand, 
remained marginal in academic research dedicated to either Syria or the Kurdish question 
until the Qamishli revolt of 2004, which is accepted as a major milestone regarding the 
growth of Kurdish nationalism in Syria. 
By the 1990s, the increased salience of Kurdish nationalism as a political factor, 
particularly in Turkish and Iraqi politics, resulted in a remarkable upsurge of academic 
work on the Kurdish question. The first comparativist and more theoretical work on the 
Kurds were published in this period (Entessar 1992; Chaliand 1993; Gunter 1993, 1997; 
Olson 1996, McDowall 1996; Ciment 1996). From the late 1990s and throughout the 
2000s, Kurdish Studies was increasingly integrated into country studies and comparative 
work focusing on all four parts of Kurdistan. These studies address a diverse range of 
issues and focus on different periods and aspects of Kurdish society and politics. An 
overwhelming number of these studies focus on the historical origins and development of 
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Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East with particular attention paid to the conflict 
analyses of Kurdish political actors and state authorities as well as the accounts of the 
political history of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.92  
The political history literature predominantly focuses on the evolution of Kurdish 
national movement and the politicization of Kurdish identity after the establishment of 
modern nation-states in the Middle East in the early twentieth century. The political 
history accounts by Van Bruinessen (2000), White (2000), Natali (2005), Tahiri (2006), 
Ahmed and Gunter (2007), Tejel (2009) and Aziz (2011) generally trace the evolutionary 
trajectory of Kurdish nationalism with a particular focus on the nation-state building 
processes in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria as the major determinant of the rise of Kurdish 
ethno-nationalism in the 20th century. These studies not only highlight the significance of 
the modernization process – increased urbanization, educational opportunities and 
communications – in giving rise to the politicization of Kurdish identity in the newly-
established nation-states of the Middle East, but also analyze the internal social and 
economic characteristics of the Kurdish society as a causal factor in explaining the failure 
of the Kurds to establish a nation-state of their own.  
Similarly, the conflict analysis literature as exemplified by the works of Gunter 
(1990), Kirişci and Winrow (1997), Barkey and Fuller (1998), Özcan (2006), Romano 
(2006), Vali (2011) and Eccarius-Kelly (2011), examine the conflict between the Kurds 
and their respective central governments in a historical context. They refer to particular 
theoretical frameworks such as social movements and constructivist approaches in 
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accounting for the origins and evolution of the encounters between the sovereign powers, 
and the Kurdish communities and their political representatives.    
Recently, studies that have a narrower focus on a particular aspect of the 
contemporary Kurdish national movement have also been published such as the works by 
O’Leary, McGarry and Salih (2005), Yıldız (2005), MacDonald and O’Leary (2007), 
Lawrence (2008), Visser and Stansfield (2008), Gunter (2008) and Natali (2010). These 
studies deal predominantly with the social and political changes that took place within the 
Kurdish national movement since the early 1990s with a particular focus on the debates 
on democracy and federalism in Iraq after the 2003 American intervention and the 
increasing significance of the discourse on human rights regarding the Kurdish question 
in Turkey within the context of Turkey’s EU accession process.  
Following the first Gulf War, the literature on the Kurds and Kurdish nationalism 
was enriched greatly through the political history and conflict analyses accounts of 
Kurdish political activism. However, works produced in the field of Kurdish Studies 
continue to focus on structural factors – the market, the economy, industrialization, 
capitalism, education, communication, transportation – in explaining the rise and 
development of the Kurdish national movement. Informed largely by the mainstream 
structural-statist theoretical frameworks on nationalism, contemporary Kurdish 
scholarship often highlights the causal relationship between the processes of state-
building and modernization in the Kurds’ host countries and the social and economic 
changes that took place in the Kurdish society. These studies usually trace the roots of 
Kurdish nationalism back to the state formation period in the Middle East after World 
War I, and examine the Kurdish national movement as a phenomenon primarily shaped 
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by the state-building policies in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Accordingly, the evolution 
of Kurdish nationalism is principally explained as a function of these diverse political 
environments in which the Kurds act, and whether or not Kurdish nationalist aspirations 
become publicly salient is viewed largely in the context of the positive or negative 
incentives offered by the central governments.    
Although these analyses have extensive explanatory power in terms of 
understanding the variations in the manifestation of Kurdish nationalism across space and 
time, they fail to capture the changes in the Kurdish national movement during the 
contemporary era because of the limitations imposed by framing the problem from the 
perspective of the political structures of the states in which the Kurds live. Lately, the 
works of Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden (2010), Cengiz Güneş (2011) and Büşra 
Ersanlı, Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Nesrin Uçarlar (2012) made important contributions 
to the literature by clarifying how the demands of the Kurds were constituted in the 
discourses of the Kurdish political elite, and then communicated to the state authorities 
and society at large in the context of the pro-Kurdish actors’ attempts to transform their 
respective polities. These studies have opened a greater space for Kurdish agency within 
the policy-making processes.  
Others such as Nicole Watts (2010), despite giving an account of the Kurdish 
democratic and legal forms of engagement as a political oppositional force in Turkey, 
analyzes the pro-Kurdish parties largely from the perspective of the official Turkish 
discourse. Her study “does not include a discussion of the conception of democracy being 
proposed by the pro-Kurdish movement, how it addresses questions of pluralism – both 
within and outside the Kurdish community – and to what extent this discourse of 
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democracy has challenged the notions of democracy and citizenship in Turkey.”93 Hence, 
an in-depth study of the fluid and reciprocal relationship between the Kurds and their 
respective central governments and the role that the Kurdish political actors play in 
reshaping the legal and institutional structure and political alignments within their 
respective polities remains a major gap scholars have not yet addressed.  
The structural accounts of Kurdish nationalism often take the “political 
opportunity structures” as their point of departure. Political opportunity structures are 
explained on the basis of the premise that emphasis should be given to the interaction 
between the movement and institutionalized politics and the importance of the broader 
political system in structuring opportunities for collective action.94 A political 
opportunities perspective seeks to show how changes in some aspect of a political system 
create new opportunities or constraints for activist efforts in order to explain the 
emergence of a particular movement or “cycle of protest.”95  
Laying the foundation in this tradition, Charles Tilly, in his classic From 
Mobilization to Revolution (1978), explains what he calls as the “polity model,” which 
relates contenders to a government and to other contenders via coalitions and struggles 
for power.96 The polity model deals with the surrounding world that is likely to affect the 
contender’s well-being, that is, by considering incentives or opportunities to act. In other 
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words, the strengths and weaknesses of the external actors comprise the contender’s 
opportunities to act on its interests.97 
Similarly, David Meyer suggests, “the primary point of the political opportunity 
approach was that activists do not choose goals, strategies, and tactics in a vacuum. 
Rather the political context, conceptualized fairly broadly, sets the grievances around 
which activists mobilize, advantaging some claims and disadvantaging others.”98 He 
asserts “the wisdom, creativity, and outcomes of activists’ choices – their ‘agency’ – can 
only be understood and evaluated by looking at the political context and the rules of the 
games in which those choices are made – that is, “structure.”99 
Political opportunity accounts of the Kurdish question by scholars such as Paul 
White (2000), Hakan Yavuz (2001), Denise Natali (2005), Nader Entessar (2007) and 
Nicole Watts (2007) generally focus on state policies as the determining factor in the 
development of the Kurdish national movement, particularly the politicization of Kurdish 
identity. In explaining the evolution of Kurdish nationalism, these accounts explain 
Kurdish political action by referring to the opportunities and constraints facing the Kurds. 
Within this framework, the political opportunity perspective enables scholars of Kurdish 
Studies to address two questions: how the movement emerges on the one hand, and its 
ongoing development, on the other. Nonetheless, while tracing the evolutionary trajectory 
of the Kurdish movement, these accounts do not explore the encounters between the 
Kurds and the state as a reciprocal process. During their confrontations with the political 
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structure, the Kurds, as a challenging group, also affect legislative or other forms of 
political change that serves to restructure the legal and institutional basis of the political 
system.   
Other studies such as Michael Gunter (2008) and Kerim Yıldız and Mark Muller 
(2008) focus on external opportunity structures, namely, the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 
2003, and Turkey’s EU accession process, as factors that explain the increasing salience 
of Kurdish nationalism in twenty-first century. However, although they contribute greatly 
to the literature in terms of addressing the role of external factors in providing new forms 
of support for Kurdish nationalist projects, these accounts do not demonstrate how the 
externally-based opportunity structures are reinterpreted by the Kurdish actors and 
expressed within their political agendas attempting to make new opportunities in the 
domestic realm.  
Within the literature, there are also studies that analyze the mobilization strategies 
and the cultural and social-psychological tools employed by the Kurdish political groups 
in order to strengthen Kurdish collective action and organizational capacity. David 
Romano (2006), besides providing a political opportunity account, examines various 
vehicles of mobilization as well as social psychological and cultural factors that serve as 
crucial inducements to Kurdish collective action in Turkey, Iran and Iraq, and does this 
from a comparative perspective. Ali Kemal Özcan (2006) specifically analyzes the 
discourse of the PKK from the 1970s to early 2000s and focuses on the views and ideas 
of the organization as well as its political objectives and corresponding strategies for 
action. Martin Van Bruinessen (2003) draws attention to the development of Kurmanci as 
a modern literary language and its role in the emergence of Kurdish national awareness 
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during the evolution of the Kurdish movement. Farideh Koohi-Kamali (2007) studies the 
transition of Kurdish society in Iran from a traditional tribal community to a society with 
market-based economic and social relationships, and discusses the impact of economic 
developments in Kurdish society on the expression of political demands for 
independence. Nicole Watts (2006) provides a discussion of the Kurdish participation in 
electoral politics in Turkey as a form of social movement activism for surviving, 
consolidating and advancing the Kurdish political agenda.  
Although these accounts provide important reflections on the cognitive, ideational 
and strategic dimensions of the Kurdish collective action and the roles they play in the 
construction of Kurdish nationalist discourse, the scholarship does not offer a 
comprehensive analysis of how this repertoire of collective action is used by the pro-
Kurdish contentious actors to create new opportunities and widen the cycle of contention 
in order to challenge and transform existing political systems. In other words, although 
they open a greater space for the role of agency in contentious politics, these studies do 
not provide a discussion of the contentious actors’ dynamic relationship to the 
opportunity structures and their potential to transform their given polity. 
While it is true the institutionalized political systems and changes in the patterns 
of political opportunities and constraints play a significant role in shaping the prospects 
for collective action and the forms movements take, they are not an inevitable 
prerequisite to action. Structural explanations suffer from a high level of determinacy by 
assuming that the structural changes in government and society inevitably produce 
changes in social movements. Such a stance does not leave room for unintended 
movement-initiated change in the structure of political opportunities. 
62 
 
William Gamson and David Meyer remind us that “opportunities open the way 
for political action, but movements also make opportunities.”100 Nonetheless, the 
observation of Gramson and Meyer is not widely reflected either in the field of Kurdish 
studies or in the broader literature on social movements. As Doug McAdam underscores: 
While lavishing attention on the impact of political opportunities on the 
timing, form, and consequences of social movements, movement scholars 
have spent comparatively little time and energy systematically studying 
the role that movements have played in reshaping the institutional 
structure and political alignments of a given polity.101 
 
Given that the majority of the Kurdish studies scholars emphasize the increasing 
importance of the Kurdish movement as a powerful force for change in society, their 
collective failure to undertake any systematic and comprehensive accounting of the effect 
of the Kurdish movement on the various dimensions of political opportunities is puzzling. 
In this respect, the literature on the Kurds falls short of capturing the dynamic, reciprocal, 
and crucially important relationship of the Kurdish actors to structures of political 
opportunity. McAdam states: 
Those structures simultaneously constrain and facilitate collective action 
by a wide range of challenging groups. Those who temporarily benefit 
from the structure are apt to act aggressively to take full advantage of the 
opportunities accorded them. In doing so, they are likely to effect 
legislative or other forms of change that serves to restructure – in both 
intended and unintended ways – the legal and institutional or the relational 
basis of the political system or both. Thus transformed, the structure of 
political opportunities once more acts back to confront the population of 
challenging groups with new constraint and possibilities for action.102 
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Since the early 1990s, the Kurdish national movement can be said to acquire a 
dual character: an ethno-cultural struggle for the recognition of Kurdish identity and 
demands, and a democratization movement for the prohibition of human rights violations 
and the achievement of democratic reforms. In other words, Kurdish nationalism is no 
longer defined solely by ethnic assertiveness but also by wider claims for expanded rights 
and democratic governance for all the nationalities coexisting with the Kurds. Explaining 
this discursive transformation merely as a change in political tactics and strategy or a 
derivative of the structures of political opportunity leaves no room for considering the 
Kurdish question outside the framework of the official state discourses.  
The process by which the Kurdish question became intertwined with the question 
of democratization transformed the relationship between the Kurds and their respective 
central governments. The Kurdish parties and activists seek to challenge the political and 
ideological authority of the state not only on the basis of identity politics, but also by 
raising claims for a competing vision of culture, governance and political representation 
to that espoused by the central governments of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. 
Restricting the study of the Kurdish question to a narrowly defined framework of 
reactive nationalism unfavorably assigns a passive role to the Kurdish movement in its 
encounters with the state. In other words, the Kurds’ capacity to engage in politics is 
simply confined to the “right to react” which subordinates the movement to one which 
derives solely from the actions and decisions of those in power. Such an approach not 
only precludes the consideration of the Kurdish movement as an autonomous actor, but 
invariably reproduces the narratives of victimhood, which allows governments to claim 
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full agency in the processes at work in the definition, transformation and the eventual 
solution of the Kurdish problem. 
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CHAPTER III 
KURDS IN IRAQ 
 
Iraq is facing a serious crisis. We have tried our utmost to prevent Iraq 
from descending into a sectarian conflict and we have consistently avoided 
taking sides in this conflict. The Kurds have played a pivotal role in 
bringing about the new Iraq, particularly two years ago when our initiative 
resulted in the formation of the current government. Had it not been for 
our role, one can only guess what an unknown fate would have beset Iraq. 
It is very unfortunate that a small number of people in Baghdad have 
imposed themselves and monopolized power.103 
 
After the 2003 American invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, the southern and central governorates of Iraq became mired in civil war and 
economic stagnation, while the Kurdish north experienced relative stability and certain 
levels of development.104 In the context of the new power-sharing system established in 
Iraq following the approval of 2005 constitution, this asymmetrical growth largely 
influenced center-periphery relations by strengthening the Kurdistan region’s political 
power in relation to the state and increasing its leverage on the central government to 
accommodate Kurdish demands.105 This situation inevitably revitalized the long term 
Kurdish-Arab animosity that lies at the intersection of fundamental questions about the 
future of Iraq. These questions include the stability of the new regime, the process of 
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democratic transition, and whether Iraq will become a truly federal state with an inclusive 
vision towards its ethno-sectarian diversity.  
Barzani’s statement on the Kurdish New Year in 2012 highlights the role of the 
Kurdish movement not only in establishing a new political order in Iraq, but also in 
ensuring the future stability of the regime in the context of the challenges facing the 
newly-established power-sharing system. The relationship of the Kurds to the process of 
democratization in Iraq is a complex one that raises the question of whether the Kurdistan 
region is a stabilizing or a disintegrating force. Why has the Kurdish movement in Iraq 
become so central to the questions of whether Iraq can be democratic or whether 
federalism can stabilize Iraq, particularly in the post-Saddam era? In the same vein, why 
has the Kurdish movement in Iraq gained greater prominence within its respective 
political environment compared to its counterparts in Turkey, Iran and Syria? 
One answer lies in the sheer demographic weight and territorial concentration of 
Kurds within Iraq.106 Kurds in all parts of Kurdistan are, by and large, territorially 
concentrated with the exception of Syrian Kurds who are geographically dispersed along 
the northern Syrian line. The number of Kurds living in Iraq is less than those living in 
Turkey and Iran. However, as far as the ethnic demography and comparative rates of 
voter turnout are concerned, the Kurds have a more significant presence in Iraq, 
particularly by comparison to their presence in Iran and Syria.  
The second explanation for the relative strength of Iraqi Kurdistan is the sustained 
continuity of the Kurds’ armed struggle against successive regimes in Iraq since the 
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British mandate in Iraq. Organized Kurdish armed struggle against the state started in 
Turkey only in the 1980s while armed struggle was never a mode of opposition for the 
Syrian Kurds until the uprising of 2011. Armed struggle in Iranian Kurdistan, on the 
other hand, proved to be effective in terms of placing the rights of ethnic and religious 
minorities on to Iran’s political agenda, but it was never sufficient to force the 
government into a political solution.  
The crucial factor that affected the success or failure of Kurdish armed struggle in 
each country is the relative military and bureaucratic capacity of the state. Until the rise 
of the Baathists in 1968, Iraq was a fairly weak state whose military and bureaucratic 
capacities were far less than those of republican Turkey or monarchical Iran. Whereas, in 
Syria, armed struggle as a viable strategy of resistance was generally avoided due to the 
limited size and organizational capacity of the Kurds. Even during the Baathist regime, 
the Kurds in Iraq won concessions on language rights, constitutional recognition of their 
identity, and promises of decentralization mainly as a result of the long struggle waged 
by the Kurdish armed forces in the country’s north. The implementation usually remained 
poor, but the idea of an “Iraqi Kurdistan” with distinct political and administrative 
capacity was increasingly solidified.  
The third reason Kurdish nationalism endured in Iraq lies with the peculiarities of 
the British mandate in the early twentieth century. The British policy towards the Kurds 
throughout the mandatory period was generally marked by the British dilemma of how to 
reconcile its assertions for democracy in Iraq with its preference for a strong centralizing 
authority necessary to maintain internal stability and ensure the preservation of Britain’s 
political interests. In this context, the Kurdish uprisings of the 1920s and 1930s were 
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perceived by the British largely as disintegrative movements that should be suppressed in 
order to ensure that the economically important Kurdish areas, particularly the oil-rich 
Mosul, was attached to the emerging Iraqi state.  
On the other hand, the British emphasis on representation and constitutionalism as 
well as Britain’s commitments to both the League of Nations and to the Kurds to grant 
official autonomy to Kurdistan constrained Britain’s ability to encourage a strong 
government in Iraq. Through the mid-1940s, successive Kurdish revolts were constant 
reminders of the Iraqi government’s failure to maintain order and fulfill its obligations to 
its Kurdish citizens. The British, therefore, encouraged the official use of Kurdish 
language, education in Kurdish and appointment of Kurdish officials in the Kurdish 
areas. Although these policies were never more than half-heartedly carried out and did 
not ensure the bureaucratic entrenchment of these cultural rights, they assisted in the 
preservation of the constitutive elements of Kurdish culture and nationalism in Iraq. It is 
fair to say that under the mandate and indeed until the high tide of Baathist ascendancy 
(1975-1990), in contrast to the much more repressive situation in Iran or Turkey, the 
Kurds’ separate identity was generally recognized to a greater or lesser extent, or at least 
not denied, by all Iraqi governments.107   
The fourth answer to the question of why Iraqi Kurdistan became so fundamental 
to the future of Iraq and proved more effective in pressing its agenda for greater rights 
and autonomy than its counterparts in Turkey, Iran and Syria is the sustained 
organizational capacity of the Kurdish nationalist groups in the country. This situation 
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has much to do with the internal instability of the Iraqi state itself as well as the military 
capacity of the Kurdish movement. Until the establishment of the Baathist regime in 
1968, Iraq was suffering severely from successive coups and intra-Arab conflicts. The 
Kurds, in the meantime, continued to fight for the recognition of their language and 
administrative control of Kurdistan. Both of these factors hindered full state penetration 
of Kurdistan and gave the Kurdish leaders opportunities to advance their cultural, 
administrative and territorial demands. The Kurds never fully controlled Kurdistan until 
1991, but they consistently consolidated the governance and control of portions of 
northern Iraq and maintained minimal state functions.  
Finally, regarding intra-Kurdish politics, the power configuration of Iraqi 
Kurdistan remained predominantly tribal after the establishment of Kurdish nationalism 
in Iraq in the 1930s and 1940s. However, the tribal leaders’ pragmatic partnership with 
the intellectual and urbanized Kurdish nationalists played a crucial role in the emergence 
of a functioning Kurdistan in Iraq. While the tribal/modernist divide has been a major 
source of disunity, so much so it led to crippling episodes of infighting, that disunity has 
enabled the Iraqi Kurds to better organize in order to conduct armed and political 
struggle. In sum, although the current status of the Iraqi Kurds has much to do with 
outside intervention in Iraq, the emergence of Kurdistan as a de facto autonomous entity 
after Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the Kuwait war of 1991 was not an accident. Likewise, 
the fundamental role of the Kurds within the debate on democracy and federalism in Iraq 
in the post-Saddam era is not a coincidence. Both developments have their roots in the 
past developments of the state of Iraq and the evolution of its relationship to Iraq’s Kurds. 
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The Road to Autonomy: The Legacy of the Armed Struggle 
Until the Kurds gained de facto autonomous status in 1991, Kurdish nationalism 
in Iraq was for the most part a “reactive” nationalism. After the establishment of the 
modern state of Iraq, the persistent focus of successive regimes on a unified sense of Iraqi 
nationalism built around a distinctly Arab narrative led to the establishment of a 
contentious relationship between the state and the Kurds, who form the second largest 
ethnic group in the country after the Arabs. The warfare between the Kurds and the 
governments of Baghdad from 1960 to 1980 created a strong motivation to react in unity 
against oppression and significantly contributed to the consolidation of Kurdish 
nationalism in Iraq. More than any other single event in the past half century of Kurdish 
history in the country, the Anfal campaign of 1988, during which the Kurds were 
subjected to outright massacre at the hands of the Baath regime, further reinforced the 
common notion of suffering and provoked a galvanizing nationalism among the Kurds.108 
After the Kurds gained full control over territory following Saddam Hussein’s 
withdrawal from north in 1991, this element of reactive nationalism steadily gave way to 
the emergence of the Kurdish movement as one that not only built up a political system in 
the north for a flourishing region, but also shaped important debates on the future of 
democracy in Iraq.  
The British policy of Sunni “Arabizing” the government in Iraq during the 
mandatory period was contested right from the beginning by both the Kurds and Shia 
Arabs. The fact Arab nationalism was established as the primary pillar of the state’s 
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ideological legitimacy meant the distinction between Kurds and Arabs emerged as more 
intractable than the sectarian divide between the Sunnis and Shia. While the sectarian 
question in Iraq was mainly a problem of underrepresentation of the Shia within the 
organs of the state, the ethnic question created a more significant problem due to the 
competing claims of the Kurds to a nation-state of their own. The Shia Arabs were 
encouraged to subscribe to the notion of being “Iraqis” through the establishment of a 
monarchy that was Arab in composition and orientation. The same cannot be said for the 
Kurds whose grievance was the creation of the state of Iraq itself, which undermined 
Kurdish attempts to secure autonomy or independence after the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire. In this respect, the main distinction between the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in 
Iraq throughout the twentieth century is that while the aspirations of Shia Arabs were 
mostly directed toward changing the power configuration within the state, the Kurds had 
broader demands for a reorganization of the state of Iraq itself. 
Throughout the early 1920s, there were constant armed uprisings in northern Iraq. 
These revolts were, by and large, an expression of traditional Kurdish hostility to 
imposition of any form of outside authority and a result of the Kurdish tribal chieftains’ 
desire to exploit the disintegration of former power centers to assert their own autonomy 
in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.109 These early Kurdish revolts in Iraq 
were quickly suppressed by the British. In the new post-World War I international order 
stamped by the principle of self-determination, the uprisings made a strong case for 
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Kurdish nationalism and posed significant challenges to the configuration of the Iraqi 
state envisaged by the British authorities.  
The 1930s marked the awakening of a national consciousness among the first 
generation of secular educated and urban Kurds in Iraq who began to develop ideas of 
how best to secure specifically Kurdish identity and interests within the framework of the 
Iraqi state.110 The new urban and intellectual nationalists challenged the dominance of the 
traditional notables of Kurdistan, yet were aware of the power of the tribal leaders in 
Kurdish society. When the British and the Hashemite attempted to penetrate Kurdistan 
with modern direct rule by replacing tribal governance with more bureaucratic yet 
Arabized administration, some of the tribal notables, determined to defend their 
privileges, made common cause with the new urbanized and professionalized Kurds who 
had different grievances and agendas.111 This model led to the emergence of the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), under the leadership of a traditional notable, Mulla 
Mustafa Barzani, and a group of urban intellectuals, notably Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal 
Talabani. 
Throughout the monarchical rule and into the first years of the republican period, 
the ethno-sectarian societal structure and the idea of democracy were bound to clash in 
Iraq. The problem was that building the strong central government necessary to maintain 
unity in a socially-fractured society conflicted with the goal of creating the representative 
institutions vital for legitimatizing the order in the eyes of the existing communities, but 
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that would, by definition, constrain governmental action.112 The Hashemite monarchical 
government succeeded in building a strong central government, but largely failed in 
achieving legitimacy because of the reluctance of the governing elite to cede power in a 
truly meaningful way by assuring the diverse communities their identities and interests 
were fully respected. Consequently, a general belief took hold that coercion was 
necessary to achieve the discipline and unity required to manage Iraq’s ethnic and 
sectarian diversity.  
Iraq underwent several periods marked by democratic experiments designed to 
break the stranglehold of authoritarianism on the country. Narrowing the dislocations 
between the disparate communities of Iraq was a crucial aspect of this task. As the Kurds 
have engaged in an almost constant rebellion against Baghdad since the establishment of 
modern Iraq in 1921, the political, administrative and cultural gap between the north and 
the rest of the country was a constant reminder of Iraq’s failure to establish an inclusive, 
democratic order.  
Iraqi rulers often had an inconsistent attitude toward democracy that was clearly 
discernible in the country’s uneven march toward democratic ideals and practices, during 
which democracy would go through an extended period of denial, and then suddenly 
allowed to function, only to be denied yet again.113 It is no coincidence the relations 
between the state and the Kurds have been marked by the same attitude, which led 
successive regimes to recognize Kurdish nationalism and cultural rights for a time, then 
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to deny Kurdish identity again and reinstate strategies of assimilation and control. In this 
sense, there has always been a striking overlap between the cycles of political openings 
for Kurds in Iraq and the emergence of political will to stop the armed rebellions in the 
north through opening negotiations with the Kurds.  
The first major political opening in Iraq took place after the coup of July 14, 
1958, which put an end to the monarchical rule and marked the beginning of Iraq’s 
transition to a republican state. Issues concerning the position of the Kurds within the 
state of Iraq quickly became central to the program of action specified by the 
revolutionaries led by General Abd al-Karim Qasim. The rapprochement between the 
Kurds and the new regime was largely a result of the common interests shared by the 
Kurdish movement and the Qasim government. For Qasim, Kurdish support for the new 
regime was of great value in combatting attempts by the extreme Arab nationalists to 
displace him.114 The Kurdish movement was viewed as a critical ally both by Qasim and 
his left-wing supporters due to Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s distinguished record of armed 
combat and revolt over several years against the British administration and the monarchy. 
For the Kurds, Iraq’s transition to a republican regime created a political environment 
conducive for the recognition of their demands for the establishment of democratic 
freedoms and the realization of the Kurds’ political and cultural rights.   
The general program drawn up by the new republican government called for the 
establishment of a democratic regime and the adoption of a new constitution based on 
freedoms, social justice and recognition of the rights of the minorities within Iraq’s 
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national unity.115 Within this framework, Qasim legalized the KDP, welcomed Mullah 
Mustafa Barzani on his return from the Soviet Union where he was in exile since 1945, 
and removed some of the restrictions that had been placed on Kurdish publications under 
the preceding regime. 116 Qasim and his leftist supporters promoted an Iraqi-first identity 
and tried to create a sense of Iraqiness based on the Kurdish-Arab fraternity. The draft 
constitution stated, “Arabs and Kurds are partners in the Iraqi homeland and their 
national rights are recognized within the Iraqi state.”117 Nonetheless, the honeymoon 
between Qasim and the Kurdish movement did not last long, not only because Qasim 
shared the preconceptions of his predecessors regarding the Kurdish question, but also 
because his administration did not manage to progress beyond the very limited elements 
of representative government established by the preceding regime. 
The Kurdish question has an important place in any analysis of the decline of 
Qasim. The major flaws in Qasim’s administration such as his gradual concentration of 
power and his failure to depart from the entrenched state traditions of authoritarianism 
soon made it apparent the Kurdish aspirations for autonomy and the restoration of 
democratic liberties were in fact representing demands which the government in Baghdad 
was not yet willing to grant to Iraqi Arabs, and so they could hardly grant rights to the 
Kurds.118 Under these conditions, relations between the Kurds and the Iraqi state rapidly 
deteriorated. The fighting that broke out in 1961 was the start of a prolonged conflict that 
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continued intermittently until 1975. The prolonged war in the north played a significant 
role in the declining popularity of the Qasim regime and its eventual ouster by the 
Baathists and Arab nationalist military figures on February 8, 1963.  
The next major attempt at a democratic opening in Iraq emerged directly out of 
the concerns over finding a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem. In 1966, Abd al-
Rahman al-Bazzaz was appointed as the first civilian prime minister of Iraq since the 
collapse of the monarchy in 1958. Iraq had been under military rule since 1963. The 
appointment of Bazzaz appeared to be a move away from the military ruler regime 
towards some civilian power, giving the impression a new era of a more open 
government would be introduced.119 Bazzaz himself was an Arab nationalist ideologue, 
but he recognized the centrality of the Kurdish question to the country’s progress and 
attempted to initiate negotiations to end the war and effect a settlement in the north. On 
June 29, 1966, he outlined a twelve-point offer to the Kurds that went further than ever 
before in meeting most of the Kurdish demands. A full acknowledgement of Kurdish 
nationality was the first of the twelve points followed by the acceptance of the Kurdish 
language as an official language (along with Arabic) in the provinces that were 
predominantly Kurdish. The declaration also promised decentralization with freely-
elected administrative councils and proportional representation for Kurds in central 
government. Finally, the government declared its intent to hold parliamentary elections 
within the period fixed in the provisional constitution.120  
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With the al-Bazzaz government came a valuable opportunity to consider the 
Kurdish question in the context of a workable plan of reconciliation.121 More importantly, 
al-Bazzaz’s efforts to end the war in the north went hand-in-hand with efforts to establish 
a genuine representative government as he understood that democratic order cannot be 
discussed without confronting the bi-national character of Iraq. In this respect, the Bazzaz 
Declaration was a crucial initiative in that it addressed two requirements necessary to 
resolve the Kurdish question in Iraq: autonomy for the Kurds and an electoral 
parliamentary democracy for all Iraq.122 However, the al-Bazzaz government was short 
lived because the military rulers rejected any concession to the Kurdish nationalist 
demands. With his departure in August 1966, the best chance for both the Kurds and a 
democratic republican Iraq disappeared. 
Before 1991, the final episode of rapprochement between the Kurds and the state 
took place under the most coercive regime in the modern history of Iraq. On assuming 
power in 1968, the Baath regime launched a program intended to take over all of Iraq’s 
social and political institutions and organizations, and used violence on a scale 
unmatched in Iraq’s history in order to suppress all of its opponents.123 In this context, the 
Kurdish war in the north was troublesome in light of both the Baath determination to take 
“full” control of the country and the wish of the ruling civilian faction of the Baath to free 
itself from its dependence on the army. In the meantime, as the efforts to suppress the 
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revolt and isolate Barzani failed, the government in Baghdad decided, as Abd al-Rahman 
al-Bazzaz had before them, that for Iraq to become strong the Kurds had to be 
accommodated and decisively brought into the national fold.124  
On March 11, 1970, the Baghdad government declared a far-ranging agreement 
with the Kurds. The agreement recognized the Kurdish nationality and promised 
linguistic rights, Kurdish participation in the government and appointment of Kurdish 
governors in the mainly Kurdish areas.125 Most controversially, Article 14 of the 
agreement stated that “appropriate measures will be taken to unify the mainly Kurdish 
districts and administrative units, as established by official statistics drawn up for the 
purpose.”126 In this way, the government promised self-government for the Kurds and 
decided the territorial extent of the Kurdish autonomous area would be determined 
through a population census. During the years following the agreement, Article 14 
remained the main obstacle to the agreement’s implementation as Baghdad was 
determined to ensure that the major oil-producing areas of Kirkuk and Mosul remained 
outside Kurdish control. Thus, the period of Kurdish-Baath amity that emerged in the 
early 1970s, withered away quickly given the sluggish pace of negotiations. However, the 
legacy of the 1970 agreement continued until the 1990s, and laid the foundations of 
decentralized government in Iraq.  
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The relationship between the Kurds, the state and democracy in Iraq was never 
straightforward. Successive regimes attempted to give concessions to the Kurds, not out 
of genuine concerns for democracy, but mainly to accomplish their own political 
interests. Although there was no formal link between the Kurdish issue and the question 
of restoring representative government in Iraq, it was impossible to accommodate the 
Kurdish demands for autonomy and cultural rights without opening up the system to 
embrace diversity and dissent. Thus, the episodes of formal negotiations between the 
Kurds and the governments in Baghdad always act as a catalyst in pushing successive 
regimes to consider the broader question of democracy in Iraq. 
Well aware democratization in Iraq was necessary to accomplish their goals, the 
Kurds persistently emphasized the importance of democratic order in Iraq as the primary 
precondition for the implementation of their identity demands. In this respect, they took 
strategic advantage of Baghdad’s politicians’ need to broaden support for their 
governments and pressed ahead the Kurdish agenda for greater rights and autonomy. 
Maintenance of military discipline among contentious Kurds, which was mainly a 
consequence of the tribal power configurations, enabled the Kurdish movement to 
constantly challenge the central government and strengthen their political leverage and 
negotiating power. The professional-intellectual wing within the movement, despite its 
competing agendas, often acted in concert with the tribal leaders in the face of extreme 
government coercion and played a significant role in building up the organizational 
capacity of the movement. The Kurdish movement in Iraq suffered severely from intra-
Kurdish conflict, but often the opposing party organizations cooperated to protect the 
interests of the Kurds of Iraq. When the opportunity manifested itself in 1991, both the 
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KDP and the PUK, despite their limitations, were ready to govern Kurdistan with their 
established social bases, and administrative and military capabilities.  
Autonomous Kurdistan: An Opportunity for Democracy 
From 1991 until the United States-led coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003, the 
Kurdish region of Iraq remained largely insulated from the rest of the country 
economically and politically. Until 1991, the cycles of Kurdish rebellion in the north 
paradoxically encouraged both a central government with strong coercive powers and an 
open government responsive to the demands of its citizens. Given the entrenched role of 
the military in Iraqi political life and the powerful tendency for politics to be seen as a 
way of disciplining the population, democratic experiments in Iraq never culminated in 
genuine political change. Nevertheless, the rulers’ commitment to ensure conformity with 
their visions of social order was constantly interrupted by successive revolts in the north, 
which occasionally gave way to the emergence of leaders willing to open up the political 
system and make deals with the Kurds. The establishment of a de facto autonomous zone 
in the north practically eliminated this dynamic in the relationship between the Kurds and 
the state. 
The 1991 Gulf War virtually put an end to the Kurdish armed struggle in Iraq, 
which had defined the relationship between the Kurds and the Iraqi state more than half a 
century. Following the defeat of 1991, as testimony to the resilience of the system he has 
constructed, Saddam Hussein’s regime and much of his ruling circle remained largely 
intact. The power of the regime in Baghdad was not much affected by the emergence of 
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an autonomous Kurdish entity in the north.127 For the Kurds, on the other hand, state 
repression ceased to be a major threat in the virtually independent area under Kurdish 
control, which was protected from interference by the central government through a 
sterile U.S. containment policy against Saddam Hussein. Over the years following the 
Gulf War, the Kurdish region, historically one of Iraq’s most conflict-ridden and 
underdeveloped areas, has emerged as the most stable, secure and prosperous region by 
far. While the creation of a safe haven and subsequent development processes widened 
the social, political and economic gap between the north and the center, and were seen as 
a precursor to Kurdish statehood, the same processes became the very reason why the 
fate of the Kurds became tied to the future of Iraq and the establishment of a stable 
democracy in the country. 
The emergence of Iraqi Kurdistan as an autonomous entity in 1991 was not an 
unintended consequence of the defeat of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. The 
intermittent guerilla war that the Kurds themselves conducted against the central 
government, as well as the political cohesion and organizational capacity they built over 
the decades, shaped the turn in fate for the Kurds of Iraq as much as the major wars that 
were fought in the region. At the end of 1991, Saddam Hussein, content that the 
international community, particularly the US and Turkey, would never support Kurdish 
secessionism, withdrew the Iraqi army from Kurdistan. Saddam was right in anticipating 
the international reaction to the possible establishment of a Kurdish state, but his decision 
to pull out of Kurdistan was based on two erroneous assumptions. First, he believed the 
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Kurds would not be able to survive without the services of the central government and 
would rush quickly back to the control of the Baathist state. Second, he thought the world 
would remain indifferent to the fate of the Kurds, as had been the case after the Anfal 
campaign in 1988.128 Saddam was wrong on both counts. Kurdistan managed to survive 
economically and politically as a result of the combined effects of a number of factors. 
The emergence of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq was a direct outcome of the 
enhanced international humanitarian awareness of the Kurdish plight. The subsequent 
economic survival and sustainability of Kurdistan was also made possible through the 
vast amount of international aid flowing into the region, which encouraged relative 
stability, economic recovery and rehabilitation under the difficult post-war conditions. 
The external support for Kurdish autonomy has been tied largely to the international 
commitment to keep Iraq “as a whole.” However, humanitarian relief to the Kurds was 
also linked to larger transformations in international politics in the post-Cold War era that 
challenged the notion of state sovereignty and focused on protecting local populations on 
human rights principles and demands for post-conflict recovery.129 The installation of a 
no-fly zone and the subsequent economic support to the Kurds derived in large part from 
the strategic interests of the US and foreign governments to protect world petroleum 
markets and contain the Iraqi government. Nevertheless, it was also a result of the 
international attention and recognition won by the Kurdish cause, compounded by the 
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emergence of a “new humanitarianism” in the 1990s based on the promotion of programs 
of support for democracy and human rights in conflict-ridden societies.130  
Saddam expected his regime would return to Kurdistan soon after the end of the 
war. In early 1992, he imposed a complete economic blockade on the Kurdish region 
leading to a double embargo for the Kurds as Iraq was already subject to the United 
Nations sanctions. Under those conditions, humanitarian aid became the most important 
source of the region’s external finances. Over time, the UN’s difficulties in operating 
freely in Saddam-controlled regions of central and southern Iraq as well as the doubts 
concerning the proper monitoring or accountability for aid given for projects in 
government-controlled areas led to the emergence of development differentials across 
regions of the country.131 While the Saddam-controlled, aid-restricted regions 
experienced spiraling inflation, political instability, and socioeconomic decline, the 
Kurdistan region enjoyed certain levels of economic revival and assured some basic 
needs for the local population.132 During the regime’s last decade, the status-quo in Iraq 
remained largely unchanged, but the economic and political progress made by the 
Kurdistan region since 1991 came back to haunt the post-Saddam era, providing the 
Kurds with strong leverage over the debates on building a more inclusive political system 
in Iraq.  
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If international financial support played a major role in Kurdistan’s economic 
survival, it is the power of Kurdish nationalism as an ideological force that ensured the 
endurance of Kurdistan politically. After Baghdad pulled out of the Kurdish region, 
Saddam informed the legion of Kurdish civil servants they had to relocate to Iraqi 
government territory or lose their salaries.133 But the Kurds stayed. The government 
withdrew its administrative units and personnel from Kurdistan, cut off the salaries to 
Kurdish employees, and imposed an internal embargo on the region, creating a unique 
administrative and legislative vacuum that paralyzed civil operations in Kurdistan. The 
Kurds, however, were determined to take up this challenge because the “Kurdish 
ethnicity” had become a deeply entrenched valued good in Kurdish society after the 
decades-long struggle against the central government. This is why the commitment to 
Kurdish self-rule was no longer up for compromise, however costly the pursuit of its 
realization.  
Indigenous Kurdish political and administrative systems were established 
immediately after the events of 1991. The Kurdish political leadership, dominated by the 
KDP and the PUK, quickly took the initiative to fill the political vacuum created by the 
withdrawal of the Iraqi central government’s presence in the north. Multi-party elections 
occurred on May 19, 1992, resulting in the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government and a power sharing system between the KDP and PUK. In the years 
following the April 1992 elections, serious problems remained in Kurdistan, notably the 
internecine fighting between the two main parties, but the Kurds’ point of comparison – 
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as Iraq was severely damaged by the authoritarian rule of Saddam Hussein since 1979 – 
set a very low standard. For all their problems of divided government and internal 
mistrust, the Kurdish progress over governing an area that was almost completely 
destroyed by war with a population numbering as many as 5 million, was noteworthy.134 
The April 1992 election was one of the most democratic to be held in the Middle East 
and had a significant turnout, which was both an unambiguous sign of the population’s 
awareness of the importance of democratic principles and a protest against Saddam’s 
regime.135     
The economic and political development in the Kurdish region after 1991, and 
notably since the end of Kurdish infighting in 1997, has been held up as a demonstration 
that establishing an open and plural politics in Iraq is possible.136 In this respect, 
particularly after the American invasion of Iraq, the question of whether the de facto 
autonomous region in the north could provide a model for future democratic state of Iraq 
gained prominence. The answer to this question is tied to two distinct but interlocked 
processes: democracy in Kurdistan and the relations between the Kurds and Baghdad in 
the post-Saddam era.   
Political Development and Emergent Democracy in Iraqi Kurdistan 
The prospects of overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime were weak until the 
emergence of a possible confrontation between the U.S. and Iraq in 2002. In this context, 
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and in the face of the still powerful status quo in Baghdad and weak and fragmented Iraqi 
opposition, the Kurds focused on establishing a self-governing region in the north with a 
functioning democracy and decent living standards. With the changes taking place in the 
region and the growing possibility of a change of regime in Baghdad in 2003, the fears 
and ambitions regarding the future of Kurdistan grew as well. Considering the economic 
and political progress made since 1991 as well as the opportunities offered by major 
military action against Baghdad by the U.S., the Kurdistan Regional Government raised 
the political stakes in post-Saddam negotiations, moving from limited local autonomy to 
a more ambitious federal system of government. Besides the intersection of U.S. interests 
with those of the Kurds, it was the claims over the success of the “Kurdish democratic 
experiment” that led the Kurdish leaders to be more assertive regarding the Kurdish 
demands in the post-Saddam era. While those claims have merit, their validity cannot be 
confirmed unless the questions of how successful the experiment was and how 
sustainable it is are answered. 
In 1992, the Kurds declared the establishment of a federal democracy in Iraq to be 
their goal. When a de facto autonomous region emerged in the north in 1991, the two 
biggest challenges facing the Kurds were, first, Kurdish unity, specifically, dissolution of 
the rivalry between the KDP and PUK, and second, the concerns of the neighboring 
countries (Turkey and Iran in particular) over the emergence of an independent Kurdish 
state in northern Iraq. Kurdish unity, which was fundamental to the empowerment of the 
autonomous Kurdish entity, was ironically frightening the surrounding countries and 
provoking their intervention. The way to overcome this dilemma was determined to be 
the Kurdish adherence to the idea of a democratic, federal and unified Iraq, which would 
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both mitigate the concerns over territorial integrity of Iraq and preserve the Kurdish 
entity within a democratic framework. 
In October 1992, the Kurdistan National Assembly announced the unanimous 
commitment of Iraqi Kurdistan “to determine its fate and define its legal relationship with 
the central authority at this stage of history on the basis of a federation within a 
democratic parliamentary Iraq.”137 The October 1992 resolution recognized both the 
Kurds’ right to self-determination and the territorial integrity of Iraq, fulfilling the two 
main requirements for ensuring the economic and political success of Kurdistan. 
Nevertheless, the deep-seated problems within the Kurdish political scene soon sprang up 
to militate against the chances of ultimate success, the most serious of which was a 
crippling episode of internal fighting. 
Democracy in Kurdistan is primarily related to the multi-party politics as the 
political position in the region results largely from the way in which the two major 
political parties evolved. Successive rounds of civil war between the KDP and PUK 
created a significant obstacle to the establishment of a coherent democratic structure and 
led to major problems in the region including the use of violence in pursuit of political 
ends, corruption, the division of society along established political cleavages and external 
intervention. This situation inevitably highlights a question about the extent to which a 
system characterized by a fundamental divide can truly provide a model for the rest of 
Iraq, which already suffered from severe social, political, ethnic and sectarian divisions.  
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Faced with the necessity of having to form an administration in the aftermath of 
the withdrawal of government forces in 1991, the political parties of the Kurdistan region 
struggled to come to terms with their newfound territorial authority.138 For decades, the 
Kurds were against law and order, and fought against the state. Changing from guerilla 
fighters to statesmen was not an easy task. Still, in 1992, Kurdistan’s voters showed they 
had both the desire and the ability to govern themselves by electing a National Assembly. 
However, the power sharing system devised to both provide an administration for the 
region and satisfy the KDP and PUK simply did not solve the historical enmity deriving 
from deep-rooted political grievances and mutual mistrust between the two parties.  
Until 1997, neither party displayed the ability to manage their rivalries in a 
peaceful manner, and resorted to military options that made the possibility of any stable 
joint government extremely unlikely.139 Moreover, the use of arms inevitably made the 
parties look beyond the Kurdish region for support, which paved the way for external 
intervention. The KDP established working relations with Turkey, which needed the 
KDP in order to destroy the PKK bases in northern Iraq. Meanwhile, the PUK turned to 
Iran for military support, which led the KDP to ask military assistance from the Iraqi 
government. American concern about the re-establishment of Saddam Hussein’s control 
in the north as well as the intervention of Iran into Iraqi territories eventually resulted in 
the U.S.-mediated Washington Agreement of September 1998, which ended the fighting 
between the KDP and the PUK.  
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The situation in Kurdistan until 1997 clearly revealed the difficulties associated 
with the Kurdish parties’ ability to “govern” due to their roots as armed opposition 
groups. Rather than viewing the first half the 1990s as an “incompetency” brought about 
by the evolution of the Kurdish movement as a predominantly military struggle, it is 
perhaps more correct to see it as a period of development toward the maturity of the Iraqi 
Kurdish political system and parties. Following the Washington Agreement, Kurdistan 
was divided into two executive jurisdictions controlled by the KDP and the PUK, 
respectively. The divided political system, despite casting a shadow of apprehension over 
the future of a unified Kurdistan government, paradoxically allowed the parties to 
manage their differences while gaining the experience, knowledge, and skills necessary 
to turn Kurdistan around.140 As awkward and cumbersome as the divided government 
appeared to be, the stability achieved by the division of power enabled both parties to 
manage the domestic affairs of their respective regions more efficiently and develop their 
administrative capacities. Since 1997, there has been an increasing trend toward 
reconciliation and cooperation as the two parties focus on being governments rather than 
parties.  
Despite the political turmoil of the mid-1990s and the subsequent territorial 
division of Kurdistan, one might still argue that a more democratic and pluralistic system 
prevailed in the north as compared to the one-party totalitarian state in Baghdad whose 
pervasive apparatus of surveillance and repression remained largely intact even during 
the 1990s. The Washington Agreement explicitly recognized the multi-ethnic 
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composition of the Kurdish region and thus of Iraq as a whole, placing the aspirations of 
such groupings as the Turkmen, Assyrians and the Chaldeans on an equal footing with 
those of the Kurds.141 Since 1991, all the cabinets of Kurdistan included the members of 
ethnic and religious minorities through the enforcement of certain minority quotas. The 
more open and liberal atmosphere has allowed the entry of new political forces, including 
the formation of parties representing other ethnic and religious groups in the region such 
as three separate Turkmen parties, the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan and its more 
radical Islamist offshoots, as well as Assyrian and other Christian parties.142  
Since 1997, the experiences Kurdistan offer proof that Iraqis, who had been 
deprived of any meaningful democratic experience for decades, can embrace democratic 
principles and norms. The process of reconciliation in Kurdistan gained pace particularly 
after the U.S.-invasion of Iraq, which galvanized the Kurdish leaders to plan carefully 
their future course of action and coordinate their efforts both in their political 
negotiations with Baghdad and in how they govern Kurdistan. These efforts brought 
about major accomplishments for the Kurds, the most notable of which was the formal 
recognition of the Kurdistan Region as a legitimate entity of the state.143 The Kurdistan 
Regional Government Unification Agreement of January 21, 2006 further strengthened 
the legitimacy of the Kurdish politicians and consolidated the Kurdistan Region as an 
                                                      
141 Tripp, 258.   
142 Ibid. 
143 Stansfield, Gareth (2010). “From Civil War to Calculated Compromise: The Unification of Kurdistan 
Regional Government in Iraq” in The Kurdish Policy Imperative edited by Robert Lowe, Gareth Stansfield, 
London: Chatham House, 138. 
91 
 
institutionalized reality in the Middle East. It was also a major step towards putting an 
end to the exploitation of differences between the KDP and PUK by the regional powers. 
Iraqi Kurdistan has come a long way for the last two decades, but it would be a 
mistake to exaggerate the levels of development that occurred in the region. Even though 
the KRG became a mixed cabinet following the unification agreement, the political 
power in the region remained divided between two poles. Both the PUK and the KDP 
have been exposed to criticisms on the grounds that they continue to put their separate 
party interests before the interests of the KRG and that even the opposition parties are 
actually on the payroll of the two main parties in the region.144 The establishment of a 
joint government provided hope that the disputes between the KDP and PUK would be 
solved, and the KRG would better serve the collective and public interest. However, the 
new unified arrangement generated concern among the smaller parties that the PUK and 
KDP might have absolute power in Kurdistan and narrow the democratic process by 
hindering the establishment of any opposition in the region.145  
Despite its distinct course of development, Iraqi Kurdistan shares many structural 
features with the country as a whole. While the region has enjoyed enhanced economic 
prosperity over the past two decades, the regional elites have maintained their patron-
client networks by relying on the same structures that materialized during their resistance 
to the Baath rule.146 The PUK and the KDP negotiated successful development programs 
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with the United Nations and international nongovernmental organizations through their 
share of the “Oil-for-food” program, which played an important role in the economic 
development of the region throughout the 1990s. However, this situation created 
important challenges for Iraqi Kurdistan similar to those facing many authoritarian 
societies based on wealth through oil. Despite the achievement of a great deal of 
economic progress, this growth remained vulnerable given the increasing dependency on 
oil and gas, particularly after the realization that the region cannot continue to count on 
international aid to maintain its economic growth.          
Contemporary Iraqi Kurdistan is not quite a rentier state (or quasi-state) in the 
classical dependency-theoretical sense of the word. Nevertheless, the growing oil sector, 
combined with Kurdistan’s position as a “post-civil war society,” resulted in certain 
structural problems whereby the heritage of domestic conflict strengthened, and even 
institutionalized, the patronage relations in the region.147 Instead of the KRG, the control 
over important sectors such as oil, gas, telecommunications, construction and trade 
remained in the hands of the PUK and KDP or other allied political groups.148 The wealth 
acquired through international aid and oil has not been distributed among the Kurdish 
cities equally due to the two major parties’ tendency to spend most of the funds for the 
benefit of their respective spheres of influence. Thus, economic inequality remains a 
major problem as not all people have been able to profit from Kurdistan’s newly-
achieved prosperity. Smaller political parties, independent civil society organizations and 
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the media have largely failed to act as checks over the larger parties due to the 
institutionalized patronage and policies of cooptation that cut across the state-society 
relations. This situation significantly weakened the chances for genuine democracy in the 
region and instead, consolidated the perception of the KRG as “Barzani-stan” and 
“Talabani-stan.”    
This institutionalized patronage gradually increased the mistrust of the KRG and 
its institutions among the Iraqi Kurdish populations. The PUK and the KDP have been 
able to maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of the Kurdish public in large part because of 
their leadership role within the resistance against decades of totalitarian rule and violent 
repression in the north. Since Saddam Hussein’s overthrow in 2003, however, it has 
become increasingly apparent the people of Kurdistan are not satisfied with the 
authorities in power and now demand for the elimination of institutionalized clientelism 
and corruption. 
The first popular expression of dissatisfaction with the ruling parties appeared in 
March 2006 when hundreds of protestors took to the streets on the anniversary of Halabja 
gas attack, expressing anger at what they view as corruption, nepotism, and a lack of 
transparency within the KRG, and particularly within the two predominant political 
parties.149 March 2006 protests were the most serious popular challenge to the political 
parties that have ruled Kurdistan for the past fifteen years and conspicuously highlighted 
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the growing tension between the local Kurdish communities and the KRG.150 Likewise, a 
series of demonstrations and riots against the KRG occurred in 2011 in the city of 
Suleymaniyah, demanding an end to corruption and social injustice, and asking for the 
resignation of the cabinet and the disbanding of the KRG. The protests were inspired by 
the pro-democracy uprisings sweeping the Arab world and organized by the Goran 
(Change) Movement, a major opposition party founded in 2009. After more than two 
months of daily protests, the demonstrations were crushed by the security forces, which 
opened fire and detained protesters, actions that received heavy criticism from Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch.151  
The problem that has prevailed in Kurdistan since 1991, is that the creation of a 
functioning government in the region remained a top-down process involving the elites of 
the two major political parties and external actors, particularly the United States. 
Ordinary people living in the Kurdistan region exercise very little influence over the form 
or substance of the government.152 Although the people of Kurdistan in principle from 
1991 to 2003 largely supported this undertaking, the fact that the regional authorities held 
significantly more power than ordinary citizens gradually created a clear set of local 
grievances and demands for renegotiating the terms of the relationship between the 
authorities and local people.  
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Kurdistan holds promise for the future. Although the major political parties of the 
KDP and PUK focused primarily on preserving their own power base within the region, 
they also acknowledged the necessity of embedding more democratic procedures in order 
to ensure both internal legitimacy and external support for the Kurdish cause. After the 
2006 protests in Halabja, increasing government responsiveness to the demands of the 
citizens created an expanded political space with more active civil society involvement. 
During the post-protest mobilization process, many of the people associated with the 
opposition media and NGOs became important players within the new Goran Party, 
which formed in 2009 as a break away from the PUK over issues about transparency in 
government, accountability, and corruption.153 Following the 2011 protests organized by 
Goran, both the KDP and PUK leaderships declared their recognition of the people’s 
right to protest and the legitimacy of their demands.154 Goran won nearly a quarter of the 
votes in the Iraqi Kurdistan parliamentary elections of July 2009, and mounted a serious 
challenge to the monopoly of power of the two main parties. In the 2013 parliamentary 
elections, Goran gained even more votes and won the second-most seats in the parliament 
after the KDP, bumping the PUK in the third place. After the elections, the PUK 
announced that it respected the results and “denying the people’s will would be 
shameful.”155 
Increasing competition between the KDP and PUK and the emergence of a new, 
more vigorous Kurdish opposition, definitely presents challenges for stability in 
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Kurdistan. On the other hand, a growing understanding among the parties regarding the 
rules of political competition looks promising in terms of effective promotion of 
democracy and expansion of multi-party involvement in the region. It is important to note 
that many of the difficulties facing post-Saddam Iraq are similar to those facing Iraqi 
Kurdistan since 1991. If there is one clear lesson to be learned from the experience of the 
Kurds, it would be that embarking on a competitive multi-party democracy without 
considering the multiple fault lines in political, ideological, ethnic and sectarian terms in 
divided societies is potentially disastrous. This lesson proved pertinent for the whole of 
Iraq in the post-Saddam era, confirming that the development of political framework 
underpinned by consensus regarding the rules of political competition is not possible 
without political reconciliation between various ethno-sectarian groups in Iraqi society.    
Relations between the KRG and Baghdad in the Post-Saddam Era 
Besides the shortcomings of the model of governance and democracy in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, the question of whether Iraqi Kurdistan can become a model for the rest of 
Iraq is important especially when one considers the Kurdish movement is the most 
influential component of the Iraqi opposition. Until 1991, the Kurds’ position in Iraq’s 
internal opposition took the form of armed struggle, which played an important role in 
forcing successive Iraqi regimes to make concessions on issues regarding democracy, 
governance, and political participation. However, those concessions never turned into 
permanent measures or spurred real political change in Iraq because of the deeply 
entrenched authoritarian structure of the state.  
When regime change became imminent in Baghdad in the aftermath of the 
American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iraqi Kurdistan had been without any direct link to 
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the central government for more than a decade. After the removal of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, the Kurdish leaders “returned” to Iraq to participate in the negotiations 
concerning the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) after more than a decade of de 
facto sovereignty. However, this time, Iraq’s diverse ethnic and religious groups had a 
unique opportunity to redefine, negotiate and reshape the state on new bases of legal 
plurality and decentralization. It was in this context the Kurds once again took up their 
role as the core element of the internal opposition in Iraq and their role became central to 
the questions of democracy and federalism in the country in the post-Saddam period.            
The emergence of Iraq as a federal state after the regime change was in part a 
consequence of the American views of the larger question over Iraqi identities. However, 
the form federalism took in Iraq as it was accepted in the 2005 constitution was mainly 
the outcome of dedication and active participation by the Kurds in both the Iraqi 
Governing Council and the transitional Iraqi government, which lasted from June 2004 to 
the January 30, 2005 elections.156 Given their accumulated power and experience with 
administration and organization over a decade, the Kurdish parties operated with 
increased leverage over the Arabs in shaping the constitutional negotiations.  
The Kurds were never seen as a strategic asset by the U.S. despite the important 
role they played in ousting Saddam Hussein from power. After the victory of the U.S. it 
soon became apparent that this role was a transient one. The fact the U.S. refrained from 
publicly supporting the planned federation pushed the Kurdish officials to intensify their 
efforts to fine-tune the concept of federalism, which they envisioned in 1992 for the new 
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Iraq and reiterated during the Iraqi opposition conference in London in 2002.157 The 
TAL, and later on, the permanent constitution of Iraq acknowledged the legal status of 
the KRG and recognized the Kurdistan region as one of the federal units in Iraq. 
Nevertheless, the nature of the federation, but more precisely, the question of whether 
federalism will strengthen the state and national unity in Iraq or continue to be a source of 
division, remained to be the main cause of tension and negotiation after the ratification of 
the permanent constitution in October 2005.  
The Arab-Kurdish Divide: Challenges and Prospects 
Much of the contention between the Kurds and Arabs in the post-2005 period 
arises from the status of Kirkuk and the other disputed territories in Nineveh and Diyala 
provinces, and the KRG’s desire to be autonomous in managing its own internal affairs, 
particularly, its oil resources. The 2005 constitution lays out a process of resolving the 
status of Kirkuk and the other disputed areas, but it has remained dysfunctional to date 
because of profound differences over interpretation and the lack of political will.158 A 
referendum in Kirkuk was supposed to have been held in 2007 in accordance with the 
Article 140 of the constitution, but has been put off indefinitely by Baghdad. From the 
perspective of the Kurds, this is an indication of the central government’s anti-
democratic, sectarian, centralizing and unconstitutional behavior, which threatens the 
fragile democracy in Iraq and opens the way for inter-communal conflict.159  
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The prosperous, autonomous Kurdish oil market is the greatest factor in 
instigating political feuds and complicates the status of Kirkuk. In this regard, the 
Kurdish attempts to make separate oil deals with foreign governments and international 
oil companies plays the role of both stabilizing and spoiling the political process in 
Iraq.160 On the one hand, the Kurdistan’s region’s economic empowerment through oil 
exports may force the Prime Minister to engage in serious negotiation regarding the 
disputed territories and Iraq’s oil policy, which would strengthen the commitment to 
power sharing and the creation of a more inclusive political dialogue. In addition, the 
economic opportunities offered by the growth of Kurdistan’s oil and gas industry have 
greatly encouraged economic and political cooperation with regional states, particularly 
Iran and Turkey. These alliances helped stabilize the KRG’s shared borders, which have 
been historically conflict-ridden areas because of the Kurdish problems in the 
neighboring states.  
On the other hand, the KRG’s nationalist ambitions and efforts to strengthen the 
autonomy of the Kurdistan region makes it a potential political spoiler because of the 
challenge the KRG poses upon the Iraqi government’s own state-building efforts to 
consolidate its authority and territorial integrity.161 In this regard, the decisions annexing 
Kirkuk to Kurdistan and permitting the KRG to be autonomous in managing its own oil 
resources were viewed by the Iraqi government as Kurdish political overreaching, and as 
increasingly maximalist demands. 
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The authoritarian policies of the Baghdad government, headed by the Prime 
Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, were slowly unfolding since the beginning his first term in the 
office in 2006, particularly given his attempts to fill the ranks of the security and 
intelligence services with loyalists and to create constitutionally unregulated structures to 
by-pass the parliamentary approval requirements for the selection of top officers. The 
Kurds supported Al-Maliki during his first term in order to achieve stability for the 
fragile coalition government and they helped him survive several political challenges in 
2006 and 2007, not only from Sunni Arab factions, but also from within his own Shia 
community.162 Yet, the Kurds began to break with Maliki as the Prime Minister’s efforts 
to stamp his authority on the Iraqi government and to bring Iraq’s security and 
intelligence services under his direct control reached its peak by the end of 2008. When 
the Sunni-Shia tensions led to nine months of political gridlock over the formation of the 
new Iraqi government following the March 2010 parliamentary elections, it was the 
critical role played by the Kurdish parties that resolved the impasse and ensured a second 
term for Maliki. 
Although the Shia bloc in Iraq is more willing to play along with the emphasis on 
consensus and power sharing in the new political order as compared to the Sunnis, both 
the Shia and the Sunni political groupings disfavor the federal structure in Iraq which 
limits the power of the central government and provides the Kurds with greater say in 
Iraqi politics. The Kurdish parties, therefore, refrained from embracing a specific party or 
candidate from among either the Shia or Sunni-backed contenders to lead the new 
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government in 2010. While Maliki’s growing power and authoritarianism was definitely 
alarming if he were reappointed, a potential Sunni-dominated government was equally 
worrisome for the Kurds given the Sunni Arabs’ decisive advocacy for a strong, 
centralized government that could lead to the unraveling of the political settlement 
reached in 2003. Eventually, the Kurds threw their support behind Maliki on three 
conditions: the governing coalition would be a government of national unity, comprising 
all the major political blocs in Iraq; the prime minister’s authority would be diluted to 
prevent accumulation of disproportionate power; and negotiations would be resumed, in 
accordance with the 2005 constitution, on the status of Kirkuk and the other disputed 
territories, and the long-stalled hydrocarbons and revenue-sharing law.   
Maliki accepted the demands of the Kurds by signing a pledge that spelled out 
key agreements and the terms designed to limit his power. However, once the new 
government finally coalesced, it became apparent the measures taken to constrain 
Maliki’s grip on power would remain on paper. Maliki tightened his control over the 
Iraqi state and its security forces by increasing his efforts to centralize power by 
controlling the strategic ministries, the military, the electoral commission and the 
economy.163 He also implemented a harsh bureaucratic cleansing campaign against 
Kurdish and Sunni figures, which undermined the power-sharing system implemented in 
Iraq after the U.S. invasion.  
The Kurdish-Arab relations further deteriorated after the withdrawal of the U.S. 
forces from Iraq at the end of 2011. The US withdrawal greatly weakened the safety 
valve that helped manage Arab-Kurdish relations in Iraq since 2003 and left highly 
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sensitive and significant issues that have not been resolved on the table, such as the 
reconciliation between politicized communities, the disagreements over disputed 
territories, the scope of Kurdish autonomy, oil policy, and the overall nature of the 
national project. Following the US departure, Maliki’s calls for a rewritten constitution 
that would increase the executive authority of the prime minister’s office over regions 
reflected the growing discrepancy between the centralization policies of Baghdad and the 
autonomy aspirations of the Kurdistan region. The main driving force behind the attack 
against the constitution was the view that the Kurds are an existential threat to the 
territorial integrity of Iraq and that the Kurds’ attempts to implement article 140 of the 
constitution and negotiate an oil law for Iraq illustrate their ultimate aim to secede from 
the state.  
The suspicion about the ultimate Kurdish goals is a consequence of the prevalence 
of ethno-sectarian-based analysis of Iraqi politics that has existed since the establishment 
of the modern state of Iraq. As the post-Saddam era paved the way for the furthering of 
Kurdish autonomy, the possible secession of the Kurds from Iraq became more 
frequently pronounced by Baghdad and the neighboring governments as well as by 
academics, journalists and media commentators. Repeated emphasis on this option 
derived partially from the desire of both the Sunni and Shia Arabs to return to an Iraq 
dominated by a strong state narrative founded on Arabism, and partially from the failure 
to think outside the dominant paradigm that national self-determination has only one 
meaning, a sovereign and independent state.  
Since the mandatory period, none of the major Kurdish political forces in Iraq 
presented independent statehood as an organized political demand. The Kurds had 
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founded their political and military struggle on the argument that self-determination does 
not necessarily entail only one option. As a demonstration of their commitment to new 
forms of national affirmation beyond statehood, the Kurds developed a perspective in 
which Iraq was viewed as a state where the devolution of some state competences go 
hand-in-hand with a meaningful recognition of the Kurds as a distinct national 
community within a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Iraq.164 From this perspective, the 
2005 constitution was not a document that set the stage for the eventual Kurdish 
secession, but a compromise by the Kurds undertaken for the interests of the “new Iraq” 
and as evidence of the Kurds’ commitment to the integrity of the state.165 In the same 
vein, and when viewed from the Kurdish perspective, the actions of the KRG regarding 
the disputed territories and oil revenues, which are perceived as indications of Kurdish 
secessionist aims, are simply reactions of the Kurds to Baghdad’s refusal to negotiate the 
territories, revenue sharing and national hydrocarbon law through constitutional means.   
The Debate on Federalism 
The adoption of a federal system of government, whereby power is 
constitutionally divided among different levels of government, is among the most 
frequently advocated solutions to the problem of managing conflict in divided 
societies.166  However, the challenge lies in the question of how to structure a federation 
that can alleviate, rather than exacerbate, ethnic and religious divisions. The concerns 
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regarding the design of federal system and the future of democracy in Iraq bear a 
substantial resemblance to the concerns raised during the British mandate over how to 
amalgamate Iraq’s diverse peoples into a coherent whole within a representative 
governance framework. Since the mandatory period, successive regimes in Iraq saw the 
Arab-Kurdish divide as carrying the greatest potential for undermining Iraq’s social and 
political unity.167 The post-Saddam era is no exception.  
During the 1920s, the British opted for supporting Arab nationalism in Iraq in 
order to integrate the peoples of the new state, which only exacerbated the ethnic gap in 
society and left Iraq’s north in a constant state of war until 1991. The American policy 
towards post-Saddam Iraq, while supporting the creation of a federal government that 
represents the right of all peoples of Iraq, is fixated on the international commitment to 
Iraq’s territorial integrity, which propels the U.S. policy makers toward favoring 
recentralization. Thus, in both cases, the external powers’ commitment to maintain a 
strong central government in Baghdad encourages the promotion of the idea of “oneness 
of Iraq,” which eases the sectarian divisions by appeasing pan-Arab opinion, but does not 
relieve the conflict potential rooted in the ethnic divide.  
The Shia grievances in Iraq until the 2003 war and the Sunni grievances in the 
country in the post-Saddam era are, by and large, similar in nature and have more to do 
with the distribution of power within the state than the form of governance. The political 
and economic balance in Iraq, which has been heavily in favor of the minority Sunnis, 
shifted dramatically after the demise of Saddam’s regime and provided the Shia Arabs 
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with increased access to power due to their demographic majority. Although the Sunnis 
reacted harshly to their reduced political status, they made common cause with the Shia 
Arabs in calling for a tight-knit Arab Iraq with a strong central government, as opposed to 
the Kurdish desire for a loose federation. Iraq’s new constitution recognized the majority 
of the demands by the Kurds. However, the post-2005 political process in Iraq simply 
transformed the ethnic struggle between the Arabs and the Kurds into a struggle between 
“centralists” and “regionalists,” thus, leaving the problem of Arab-Kurdish divide largely 
unresolved. 
The standard approach to the question of democracy and federalism in Iraq among 
both the academic and policy communities is that in order for democracy to take root, the 
federal system in Iraq has to be territorially, not ethnically, based.168 In other words, it is 
argued that a federal system based on ethno-sectarian divisions will entrench community-
based loyalties and lead to civil breakdown by encouraging the citizens’ commitment to 
the “good” of the narrower community rather than to the “general good.” The best 
alternative for Iraq is seen as deemphasizing the particularistic attachments to sect or 
ethnicity, and establishing a federal system that is decentralized on the basis of territory, 
and promotes citizenship and constitutional patriotism. Within this framework, the Kurds 
and their efforts to protect the autonomy of Kurdistan are automatically denounced as a 
threat to the unity of Iraq.  
Iraq’s communal divisions might indeed undermine political stability and 
democratization. However, what threatens the future of democracy in Iraq is not Iraq’s 
                                                      
168 See Dawisha (2005); Hakan Yavuz (2004); Democratic Principles Working Group (2002). “Final Report 
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communal diversity per se, but how it is managed. The political process in Iraq has long 
been a scene of life-and-death struggles that formed the texture of a violent and 
communal politics across the country.169 For democracy to flourish in Iraq, the new 
political order must first address the fear of each community that one group might come 
to power and impose its interests and goals on the other groups. If Iraq’s ethnic and 
sectarian diversity is managed as matter of pluralism and democratic participation rather 
than as a divisive factor, then the motivation of each group to limit the power of the other 
might in fact provide the checks and balances essential to the establishment of a workable 
and equitable power sharing system. Therefore, the main task is to transform the 
country’s communal diversity from a disintegrating force to an agent for democratic 
change. For those advocating for a territorial federalism in Iraq, this task can be achieved 
by emphasizing the “Iraqi” character of the state above all considerations of ethnic or 
religious affiliation. According to this argument, there is but one “people” in Iraq, the 
“Iraqi people,” which refers to the citizens of the state of Iraq regardless of race, 
ethnicity, or religion.170  
This view, while finding resonance among the majority Arab community, invites 
suspicion among the Kurds as it means relinquishment of their formal status as a separate 
nationality and the loss of Kurdish identity, distinctiveness and existing rights. There is 
no doubt the promotion and reinforcement of a shared Iraqi citizenship and identity is 
crucial for establishing a sustainable democracy in Iraq. However, this approach does not 
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170 International Crisis Group. “Iraq’s Constitutional Challenge,” Baghdad and Brussels: ICG Middle East 
Reports 19, November 13, 2003, 11. 
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capture the complexities and historical particularities of modern Iraq. Throughout the 
twentieth century, the barrier to democracy in Iraq was not its ethno-sectarian diversity, 
but the absence of any meaningful political space for the expression of ethnic and 
religious identities. Given the long history of ethnic expulsion, coercive assimilation and 
genocidal action against the Kurds, it is politically unrealistic to expect the Kurds to 
abandon their long struggle to be recognized as a nationality in exchange for reintegrating 
into Iraq on the terms of Iraq-first patriotism. A shared “Iraqi” identity can be 
reconstructed only if it is articulated on the basis of explicit recognition of multiple 
identities, be they national, religious, or linguistic.  
The notion of shared Iraqi citizenship stems primarily from an effort to encourage 
commitment to “civic nationalism” and “constitutional patriotism,” as opposed ethnic 
nationalism. Nevertheless, it is hard for Iraq to develop into a Western-style liberal 
democracy as such, given that it does not correspond to the ethnographic realities of the 
country. There is not just “one” Iraqi people. The Iraqi people are made up of more than 
one nationality, including Arabs and Kurds, which was recognized even by the Baathists 
in their March 1970 accord with the KDP, as well as by the provisional constitution of 
1958. Both in 1958 and 1970, however, the recognition of multiple nationalities in Iraq 
and the promise of democracy remained on paper due to the ideological pressure of Arab 
nationalism. These failed attempts at creating a more open government and finding a 
peaceful solution to the Kurdish question only resulted in the deepening of Arab-Kurdish 
divide and consolidation of the authoritarian rule in the country. The route taken by the 
TAL rightfully serves to manage this division by creating a durable set of political 
compromises so that Iraq could evolve into a sustainable democracy. Nonetheless, the 
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post-December 2005 election era showed that Iraq is still facing the threat of 
recentralization and sliding back to authoritarian rule. 
The constitution adopted in Iraq in 2005 set up a decentralized federation and put 
forward a very progressive framework of democratic governance, civil rights and 
freedoms. Apart from the Kurds’ strong assertion of federalism, little has been discussed 
in the country at large about the composition of the new government, particularly the 
degree of devolution of central power and the definition of the boundaries of the federal 
units. While the Sunni Arabs were primarily concerned about their marginalized status in 
the new order, the Shia were eager to claim the political power they believe their majority 
deserves and was denied for so long under Saddam’s Sunni-dominated government.171 In 
this context, the Kurdish parties emerged as the critical “third” players in the post-
Saddam era, concerned mainly with the troubling possibility of Shia plans to replace an 
iron-fisted minority with the tyranny of the majority. That was the main reason behind 
the Kurdish parties’ insistence on a power-sharing system that would recognize Kurdistan 
as one geographic and political entity and prevent future discrimination by the central 
state apparatus.  
Democracy and Power-Sharing in Iraq: Towards an Alternative Model  
The issues of hydrocarbons legislation, disputed territories and federalism clearly 
pitch the KRG and the Iraqi government against each other. Nevertheless, rather than a 
disintegrating factor, this situation needs to be understood in the context of the ethno-
sectarian political dynamic, which implicitly denounces Kurdistan as an ethnic entity. 
Despite shared anti-Maliki sentiments with many other Iraqi Arab groups, the Kurdistan 
                                                      
171 Al-Rikabi, Ramsey. “The Kurds and the Constitution,” Al-Ahram Weekly, March 18, 2004. 
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region has no significant support from other Iraqi populations for its key demands 
regarding the implementation of the constitution because of the still-powerful ethnic fault 
lines in Iraqi society. As the borders of the Kurdistan region are perceived to be 
ethnically defined, the disputes over autonomy, management of oil resources, and the 
status of Kirkuk and other oil-rich areas continue to derail the post-Saddam 
democratization process in the country. 
It is true that Kurdistan certainly pertains to the homeland of the Kurds as a 
distinct ethnic group. In that sense, the Kurdishness of Kurdistan is undeniable. However, 
the Kurdistan region is not ethnically homogeneous and some of the other governorates 
of Iraq, most notably Baghdad, Nineveh, Diyala and Kirkuk, have highly heterogeneous 
populations. The 2005 constitution provides a legal framework to define federal sub-units 
that transcend ethnic boundaries and focus on regional identity, with varying degrees of 
ethnic and religious homogeneity and heterogeneity.172 Article 117 of the constitution 
recognizes Kurdistan as one of the federal regions and according to article 124, the 
Baghdad, with its administrative borders, constitutes the governorate of Baghdad and 
may not merge with a region. Regulations regarding the formation of new regions are 
specified in article 119, which states that the remaining governorates shall have the right 
to organize into a region based on a request to be voted on in a referendum. The 
constitution, thus, allows the Iraqis themselves rather than the political elites to determine 
the nature of their federation and whether it will be defined by ethnicity or regional 
                                                      
172 Article 113 of the constitution recognizes the Kurdistan Region as one of the sub-units of the federation. 
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identity. From this perspective, Iraq has a chance to evolve naturally into a hybrid 
ethnic/territorial federation that will both ensure the dominant ethnic and religious 
populations their rights will not be compromised, and provide political consensus that 
regional administrations will be based on respect for diversity.  
Iraq’s dilemma is that an ethnic federation in which the political parties, electoral 
politics and power in the central government are organized around ethnic groups would 
most likely exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the ethno-sectarian nature of politics in the 
country. A territorial federation, on the other hand, which deliberately draws lines to 
divide ethnic concentrations would equally reinforce the ethnic divisions, at least in the 
short term, given the fact ethnicity is already one of the powerful defining features of 
Iraq’s political life. What the advocates of territorial federalism fail to realize is that 
territorial federalism offers benefits once the system is already in place, but it does not 
provide a solution to the dilemmas of creating territorial federalism in deeply-divided 
societies composed of geographically concentrated ethnic groups in the first place. 
Currently, any attempt to divide Kurdistan territorially would certainly be forcibly 
resisted by the Kurds and might spark violent reactions that would unravel the fragile 
political consensus underpinning Iraq’s nascent political order. Hence, what Iraq needs is 
a more fluid option that would prevent the imposition of either of these two extremes, and 
instead enable a smooth transition from ethno-sectarian politics to pluralist democracy.  
The option of regional federalism, where the sub-units will be defined not by 
ethnicity but on the basis of distinct historical and cultural identities, has the potential to 
offer a viable solution to the controversies regarding the design of Iraq’s federal 
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system.173 Under this model, in terms of population, the regional sub-units will still be 
dominated by certain ethnic or religious groups, but communal identities will not be their 
defining feature. Since the late 1990s, the Kurdish political leadership of Iraq has 
attempted to build a civic nationalist project that promotes the idea of a “Kurdistani” 
identity to which Arabs, Turkmens, Assyrians as well as the Kurds living in Kurdistan 
region could subscribe. In doing so, the Kurdish leaders have sought to promote the idea 
that the “Kurdistan Region” is a geographic construct and an institutionalized entity 
based on the recognition of the distinct ethnic and cultural identities of its component 
peoples under an all-encompassing “Kurdistani” vision. 
Although it has yet to be voted on in a referendum and thereby enter into force, 
the KRG approved the draft constitution of the Kurdistan region on June 24, 2009, which 
lodges significant protections for the non-Kurdish groups in the region. The equality 
clause of article 20 lays the groundwork for this by stating that all forms of 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, language, social background, nationality, 
origin, religion, belief, thought, age, social, political or economic status, or handicap are 
prohibited.174 Article 5 of the draft constitution recognizes the ethnically and religiously 
diverse structure of Kurdistan by stating that the people of the region are composed of 
Kurds, Arabs, Chaldo-Assyrian-Syriacs, Armenians and others who are citizens of 
Kurdistan. The religious rights of the Christians, Yazidis and other non-Muslim groups 
are recognized under article 6. The draft constitution accepts Kurdish and Arabic as the 
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two official languages of the Kurdistan region, but also guarantees the right of the 
region’s citizens to educate their children in their mother tongue and recognizes that 
along with Kurdish and Arabic, Turkmen and Assyrian shall be official languages in 
administrative districts populated by the speakers of these languages.  
The draft constitution as well as the electoral law of the Iraqi Kurdistan National 
Assembly recognizes the election system shall take into consideration the fair 
representation of all geographic localities, ethnic and religious groups and that a member 
of the parliament shall represent all the groups that make up the people of Iraqi 
Kurdistan, regardless of their political, ethnic and religious affiliation. According to 
article 22 of the electoral law, every group or ethnic minority (Turkmen, Arab or others) 
have the right to forward its own roster that includes the names of their nominees for the 
Iraqi Kurdistan region.175  
Although they gained some support from Turkmens and Assyrians, it is hard to 
claim the Iraqi Kurdish leaders have succeeded in their efforts to promote a regional 
vision of Kurdistan as home to diverse identity groups living in the north of the country. 
The overwhelming sentiment among the Assyrian community is to preserve their 
distinctiveness rather than subscribing to the wider “Kurdistani” identity, which is still 
considered as representing the dominance of the Kurds in the region.176 The strategy to 
gain Turkmens’ support for the Kurdistani initiative also failed due to the problems 
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created between the communities by the situation in Kirkuk. The KRG’s demand for the 
inclusion of Kirkuk into the Kurdistan region of Iraq, and the insistence on its Kurdish 
origins has put the Kurds in conflict with the Turkmens who accused the Kurdish 
leadership of attempting to “Kurdify” Kirkuk just as Saddam “Arabized” it.177 Similar to 
Arabs, for the Turkmens, both inside and outside of Kirkuk, incorporation of Kirkuk into 
the Kurdistan region would accelerate Kurdish independence and, thus, Iraq’s break-
up.178  
The policy of promoting the notion of “being Kurdistani” has failed for two 
reasons. The first reason is the continued dominance of ethno-sectarian divisions in 
defining Iraqi political life and the accompanying political pressures that exist in the 
country, particularly over the controversial issues of federalism and disputed territories. 
Latent suspicion continues to exist between Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians and Turkmens. The 
second reason is the fact that the traditional understanding of Kurdistan, that is the idea of 
a greater Kurdistan entity as the homeland of all Kurds, grew stronger among the Iraqi 
Kurds mainly due to the heightened expectations following the survival of Kurdistan 
region in Iraq since 1991. The consolidation of this idea has happened perhaps even 
against the wishes of the leaderships KDP and PUK, who now face the challenging task 
of balancing the political realities of post-Saddam Iraq with the expectations of the Kurds 
in the north.  
The reluctance of the Turkmen and Assyrian communities to accept the wider 
“Kurdistani” identity, as well as the growing Kurdish nationalist sentiment in the north, 
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suggests the attempts to distance the Kurdistan region from being viewed to be overtly 
Kurdish will remain futile. However, the Kurdish politicians are keen to continue to 
follow this strategy. Why this is the case is not difficult to comprehend: Kurdish leaders 
are fully aware of the fact their geography and power bases are strongly against them in 
case they opt for independence. The option of independence also means military 
confrontation not only with Iraq but also with the neighboring states and a possible US 
involvement. It is hard to imagine the Iraqi Kurdish leaders would sacrifice the economic 
and political gains as well as the international legitimacy they have worked so hard to 
achieve since the establishment of the KRG in 1991 to throw themselves into another 
wave of violence. Under these circumstances, the Kurdish leadership has followed the 
strategy of gradually changing the image of Kurdistan, perceived as an ethno-nationalist 
movement, which works against the KRG’s relationship with both the Iraqi government 
and the regional powers.  
Concerning the debate on federalism and democracy, the problem facing Iraq is 
not the domination of federal regions by certain ethnic or religious groups, as the 
advocates of territorial federalism argue. The problem is the possibility that ethnicity or 
religion would be the defining feature of the federal sub-units. In other words, there is a 
crucial difference between a federal region in which majority of the population identifies 
itself by a certain ethnic or religious identity, and a federal region in which local 
authorities govern according to ethnic or religious loyalties. Because Iraqi politics is still 
defined in terms of communal divisions, it is assumed that regional ethnic and religious 
demographics would automatically reflect on governance. Rather than the ethnic versus 
territorial federalism dichotomy, the debate on federalism and democracy in Iraq should 
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focus on two main issues: whether local governments act responsibly toward all their 
citizens within their areas, and not just for ethnic or sectarian co-nationals, and how to 
reach a broadly-accepted accommodation over the role of the central government.         
Within this framework, the efforts of the Kurdish leaders to establish a pluralist 
local government that recognizes the ethnic and religious diversity of Kurdistan is very 
important in terms of the implementation of regional model of federalism. The same 
model is applicable to southern Iraq as well, where two non-sectarian ideological currents 
have historically been far more important than the idea of Shia consolidation in a 
territorial bloc: the “far south” which is composed of the triangle of Basra, Nasiriyya and 
Amara, and the “Middle Euphrates” which represents the regionalism of the urban 
centers and the tribes.179 Similar to Kurdistan, both of these sub-units will be dominated 
by Shia Arabs in terms of population, but, critically, the Arab ethnicity or the Shia 
religious identity will not be their defining feature. In this way, the proposed regional 
model will both ensure a sense of security among Iraq’s major identity groups by 
avoiding risky attempts at dividing up the geographic concentrations of ethnicities, but 
also alleviate the impact of ethno-sectarian divisions on politics by encouraging the 
expression of regional diversity on a non-communal basis.  
Even if the Kurdish leaders’ efforts to promote a civic model of nationalism in 
Kurdistan can be viewed as part the strategic objectives of the KRG, promotion of 
pluralism and the legal recognition of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural structure of 
Kurdistan is itself very significant. This approach may set a useful example for the rest of 
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Iraq and play a crucial role in resolving many controversial issues regarding federalism. 
For example, rather than viewing Kirkuk as an intractable problem, predetermined by its 
contentious history and current politics, the Iraqi leaders may approach Kirkuk as an 
opportunity to build a compromise around legally entrenched governing arrangements 
which involve power-sharing mechanisms based on the promotion of local “Kirkuki” 
identity alongside the region’s component peoples – Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen. 
The Road Ahead 
Iraq’s history is filled with instances of discrimination and violence against 
certain sections of society on the basis of ethnicity, including attempts at genocide. For 
this reason, any attempt at imposing a solution on Iraq that does not take past communal 
traumas into consideration risks violent reaction, which, in turn, would threaten the very 
territorial integrity of the country. The model of a strong centralized government with a 
powerful controller was tried in Iraq and went horribly wrong, as was witnessed during 
Saddam Hussein’s regime. However, federalism has barely been given time to take root. 
Since the 2005 parliamentary elections, what is seen in Iraq has only been a half-hearted 
attempt at decentralization, which resulted in a dysfunctional democracy. The idea of true 
federalism is still regarded with suspicion in Iraq because of the popular assumption that 
a federal Iraq means empowerment of communal loyalties, thus, a weaker Iraq. In this 
regard, the management of the Kurdish-Arab divide is central to Iraq’s successful 
transition to a stable federal democracy.  
Opting for independence is a decision that lies with the Kurdish people and their 
political representatives. Given the regional political dynamics, this option, at least for 
now, is quite unlikely. The reality on the ground, on the other hand, strongly indicates 
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that an Iraq without Kurdistan has a significantly lower chance of becoming a true 
democracy than an Iraq where Kurdistan is an integral part of Iraq within a federal 
framework. The role of the KRG is critical in Iraqi politics in terms of the consolidation 
of power-sharing mechanisms as the Kurdish movement is the only organized actor in the 
country who has the capacity to act as a pressure group and force the central government 
to negotiate regarding on decentralization and the creation of a more inclusive political 
framework in Iraq. Without Kurdistan, it is quite likely Iraq could slide back to a strong 
centralized state built around a distinctly Arab narrative with possible sporadic outbreaks 
of sectarian conflict and the use of coercion to maintain unity and stability. 
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CHAPTER IV 
KURDS IN TURKEY 
 
A great responsibility falls on all of us to create an equal, free and 
democratic country of all peoples and cultures, befitting the history of 
Kurdistan and Anatolia.  On this occasion of Newroz, I call on the 
Armenians, Turkomans, Assyrians, Arabs and all other peoples just as 
much as on the Kurds to behold the flame of freedom and equality – the 
fire that is lit here today – and embrace it as their own.180 
 
Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), 
made a call, described by many political analysts as “historic,” on March 21, 2013, the 
Kurdish new year (Newroz). Obtained by the leader of the pro-Kurdish Peace and 
Democracy Party (BDP) during his visit to Öcalan’s prison cell, the statement was the 
result of meetings held by Öcalan with the Turkish government since October 2012. The 
statement was broadly viewed as a declaration of a ceasefire and an end to the conflict 
that has riven Turkey for the past three decades.  
The struggle of the Kurds in Turkey did not start with the PKK, which was 
formally founded in 1978 and launched its first attack in Turkey in August 1984. Nor was 
the statement of March 2013, the PKK’s first ceasefire declaration. However, Öcalan’s 
letter from jail marked the beginning of a new era for the Kurdish question in Turkey for 
a number of reasons. First, compared with the majority of other Kurdish parties in 
Kurdistan, the PKK is a relatively recent actor in the broader Kurdish struggle in the 
Middle East. It has become one of the most influential actors in the region since the early 
1990s by mobilizing the Kurdish masses not only in Turkey, but also in Iran, Iraq and 
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Syria. Secret talks between the Turkish government and Öcalan took place several times 
in the 1990s and 2000s, but they were never made public because of the classification of 
the PKK as a terrorist organization. Furthermore, those negotiations largely reflected the 
Turkish government’s prime motive to end the armed insurgency of the PKK rather than 
a genuine will to establish peace in Turkey. In this context, the March 2013 declaration 
was viewed as “historic” by many given it was the first time Öcalan was publicly 
acknowledged by the Turkish government not only as a legitimate political actor 
representing the Kurds in Turkey, but as a chief negotiator within the peace process.  
Second, since 1993, the PKK had declared numerous unilateral ceasefires with the 
stated intention of opening peace negotiations. In most cases, these initiatives were 
ignored by successive governments and portrayed instead a sign of the PKK’s weakness 
and imminent defeat. It is important to note that although the March 2013 statement was 
largely interpreted by the international media as a ceasefire declaration, Öcalan’s letter in 
fact did not even once include the words “ceasefire” or “truce.” The most appropriate 
definition would be “a call for the cessation of hostilities,” but Öcalan’s assessment and 
appeal was far ahead of even that.181 Öcalan’s main purpose was to move the Kurdish 
struggle from the military realm to the world of democratic politics in Turkey. Silencing 
the guns, which implies “cease-fire,” was an inseparable component of this process, but 
only as a logical starting point to pave the way for achieving the broader goal of 
establishing a democratic Turkey not only for the Kurds, but for all peoples and cultures.  
The founding manifesto of the PKK, which was published in 1978, sets the 
party’s goal as the establishment of an independent, united and democratic Kurdistan and 
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states that other forms of solutions such as autonomy or federalism are “reformist,” and 
consequently “reactionary” views for they do not tend to disturb the existing state 
borders.182 The manifesto stresses the indispensability of the use of force against the 
“colonial” forces183 and embraces that all-in-one use of ideological, political, and military 
forms of struggle are necessary for the success of the national liberation of Kurdistan. It 
emphasizes that the PKK’s primary focus is on the Kurdish struggle in Turkey, but that 
national liberation will be achieved through the destruction of not only Turkish 
colonialism, but also the colonialism of the other occupying state-forces in Kurdistan and 
the subsequent construction of a democratic and united Kurdish state.  
Until the early 1990s, independent statehood, armed struggle and the idea of 
united and democratic Kurdistan were the three major pillars of the PKK movement. The 
Newroz message of Öcalan, which strongly emphasized ending the armed struggle and 
finding a solution to the Kurdish question within the democratic politics of Turkey, 
remarkably reflects the dramatic alterations in the PKK’s political and ideological 
outlook on the Kurdish question as it gradually unfolded over two decades. Throughout 
this process, the major changes the PKK underwent with regard to its programmatic 
development can be categorized into three areas: an ideological transformation from 
state-seeking nationalism to one centered on “radical democracy,” which is based on the 
rejection of the concept of nation-state; the political transformation from the ideal of 
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separate statehood to the ideal of democratic confederalism, which represents a new 
specification of Kurdish independence; and strategic transformation from armed struggle 
to political struggle aimed at negotiation and peaceful settlement.      
The evolution of the PKK shows how Turkey’s Kurdish question has been 
translated into a quest for democracy that concerns all peoples living within the borders 
of Turkey. “Radical democracy” is a term that thoroughly captures the emergent 
discourse of the PKK in the 1990s, given that it provides a new understanding of politics 
in Turkey on the basis of a critique of the nation state. This approach differentiates the 
Kurdish movement in Turkey from its counterparts in Iran, Iraq, and Syria, as it views the 
nation state as the main obstacle to the liberation of people, be they Kurdish or other. 
While the Kurdish movements in Iran, Iraq and Syria are equally critical of the nation 
state and its implications for democracy, their criticisms concentrate solely on the 
exclusionary character of Arab and Shia Islamist Iranian nationalisms. The discourse of 
the PKK, on the other hand, derives from a critical evaluation of the theoretical 
foundations of the concept of nation state and underscores its antagonistic relationship 
with democracy. Accordingly, the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the 
context of the PKK’s discourse would only further consolidate the existing system of 
nation states in the Middle East, which are seen by the PKK as the main obstacles to 
democratization in the region throughout the twentieth century. The solution, therefore, 
lies in transforming the existing system, not in consolidating it.   
The Ideological Foundations of the Kurdish Movement in Turkey 
It is not possible to understand the evolution of the Kurdish movement in Turkey 
from the 1990s onwards without comprehending its relationship with the Turkish left, 
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which provided the Kurds with an important avenue to express their grievances 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The Kurdish movements in the Middle East came into 
close contact with the leftist movements in all parts of Kurdistan throughout the twentieth 
century. This association sometimes took place sometimes through the politicized Kurds’ 
tendency to view the communist parties as the best places for the expression of their 
militancy in the absence of Kurdish nationalist parties, as in Syria, and sometimes 
through the reliance of Kurdish parties on leftist forces to maintain their presence under 
suppressive political conditions, as in Iran. In Iraq, where Kurdish parties managed to 
maintain a strong presence in the political arena despite suppression, the left-wing forces 
saw the Kurds as critical allies in their struggle against their political rivals. However, it 
is only in Turkey that the organized, mass-based Kurdish movement was born directly 
from the leftist movement with an equally strong emphasis placed on both socialist and 
Kurdish nationalist goals. The alliance between the Kurds and the Turkish left resulted in 
separation mainly because of the failure of leftist forces to accommodate ethnic demands. 
Nevertheless, once again, only in Turkey, this process of dissociation resulted in major 
political and ideological transformations within the Kurdish movement. 
The 1960s is usually considered as “rebirth” or “reawakening” of Kurdish 
nationalism in Turkey184 after the Kurdish revolts of 1920s and 1930s in the early years 
of the Republic. Although it is not entirely wrong to use the term “reawakening” to 
describe Kurdish nationalism during this period, it is important to note the underlying 
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causes of Kurdish activism and show that the element of “Kurdishness” as defined in the 
1960s and 1970s differs greatly from the 1920s and 1930s.  
The view that the Turkish state’s discriminatory, violent and exclusive policies 
have had a decisive influence in shaping contemporary Kurdish nationalism has 
substantial explanatory power in accounting for the emergence of political mobilization 
among the Kurds after the First World War. The most significant result of WWI in terms 
of its repercussions on the future trajectory of Turkish nationalism was the replacement 
of the decentralized multi-ethnic Ottoman heritage with a centralized nation-state, 
defined as the Kemalist model, which does not recognize any nation other than the 
Turks.185 The problem of “minorities” was solved in the Turkish constitutional scheme 
without ever addressing it186 and all the “now-citizens” of the Turkish Republic were 
invited to become Turks through article 88 of the 1924 Constitution, which states, 
“Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.”  
The shift from the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural realities of Ottoman Empire to the 
nation-state model was considerably problematic from the standpoint of the Kurds not 
only because of the loss of regional autonomy they had under the decentralized Ottoman 
system, but also because the new state denied the ethnic heterogeneity of society in legal 
terms. The growing Kurdish discontent following the foundation of the Republic was 
shaped by both the concerns of the traditional Kurdish elites over the loss of their 
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privileges under the Ottoman rule, and an increasing emphasis on “Kurdishness” as an 
ethno-political cause.  
Since the concept of nation was defined within an essentially Islamic framework 
under the Ottoman Empire, although aware of their ethnic identity, the Kurdish 
traditional dignitaries and the Kurdish intelligentsia did not conceive “Kurdishness” as a 
decisive element in determining their social and “national” status.187 It would be 
misleading to exaggerate the nationalist essence of the revolts of the 1920s and 1930s as 
they did not take place around a clear Kurdish nationalist agenda. However, it is 
important to note that the logic of the nation-state embraced by the new Republic played 
a significant role in increasing the emphasis of the Kurds on “Kurdishness” as their 
primary identity marker. These growing ethnic sentiments in the early years of the 
Republic provided the social, cultural and political resources for later Kurdish nation-
formation in Turkey.   
Within this framework, rather than a period of “reawakening,” it is more 
appropriate to view the 1960s and 1970s as a period of maturity of the Kurdish nationalist 
consciousness in Turkey. Kurdish activism for the first time appeared in Turkey’s 
political arena as an organized movement with a specific structure, program and strategy. 
It was no longer possible to reduce political mobilization among Kurds to a reaction to 
ethnic Turkish nationalism and discriminatory state policies. By the 1960s, a young 
generation of Kurdish counter elites seized control of the movement from traditional 
Kurdish leaders, defined Kurds in radical new ways, and engaged in new types of 
                                                      
187 Bozarslan, Hamit (2003). “Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From Tacit Contract to Rebellion (1919-
1925)” in Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism edited by Abbas Vali, Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda 
Publishers, 170. 
125 
 
political activism with clearly defined nationalist goals aimed at challenging the basic 
principles of the republican state.188 This new generation was composed mostly of 
educated intelligentsia using legal, non-violent repertoire to promote a class-based 
interpretation of the Kurdish question with the goal of creating a socialist state. While 
earlier generations of Kurdish activism failed to create mass action due to tribal, religious 
and sectarian divides, this new generation not only brought diverse Kurds together in 
protest, but did so across ethnic boundaries in coordination with the Turkish left.189  
The 1940s and 1950s were largely experienced as “decades of silence”190 for the 
Kurds in Turkey given the Turkish state’s policy of denying the very existence of ethnic 
communities other than Turks, and the militarization and systematic surveillance of 
Kurdish territories from the 1930s, which had an intimidating effect on the population. 
By the 1960s, the “decades of silence” ended when Kurdish unrest resumed as a segment 
of the rising left-wing opposition in Turkey. A broad stratum of educated Kurds, who 
were mostly university students, discovered in leftist ideas – more specifically, in 
Marxism-Leninism – a universalistic syntax that allowed them to establish a link between 
the “oppressed Kurdish nation” and “oppressed classes” of Turkey.191 In this regard, they 
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began to appropriate a socialist discourse stressing national oppression and economic 
exploitation of the Kurdish peasant masses, which gradually culminated in the conception 
of Kurdistan as a “colony” and Kurds as a colonized people.192 This framing of the 
Kurdish issue gained widespread acceptance among Kurdish activists, yet laid the 
groundwork for the organizational and ideological separation of the Kurdish struggle 
from the struggle of the revolutionary left in Turkey in the 1970s. 
Until 1968, the Workers Party of Turkey (TIP) played a major role in organizing 
and leading the socialist struggle in Turkey and served as an incubator for Kurdish 
mobilization by incorporating many Kurdish activists into the Turkish political system. 
TIP drew attention to both the problem of economic underdevelopment in the Kurdish 
inhabited regions of Turkey and the political and cultural problems encountered by the 
Kurds due to state discrimination. The party played a particularly important role in 
organizing the 1967 “Eastern Meetings,” which were a series of protest meetings and 
demonstrations held in several towns in Turkey’s mainly Kurdish southeast. Framed as a 
protest campaign against economic underdevelopment and lack of democracy, they 
constituted the first peaceful mass Kurdish protests in republican history and significantly 
contributed to the public debate on the Kurdish question and demands of the Kurdish 
people.193 The fact that the Kurdish rights agenda was adopted not only by the Kurdish 
socialists, but also by the Turkish leftists, led to the integration of Kurdish resistance as a 
political practice at the heart of Turkish politics. This came as a major challenge to the 
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Kemalist project, which was mainly based upon isolating the Kurdish resistance in 
geographical and ideological terms.194 
The interpenetration of Kurdish and Turkish politics proved remarkably durable 
until the late 1960s. However, the signs of splintering of the Turkish socialist and 
Kurdish political agendas began to appear when, as elsewhere in the world, the left in 
Turkey started to become severely handicapped by divisions and internal struggles in the 
1970s. Very basically, two main currents of thought and action in the revolutionary left 
emerged. “Socialist revolutionaries” claimed capitalism had advanced in Turkey, and a 
transition to socialism was possible. “National democratic revolutionaries,” on the other 
hand, envisaged a two-phase revolution, the first phase being the national democratic 
revolution and the second being socialist revolution. This theorization characterized 
Turkey as a semi-colony of Western imperialism and concluded that, for Turkey to have 
its economic and political independence, workers, peasants and progressive forces within 
the bourgeoisie needed to enter into an alliance to achieve a national democratic 
revolution, which would be followed by a socialist revolution.195  
TIP was the main representative of the socialist revolution thesis. It was also the 
first legal political party to openly acknowledge the existence of the Kurdish people in 
Turkey and draw attention to their national oppression under the republican rule. 
However, the factional struggles and disagreements over the revolutionary strategy 
gradually plunged the party into crisis and marginalized its position within the leftist 
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movement in the late 1960s. In the meantime, as the national democratic revolution thesis 
became more dominant in the Turkish socialist movement in the early 1970s, the 
relationship between the Kurdish activists and the Turkish left wing began to unravel. 
After the military coup of March 1971 was a period of collapse for the left in 
Turkey given the ban on left wing organizations and publications, the arrest of its 
militants and the killing of its main leaders. It was during this period that the idea of 
organizing a separate Kurdish struggle around the thesis of Kurdistan as a “colony” was 
born.  As the left started to organize again in the mid-1970s, the division between the 
Turkish socialists and Kurdish activists increasingly came to the surface. Turkish leftists 
were exposed to criticism by the Kurdish groups on the grounds they had left their 
challenging position and had become parties of the regime. The national democratic 
revolution thesis’ definition of the Turkish state as a semi-colony of Western imperialism 
inevitably led to a tendency on the part of the left to reconcile the revolutionary 
movement with the Kemalist ideology.196 The motto “Fully Independent Turkey” became 
one of the most widely used slogans by the left in the 1970s.  By defining Turkey’s status 
as a semi-colony, this approach turned a blind eye to Turkey’s own role as a colonizing 
force vis-à-vis Kurdistan. According to the Kurds, the Turkish left not only became statist 
and lost its capacity to act as a genuine opposition force in Turkey, but it also failed to 
approach the Kurdish question from an emancipatory perspective.            
Turkish socialists remained generally unreceptive to Kurdish rights and demands 
because they perceived the ethnic and national demands as a threat to the unity of the 
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socialist movement and the working class in Turkey.197 In addition, increasing 
government repression and paramilitary activity against the Kurds in southeast Turkey in 
the late 1960s and 1970s, gradually increased the gap between the socialist agenda and 
the Kurdish rights agenda because of the growing “separatist” stigma attached to the 
Kurdish movement. In this context, the Turkish socialists increasingly viewed the 
Kurdish question as a problem only to be considered once a socialist Turkey was 
established. The Kurdish movement, on the other hand, differentiated itself from the 
Turkish left by reframing the socialist ideology in the context of the national question and 
portraying the national liberation of the “peoples” as a core requirement of the 
revolutionary and socialist ideology. This approach increasingly manifested itself in the 
Kurdish activists’ emphasis on the distinction between the nationalism of the “oppressed 
nations” and that of the “oppressor nations,” and the promotion of the idea that unless the 
reality of Kurdistan was recognized in Turkey, it would be impossible to pursue and 
implement a truly socialist ideology.  
The rise of the Turkish left and the emerging schisms within the Turkish ruling 
elite in early 1960s are often referred to as important political opportunity structures that 
enabled the Kurdish movement to reassert its influence in Turkey’s political arena. The 
Turkish left’s real impact on Kurdish politics in Turkey lies in the way it helped construct 
Kurdish identity by providing Kurdish nationalism with an ideological framework 
through which the Kurdish activists found collective answers to questions about “who 
they are” and “what kind of world they want to live in.” Nevertheless, the developments 
from the late 1960s on showed that the Kurdish groups, despite the still relatively 
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influential position of the Turkish left, decided to pursue a separate agenda shaped by a 
reinterpretation of socialist ideology on the basis of Kurdish national struggle. This was 
certainly not a politically pragmatic move for the Kurds because of the high costs of 
pursuing identity politics in Turkey at a time when just being a leftist was a dangerous 
path to follow. The Kurds, however, were determined to take up this challenge given the 
growing power of Kurdish nationalism as an ideological force in its own right. Kurdish 
national demands were no longer up for compromise, however costly the pursuit of their 
realization might be.  
Enter the PKK  
Although the signs of separation between the Turkish left and Kurdish 
nationalism became clear in the late 1960s, Kurdish activism was already evolving 
towards a more organized form. The Kurdish uprising led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani in 
1961 had a direct bearing on this process. In 1965, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of 
Turkey (TKDP) was established as the ideological equivalent of Mustafa Barzani’s KDP 
in Iraq. TKDP advocated for a similar autonomist plan and demanded the recognition of 
social, political and cultural rights of the Kurds within the territorial integrity of Turkey. 
TKDP was the first specifically Kurdish party of Turkey, but it never managed to have a 
strong hold among the Kurds because of its very conservative ideology. The founders of 
the party, Faik Bucak and Sait Elçi, had previously subscribed to the mainstream rightist 
Turkish politics. Consequently, they appealed to a conservative society, one that is loyal 
to the aghas and tribal structures organically tied to the government for the protection of 
their interests. Given its ideological link with the existing political system, TKDP had 
little to offer. Many of the party’s leaders were arrested in January 1968, and internal 
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divisions in 1969 further weakened the party.198 The party revived briefly during the 
second half of the 1970s, but failed to put down strong roots.   
On the leftist front, as the factional infighting within TIP made clear the fact it 
was unable to formulate and maintain a coherent policy on the Kurdish issue, the 
discontented Kurds intensified their attempts to establish Kurdish socialist organizations 
which resulted in the establishment of Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (DDKO) 
in 1969. DDKO brought together university students and youth in Turkey’s urban centers 
who shared common goals revolving around the recognition of the political, social and 
economic rights of the Kurds, developing Kurdish culture and language, and combatting 
the official policies of the Turkish state that deny the existence of the Kurds in Turkey.199 
The DDKO, like TIP and other leftist organizations, was closed following the 1971 coup. 
They were reorganized in mid-1974 as the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Associations 
(DDKD) and remained one of the most important organizations among the left wing 
Kurdish nationalist groups in the 1970s.  
The main legacy of the DDKO is that they represent the first attempts on the part 
of the Kurdish activists to break away from Turkish socialists and form autonomous 
Kurdish organizations on the basis of the discourse of “national oppression” of the Kurds. 
Throughout the 1970s, the number of legal and underground left-wing Kurdish 
organizations proliferated rapidly. Some of these groups such as the Rizgari (Liberation) 
movement and its break away, Ala Rizgari, traced their origins to the DDKO. Another 
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group, the Turkish Kurdistan Socialist Party (TKSP), was established by the TIP’s 
Kurdish members and became one of strongest Kurdish socialist groups in the 1970s. The 
popularity of socialist ideas among the Kurdish activists also affected the ideological 
evolution of the formerly conservative TKDP. The defeat that the Iraqi Kurdish 
movement suffered in 1975 played a significant role in discrediting the conservative 
autonomist brand of Kurdish nationalism represented by the TKDP in Turkey. TKDP 
began its revival in 1975 and its left wing dominated the DDKD. Later, three groups, 
Kawa, the KIP/DDKD and the KUK (National Liberationists of Kurdistan) emerged from 
the DDKD movement and became influential in Kurdish politics throughout the second 
half of the 1970s. Finally, there was the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), which had its 
roots in the illegal revolutionary left in Turkey.200    
The 1970s witnessed a virtual explosion of Kurdish nationalist organizations in 
Turkey. However, none of these groups were able to survive the effects of the 1980 
military coup, which targeted the political left, both Turkish and Kurdish variants, in an 
attempt to eradicate it.201 According to İsmet İmset, there were twelve Marxist-Leninist 
Kurdish groups active in the 1970s, among which only the PKK (Kurdistan Workers 
Party) managed to achieve a steady rise and growing effectiveness throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s.202 The endurance of the PKK movement in the post-1980 period is a 
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benchmark for the evolution of the Kurdish movement in Turkey in terms of 
understanding not only the transformations within the Kurdish society itself, but also the 
significant shifts the relationship between the Kurds and the Turkish state underwent 
from the early 1990s onwards.  
The organizational development of the Kurdish movement in the 1960s and 1970s 
made important contributions to the public discussion of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. 
Particularly in the second half of the 1970s, the Kurdish socialists became considerably 
assertive and influential in stressing the notions of “national oppression,” “colonialism” 
and “national liberation,” which were disseminated widely in the political magazines of 
the Kurdish political groups and clandestine parties.203 Although this process provided an 
important platform for the expression of the views of Kurdish activists and consolidation 
of their political position, the Turkish state’s perception of the Kurdish question and the 
security-oriented policy making, which had dominated the state’s dealings with the 
politically active Kurds since the early years of the republican rule, remained largely 
unchanged.  
The Kurdish uprisings of the 1920s and 1930s were considered by the state as an 
artificial question originating simply from the resistance of the pre-modern tribal 
structures and adherences towards the dissemination of modern state power into the 
Kurdish-inhabited regions. Likewise, the Kurdish unrest of the 1960s and 1970s was 
believed to be simply an outcome of communist incitement. In other words, the Turkish 
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state consistently avoided recognizing the “Kurdishness” of the Kurdish question.204 This 
situation did not change after the emergence of the PKK as a guerilla organization in the 
1980s, during which the discourse of “terrorism” and military solutions dominated the 
state’s approach towards the Kurds. By the early 1990s, however, both the state’s 
perception of the Kurdish question and its methods of addressing the issue started to 
undergo significant shifts. The endurance of the PKK both as a military and political 
organization was a major causal factor in effecting this transformation. The PKK’s own 
ideological transformation in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union formed 
another important aspect of this process. It is the combination of these factors that 
eventually resulted in the interpenetration of the Kurdish question with the problem of 
democratization in Turkey.   
The question of why the PKK emerged as the only socialist and Kurdish 
nationalist group that survived the widespread suppression following the 1980 coup is 
significant in terms of understanding the long-term consequences of the Kurdish armed 
struggle in Turkey. It is common in the literature to establish a direct causal link between 
the rise of the PKK in the post-1980 period and its use of violence against the state.205 
The torture and other degrading and humiliating treatment the Kurdish activists were 
exposed to in Diyarbakir Prison after the coup is seen as a turning point in the 
radicalization of the Kurdish movement and its abandonment of peaceful opposition 
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tactics. These approaches, however, have very limited explanatory power in accounting 
for the evolution of the Kurdish movement in Turkey since the 1980s, particularly for the 
transformations that took place both within the Kurdish movement itself and its relations 
with the state since the early 1990s.  
The argument that explains the emergence of the PKK as a reaction against the 
extreme state repression following the 1980 coup denies the very “continuity” of the 
Kurdish question in Turkey since the 1920s. This perspective explains the Kurdish 
movement on the basis of a narrowly defined causality confined to the state-PKK conflict 
in the post-1980 period and essentially seeks to construct an alternative “Kurdish reality,” 
disconnected from its historical dynamics, internal controversies and organizational 
processes, and instead draws on the 1980 coup as a convenient tool to justify its 
arguments.206  
Turkey’s Kurdish question did not emerge in 1980 with the rise of the PKK, nor 
did the PKK emerge as a reaction to state brutality against the Kurdish activists in 
Diyarbakir Prison. More importantly, the rapid growth of the PKK’s influence among the 
Kurdish masses in the 1980s cannot be reduced to a reaction against the oppressive 
political environment following the 1980 coup, but can be traced back to the early 
beginnings of the movement in the 1970s. At best, the impact of the 1980 coup on the 
Kurdish movement can be explained by the fact that the discriminatory and draconian 
measures adopted by the military regime between 1980 and 1983, such as banning the 
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Kurdish language altogether and the widespread torture in Diyarbakir Prison, provided 
the recruits that the PKK needed.207  
Although the PKK launched its first attack in 1984, armed struggle was accepted 
by the organization in principle since the early 1970s. Until 1977, the PKK defended 
armed struggle ideologically, but without any serious attempt to engage in it. By the late 
1970s, serious preparations to organize a guerilla war started and continued until the first 
attack against Turkish military targets in 1984. Therefore, establishing a direct causal link 
between the 1980 coup and the emergence of a Kurdish armed struggle is both 
misleading and reductionist. Furthermore, of the various Kurdish parties that emerged in 
Turkey in the 1970s, the PKK was the first to openly strive for “liberating” every chunk 
of Kurdistani territory and ultimately reunify them in “Greater Kurdistan” by using 
“armed struggle.” It was, however, not the “only” Kurdish party to embrace the strategy 
of use of arms to achieve the goal of full independence for a united Kurdistan. Several 
other Kurdish parties, such as Ala Rizgari, KUK and Kawa, also openly declared their 
goal to establish an independent united Kurdish state and their belief in armed struggle as 
the best path to the liberation of Kurdistan. 
The Rise of Political Violence 
It is important to answer several vital questions regarding the evolution of the 
Kurdish movement after the 1980s. Why did the PKK emerge as the only Kurdish party 
to survive the repressive political environment of the early 1980s? How did it manage to 
consistently expand its social base among the Kurdish masses while other Kurdish parties 
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were largely marginalized in the post-1980 period? Is there a causal link between the 
endurance of the PKK-led armed struggle and the transformation of the Kurdish question 
from an ethnic issue defined in the context of “terrorism” and “separatism” to a political 
problem defined in the context of democratization in Turkey? 
Given the low probability of victory and the high costs of participation, armed 
struggle is certainly the most risky path a political movement can pursue particularly if it 
is conducted against a state. When the 1980 coup almost completely destroyed both the 
Kurdish and Turkish leftist organizations, one of the main factors that distinguished the 
PKK from other Kurdish parties and enabled it to survive was its social base, which 
included a sizable portion of workers and peasants. Contrary to its popular perception, 
PKK is primarily a political party rather than a military organization, but it uses military 
means to achieve political ends.208 In this sense, what distinguished the PKK from the 
other Kurdish parties, as well as from the Turkish leftist groups that took up arms for 
achieving socialist aims, was that the party leadership put a particular emphasis on 
reaching political and ideological maturity and having a strong support base as 
preconditions to engaging in military action. The signs of this strategy can be clearly seen 
throughout the history of the PKK.  
PKK’s military struggle began after twelve years of preparation. From the first 
meeting of the organization’s founders in 1972, to the official proclamation of the PKK 
in 1978, the group carefully avoided expressing itself through any legal means; rather it 
formed a tightly organized and well-disciplined but open network, engaging mainly in 
theoretical and ideological discussions. During the second half of the 1970s, almost all 
                                                      
208 Barkey, H. and G. E. Fuller (1998). Turkey’s Kurdish Question, Boston: Rowman & Littlefield, 26.  
138 
 
the Turkish and Kurdish leftist groups established legal platforms for political action in 
the form of journals, magazines and associations. Kawa, Rizgari and Ala Rizgari 
published their own journals and the TKSP was widely known for its legal monthly 
journal, Özgürlük Yolu (Path of Freedom).209 Other illegal political parties organized 
legal fronts in the form of associations among which the DDKD was the most important. 
The original group, which later became the PKK, did not use any specific name for a long 
time, refrained carefully from producing any written material that would document the 
group’s political views or organizational structure, and focused only on verbal 
propaganda, ideological discussions and mass communications to expand its social 
base.210 The reasons behind this strategy lie mainly in Öcalan’s leadership skills and his 
cautious personality.  
Öcalan was well aware of the state’s relentless approach to the Kurdish issue and 
its violent suppression of any type of political organization involving partially or 
completely, the Kurds. Therefore, he concluded the group could never become a mass-
based influential force if it exposed itself through legal platforms. Furthermore, Öcalan 
himself closely experienced the years following the 1971 coup during which the cadre 
and leadership of the then-prominent Turkish socialist groups were killed immediately 
after they started rural guerilla warfare against the state. Based on the lessons from this 
experience, Öcalan argued that the dramatic failure of these groups derived from hasty 
organization and immediate, poorly-thought out and under-planned actions. With this 
knowledge, the group around Öcalan decided to organize itself thoroughly before 
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entering into a direct confrontation with the state. Throughout the 1970s, the group had a 
slow but steady growth by avoiding the risk of standing out too much in the eyes of the 
official authorities. That is why the PKK’s first attack in 1984 was quite shocking for the 
Turkish government, which was of the opinion that it had all illegal groups under control 
after the military coup. The survival of the PKK in the post-1980 period cannot be 
explained without referring to this organizational strategy.  
Muzaffer Ayata, who is a founding cadre of the PKK, points out how the 
organizational capacity of the PKK differentiated the party from other Kurdish 
organizations after the 1980 coup: 
After the 1980 military coup, Turkey became a place dominated by fear, 
repression, torture and violence. Turkish left and the Kurdish opposition 
were violently suppressed, while the political arena was left to be 
dominated by nationalist, conservative and sectarian forces. In this 
political environment, only the PKK managed to resist. During the 1970s, 
almost all the Kurdish organizations, such as KUK, Rizgari, Ala Rizgari, 
DDKD, were ideologically on the same page. Everybody was defending 
socialism. The emergent political atmosphere of the 1980s, which was 
overtaken by torture and violence, revealed the differences between these 
parties. Strong ones survived. The PKK resisted at the risk of getting 
wiped out of the Turkish political scene. Its members continued to resist at 
the cost of their lives both in prisons and in Kurdistan. No other party 
could reach this threshold. That’s why they were marginalized.211  
 
The reasons behind how the PKK managed to consistently increase its influence 
over the Kurdish masses while other Kurdish groups became marginalized in the 1980s 
can also be traced back to the 1970s. Although the PKK proclaimed the creation of a 
unified and independent Kurdistan as its primary objective, it did not identify that as its 
sole goal, but also desired a radical transformation of the social and political structure of 
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Kurdish society.212 After the group led by Öcalan formed their party clandestinely in the 
city of Diyarbakir in 1978, the PKK directed its armed struggle first against the Kurdish 
notables and the tribal heads. Thus, the PKK’s political actions first began as an intra-
Kurdish class struggle rather than being directed against the Turkish government.213 This 
reveals much about the PKK’s philosophy and modus operandi. PKK announced its 
existence in 1978 not as an ethnic movement, but as an actor that challenges the 
patronage-based tribal system in Turkey’s southeast. From a strategic perspective, the 
elimination of landlords was intended by the PKK to weaken the grip of feudal 
institutions over the land and people, restrict the state’s indirect rule over Kurdistan 
through cooptation, and create room to maneuver in the countryside in preparation for 
rural guerilla warfare.214 At the same time, this strategy allowed the PKK to show the 
diffident peasantry that the PKK protects their rights and freedoms by fighting against the 
tribes and landowners in the region. Consequently, the PKK’s image as the voice of the 
oppressed grew rapidly, and the party drew its leaders, members and militants largely 
from the disenfranchised and marginalized.  
Remzi Kartal, a former member of the Turkish Parliament, explains the 
relationship between the PKK and the Kurdish masses as follows: 
The problem in Kurdistan originates from oppression. The PKK rightfully 
identified this problem and gained Kurdish people’s trust. Even before the 
PKK was established, different groups and parties engaged in propaganda 
in the region and told the Kurdish people about the vitality of advocating 
for their political rights and organizing civic action and protests. However, 
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what people needed was security. Kurdish people were ready to fight, but 
they were also aware of the state violence they had to confront if they take 
action. It is only the PKK who responded to Kurdish people’s need for 
security. It is only the PKK who assured the Kurdish people that it would 
protect them if they stand up for their rights and the PKK successfully 
fulfilled that responsibility. That’s why no other movement, but only the 
PKK, managed to earn people’s trust and that’s why the masses followed 
the PKK while the other Kurdish parties remained marginal.215 
 
The Turkish state refused to consider the Kurdish aspirations or enter into 
political discussions on the matter and used constant threat of violence to maintain its 
dominance over the Kurds. However, the control of the Turkish state was seriously 
threatened when the PKK succeeded in gaining mass support and presenting itself as a 
viable alternative.216 The violence perpetrated by the PKK, it has been argued, was 
rational and instrumental in the sense it created political space for public debate on the 
Kurdish question and tried to change the social and political status of the Kurds in 
circumstances where there was no alternative avenue for the expression of grievances.217 
The threat posed by the PKK to the political system in Turkey and the influence it had 
among the masses in Turkey’s southeast has been recognized as the most serious 
challenge faced by the Turkish Republic since its establishment in 1923.218 
Whether the armed opposition of the PKK led to political gains for the Kurds and 
paved the way for the implementation of policy changes from the Turkish state is a 
significant question. Mahmut Şakar, who was one of the lawyers of Öcalan, drew 
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attention to the fact that in cases where the violence of power blocks all avenues for self-
expression, violence of the opposition becomes instrumental in forcing those in power to 
negotiate for a political solution: 
Nobody defends violence, which is an issue that directly affects human 
life. However, I don’t accept the understanding which views everyday 
violence of the state legitimate and denounces the armed resistance against 
state violence as terrorism. The existence of the Turkish state in Kurdistan 
has always been based on use or threat of force. The Kurdish movement 
came to the conclusion that armed struggle is imperative after decades of 
oppression and denial. The 1980 coup and the inhumane treatments that 
the Kurds were exposed to were the last straw. It was no longer possible to 
organize resistance through parties or associations. There is still much 
progress to be made for the settlement of the Kurdish question within a 
genuinely democratic framework. The current political conditions are 
different than the conditions which necessitated armed struggle in the 
1980s. The PKK is aware of this reality and seeks to engage in 
negotiations with the state. Today, nobody denies that there are avenues 
available to the Kurds to express themselves politically. Nonetheless, it is 
also undeniable that this is a consequence of the armed struggle.219                 
 
Hatice Çoban, who is the representative of pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy 
Party in Brussels, expresses similar views: 
We, as a party, accept that the PKK is not a cause but an effect of 
Turkey’s Kurdish question. This is not about supporting or opposing the 
use of arms. Because we all wish that the painful process of armed 
struggle, which led to the loss of a lot of lives in Turkey, was never 
experienced and that the Kurds gained their rights through peaceful 
methods. This is about recognizing a reality. The reality is that the Kurdish 
question defined as “the Kurds’ demands for rights” entered the Turkish 
state’s agenda as a result of the PKK’s armed struggle. This is undeniable. 
What would have happened if the Kurds never took up arms? I think we 
will always ask this question.220 
 
By the early 1990s, both the Kurdish movement and its relations with the state 
started to undergo important transformations. Significant shifts took place not only within 
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the PKK’s outlook on the solution to the Kurdish question, but also the Turkish state’s 
perception of the Kurdish problem. The entrance of pro-Kurdish parties on to the Turkish 
political scene in the early 1990s marked the beginning of a crucial process in which the 
Kurds’ armed struggle and political struggle began to go hand in hand, affecting each 
other as well as the larger democratic problems of Turkey in critical ways. Nevertheless, 
it is important to note that the PKK, particularly its leader Öcalan, continued to be the 
most influential actor in terms of defining the Kurdish question in Turkey and shaping the 
public debate on the demands of the Kurds. This process gradually expanded the 
boundaries of the Kurdish movement to affect not only the status of the Kurds, but also 
the broader political problems that concern the rights and freedoms of all citizens of 
Turkey. The Kurdish movement had become a force capable of influencing the political 
agenda of the whole country.  
Transformation of the Kurdish Movement in Turkey 
The PKK’s political activities throughout the 1980s and 1990s led to the 
mobilization of large number of Kurds in Turkey. The increase in political violence 
during this period caused a corresponding increase in Kurdish political mobilization in 
the form of popularly attended demonstrations and protests.221 From the early 1990s, the 
Kurdish activists also started to work within electoral politics, creating alternative 
channels to armed struggle to articulate Kurdish demands.  
Participation of the Kurds in formal political arenas, which started with the 
establishment of People’s Labor Party (HEP) in 1991, was a significant development in 
the expression of demands by the Kurds within the realm of legal democratic politics. 
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However, it is important to highlight the cause and effect relationship between the armed 
struggle and the entry of Kurdish activists into the Turkish political arena. These newly-
emerging pro-Kurdish parties were able to find a space in formal politics largely due to 
the resilience of the PKK movement. One of the main consequences of the PKK’s 
guerilla warfare was the emergence of the discourse of “terrorism” in Turkey as a novel 
way to delegitimize the Kurdish demands. Ironically, it is the PKK’s struggle that cleared 
the way and opened political space for the emergence of legal, pro-Kurdish parties that 
could consolidate the Kurds’ engagement with democratic politics and further the 
Kurdish movement in ways that armed struggle could not. Therefore, the mainstream pro-
Kurdish parties that have acted within the formal political arena in Turkey from the early 
1990s, have always maintained a strong commitment to the articulation of the Kurdish 
question as originally set forth by the PKK in the 1970s.  
There are fundamental questions to consider regarding the changes the Kurdish 
movement experienced in the early 1990s. If the main objective of the PKK-led Kurdish 
movement was the establishment of an independent united Kurdish state, why did the 
Kurdish activists increasingly turn to the formal political arena and opt for acting 
“within” the system? Why did the PKK take this approach when it would have been in its 
interests to incorporate these activists into its own ranks as recruits? The answer to these 
questions lies in the political and ideological transformations of the PKK since the early 
1990s. Instead of viewing these transformations as a break from its initial goals, it is 
more appropriate to view them in the context of both the PKK’s evolutionary trajectory 
and the changing political conditions in which it operated.  
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Although the PKK specified liberation of Kurdistan as its main objective, it never 
depicted its struggle as an ethnic one. This was a crucial distinction between the PKK and 
the other Kurdish organizations in the 1970s. Although relations with the revolutionary 
left were common to all Kurdish groups in that period, the approach of the PKK was very 
distinctive. After the separation between the Turkish and Kurdish socialists, most of the 
Kurdish organizations turned to Kurdish nationalism as their defining ideology with the 
goal of leading a proletarian revolution of their own. The PKK envisaged the revolution 
in Turkey and Kurdistan as an intertwined process in which the center of gravity rested in 
Kurdistan.222 In PKK’s ideology, the liberation of the Turkish people was seen as an 
objective that could never be accomplished without the achievement of the liberation of 
the Kurds. Accordingly, the Kurdish struggle was depicted not as an assignment for 
Kurdish nationalists, but for socialists, Kurds, and Turks alike. This was the main 
criticism posed by the PKK against the Turkish left. Öcalan makes this point by stating, 
“I turned to the Kurdish cause not because I am a Kurd, but because I am a socialist.”223 
The PKK has always had a strong orientation to Turkey and weak linkages with other 
Kurdish parties because of its tendency to position itself at a distance from narrowly 
defined anti-Turk ethnic nationalism. 
The Turkish left’s failure to rid itself of the influence of Kemalism and the 
tendency to disregard the revolutionary potential of Kurdistan eventually prompted the 
group led by Öcalan to organize separately. However, the PKK never lost interest in 
Turkey’s revolutionary organizations and their agendas. It is important to recognize this 
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distinctive approach embraced by the founding cadre of the PKK in order to understand 
the transformations in the PKK’s objectives in the 1990s. The PKK’s success at 
becoming a resilient movement lies not only in its ability to transform itself according to 
changing political conditions, but also in its ability to maintain a mass support base even 
after it underwent radical transformations with regard to its objectives.  
During the 1970s, the PKK followed the strategy of mobilizing the masses by 
emphasizing the emancipatory nature of socialist ideology and promoting socialism as a 
path to achieve independence and defeat colonialism in Kurdistan. Addressing the 
feelings of “Kurdishness” was seen as a second step.224 This approach derived 
specifically from Öcalan’s personal outlook on the Kurdish question which, for him, 
could not be confined to the narrow limits of ethnic nationalism. That is why the 
transformation of the feudal nature of Kurdish society was seen as significant to the 
establishment of an independent united Kurdish state.225 From this perspective, Kurdish 
statehood was never depicted in the PKK’s ideology as an end in itself, but as a means for 
the emancipation of Kurdish society. This approach gave the PKK the flexibility to 
redefine Kurdish “independence” according to changing political circumstances. This is 
exactly the reason why the Kurdish masses continued to follow the PKK despite its 
dramatic shift in the party’s political objectives in the early 1990s, from the goal of 
independent statehood to finding solutions within the borders of Turkey. 
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It is common in the literature on Kurdish nationalism in Turkey to explain the 
transformations within the PKK’s objectives in the context of Öcalan’s capture by 
Turkish security forces in 1999. The PKK’s abandonment of the ideal of an independent 
Kurdistan is interpreted largely as a sign of its moderation of its goals due to the arrest of 
the party’s leader and its declining capacity to act. This view is largely in line with the 
official approach of the Turkish state towards the Kurdish question in the 2000s, which 
portrayed the changes in the PKK’s goals as a sign of weakness and a result of the PKK’s 
defeat by the Turkish army. Although the PKK experienced severe difficulties and 
suffered from organizational instability from 1999 to 2004, the fact the party managed to 
reorganize itself and once again emerge as a serious challenge to the state after 2004 
onwards proved these approaches wrong.  
In fact, the PKK has neither abandoned the idea of “independence” nor its efforts 
to achieve the ideal of “united Kurdistan.” Rather, what the PKK abandoned was only its 
“statist” approach towards the Kurdish question. In other words, the party still maintains 
the goal of an independent united Kurdistan, but tries to accomplish this goal in new 
ways. In this respect, the shift in the PKK’s approach to the Kurdish question can be 
explained as a transformation of the “state-building” project to one that is centered on 
“society-building,” which focuses not only on Kurdish society, but also on accomplishing 
radical political change in the whole of Turkey. Tracing the origins of the changes in the 
PKK’s objectives to Öcalan’s capture in 1999 is misleading as it does not provide a true 
understanding of this transformation process, which dates back to the early years of the 
1990s.  
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Throughout the 1990s, Öcalan’s leadership was largely focused on recognizing 
the changing political circumstances both in Turkey and in the international arena, and 
explaining the need to modify its goals to both PKK members and the party’s support 
base. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc in 1989 was one of the 
main reasons behind the PKK’s transformation. The definition of “Kurdishness” made by 
the PKK in the 1970s was based on not only “national demands,” but also “socialist 
demands.” In this respect, the party’s goals were considerably affected by the Cold War 
conditions and the Marxist-Leninist attitude towards the national question, which was 
defined as the nations’ right to self-determination. The dominance of this approach is 
clear in the PKK’s founding manifesto, which rejects the solutions such as “regional 
autonomy,” “federalism” or “linguistic and cultural autonomy” on the grounds they are 
against the “independent state” thesis, which is the only true interpretation of the nation’s 
right to self-determination.”226 According to Mahmut Şakar, the goals of the PKK during 
the 1970s and 1980s were reflected the political conditions of the period in which the 
PKK was born: 
The PKK was born in a world where independent statehood was seen as 
the only solution to the problems of oppressed nations. The primary goal 
of the PKK was to end oppression which was originating from the denial 
of the identity of Kurdish community. If your goal is to mobilize this 
community, you have to focus on this discourse of denial. During the 
1970s and 1980s, if the PKK emerged with the goal of autonomy or 
federalism, that would not mean much to the masses. There was need for a 
much stronger formulation to respond to the Turkish state violence. 
Turkish state was where the Kurds were denied, a Kurdish state would be 
the place where the Kurds would be free. It was “independent Kurdistan” 
which we didn’t have and what we needed to hear. It sounded so good.227     
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By promoting the discourse of independent statehood and embracing the use of 
violence, the PKK aimed to directly address this policy of denial and open avenues for 
the Kurds to express their identity and mobilize their political energy. These two 
strategies enabled the PKK to not only challenge the core principles of the Turkish 
Kemalist project, but also introduce the Kurdish question as a legitimate problem on the 
Turkish state’s agenda. In the early 1990s, however, the PKK was facing a number of 
dislocations. The social, political and economic conditions that necessitated armed 
struggle were still in place in Turkey. However, the armed struggle had already served 
some of the important objectives of the PKK such as the creation of a mass movement 
and to bring the Kurdish question to the attention of the Turkish state. By the 1990s, 
guerilla warfare was no longer sufficient because the movement was growing at a rapid 
pace and the masses were in dire need of opportunities to consolidate the political 
struggle. The collapse of the Soviet Union further complicated this environment by 
making it imperative for the PKK to build a new political/ideological perspective and an 
organizational structure. To address these dislocations, the PKK started to construct a 
comprehensive democratic discourse, which significantly altered the movement’s long-
term objectives and political demands for the Kurds. 
Öcalan places emphasis on the importance of political struggle in the early 1990s 
and talks of the relationship between “independence” and “statehood”: 
Right now, armed struggle is escalating because we don’t see any 
transformation in the Turkish state’s approach towards the Kurdish 
question. However, we pay attention to political struggle too. This is not a 
contradiction. We engage in armed struggle not to block political avenues, 
but to open space for political struggle. Independence should not be 
understood only in the form for separatism. You cannot claim that you are 
independent only because you have a state. Independence represents a 
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mental and moral existence. If nations are not independent ideologically 
and morally, regardless of whether they have a state or not, they are slaves 
and dependent. Nations that search for recognition from America and the 
United Nations worship statism. This approach enslaves people. The 
notion of independence that the PKK tries to provide for the Kurdish 
people, as well as for the other peoples – Turks, Arabs and Persians – is 
not merely related to the concept of state. Statehood is within our 
understanding of independence, but we don’t want to narrow our 
movement down to that.228 
 
In another interview, Öcalan places emphasis on the coexistence of the Kurds and 
Turks in the context of the PKK’s understanding of “independence”:  
I focus on the concepts of “independence,” “freedom” and “unity” rather 
than the concept of “separation.” Independence can be claimed by 
different people living together. We are not talking about an independent 
state. We are talking about a political unity in which people can think, act 
and develop policies on the basis of equality. The problem is that the 
political tradition in Turkey is not compatible with such an understanding 
of independence. We believe that Turks need independence too. The 
Turkish state tries to solve all problems only through coercion and control. 
What the Turkish state understands from national unity is to wipe out the 
popular will of the Kurds. This approach does nothing but further 
complicates the problems.229  
 
Öcalan emphasizes how peaceful and democratic coexistence of the Kurds and 
Turks is fundamental to the liberation of not only the Kurdish and Turkish people, but all 
the peoples of the Middle East. He introduces the term “Middle Eastern Federation” and 
claims for the Kurdish movement a central role in the accomplishment of this ideal: 
Achievement of unity between Turks and Kurds will pave the way for 
unity among all the peoples of the Middle East. This is the international 
aspect of our quest for independence. For us, achieving unity with the 
Turks on the basis of freedom and equality is much easier than achieving 
unity with the Kurds of Iran or Iraq. This is because of objective reasons. 
Other parts of Kurdistan have their own movements, class interests and 
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political structures. It is not realistic to claim unity for the Kurds without 
considering these dynamics. Unity with the Persians and Arabs will be a 
more difficult process. However, these relations will form the core 
components of the eventual goal of forming a Middle Eastern federation 
which will bring emancipation for all the peoples of the Middle East.230  
   
The concepts of “autonomy” or “federation” did not become part of the PKK’s 
party program for the solution to the Kurdish question until after the capture of Öcalan in 
1999. A closer reading of Öcalan’s statements and the meeting reports of the PKK 
throughout the 1990s, however, clearly indicates that the party questioned the classical 
statist approach to the national question and contemplated other possible solutions and 
their continued dependence on armed struggle. In the Political Report submitted to the 
Fifth Congress of the PKK, Öcalan significantly highlights these issues: 
How do we define the concept of “political solution” and considering the 
military situation, when can it be possible? Is it realistic to impose 
federation in Turkey as a phase in the solution process? What would be 
the characteristics of such a federal system and what would be its 
relationship with Turkey’s democracy and struggle for democratization? 
How can we incorporate the Turkish left and revolutionary forces of 
Turkey into this process? What could be the best strategy to develop a 
political solution which would be based on establishing relations with 
Turkey, other regional states and the United States without sacrificing our 
independence and freedom?231  
 
Öcalan’s attempts to connect the solution to the Kurdish question to the 
democratization process in Turkey is a clear indication of the PKK’s search for a new 
political and ideological perspective that would respond to the changing political 
conditions of the post-Cold War world. As his questions in the Fifth Political Report 
                                                      
230 Ballı, pp. 236-237; Perinçek, Doğu (1990). Abdullah Öcalan ile Görüşmeler, İstanbul: Kaynak 
Yayinları, 118-119. 
231 Öcalan, Abdullah (1995). PKK 5. Kongresine Sunulan Politik Rapor (The Political Report Presented to 
the PKK 5th Congress), Weşanên Serxwebun, Köln. 
152 
 
suggest, the PKK remained loyal to the emancipatory ideals of socialism and maintained 
its interest in acting in concert with the revolutionary forces of Turkey. The main critique 
of the Soviet Revolution by the PKK was that it was a victim of vulgar materialism as it 
exhausted all the energy of socialism for the growth of the economy, party and state.232 
According to the PKK, the state should have been dissolved in the people, but the 
experience of socialism showed the process occurred the other way around; the people 
were dissolved to the state and the party.233 Thus, for the PKK, establishing a free 
individual and society was more vital than establishing a state and party. Accordingly, 
socialism in Kurdistan is defined as a great human revolution that does not recognize 
borders.     
Until the late 1990s, discursive changes within the PKK did not follow a clear 
pattern. The party did not abandon its commitment to the construction of a socialist 
society, but its critique of the nation-state encouraged an increasing quest for alternative 
solutions based on the peaceful coexistence of nationalities without changing existing 
borders. In this respect, the global turn towards democracy after the collapse of the 
communist regimes played a significant role in the emergence of a “democratic 
discourse” as the most appropriate alternative for the PKK as a new strategy that would 
respond to the realities of the age and resonate with the growing demands for the 
expansion of political struggle.  
The clearest indications of change were seen when the PKK declared a unilateral 
ceasefire in 1993 in an attempt to promote reconciliation and open the way for dialogue 
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and negotiations in order to solve the conflict through political means. Two more 
unilateral ceasefires followed in 1995 and 1998. These attempts at reconciliation evolved 
into, after 1999, a strategic transformation that truly radicalized the PKK-led Kurdish 
movement in Turkey. Contrary to the conventional view that armed struggle radicalized 
the Kurdish movement in Turkey, it is, in fact, the PKK’s appropriation of the 
“democratic discourse” in the 2000s that represents true radicalization. What makes the 
movement “radical” after 1999 is that the PKK no longer sought to simply transform the 
Kurdish society, but asked the Turkish state and the other regional states to face their own 
democratic deficits. This is a considerably radical demand, particularly in a region where 
the primacy of the state over the individual has always been a major barrier to the 
establishment of genuine democracy.    
The PKK’s Turn to Democratic Discourse  
After Öcalan’s capture in 1999, the PKK entered into a comprehensive process of 
ideological and organizational reorganization. This process could be characterized as the 
implementation phase of the intense theoretical and ideological deliberations of the 
1990s. Until the late 1990s, the PKK retained core socialist values, but kept its distance 
from “experienced” socialism represented by the Soviet regime. This provided the PKK 
with an opportunity to focus on the concepts of “freedom” and “emancipation” as 
opposed to socialism cast as a particular political regime. The focus on the individual and 
society, and not the state, laid the groundwork for the party’s ultimate turn to democratic 
discourse in the 2000s. It was not Öcalan’s arrest that initiated this process, but it 
certainly accelerated it by putting pressure on the PKK to reformulate its ideology and 
organizational structure.  
154 
 
The evolution of the Kurdish question in Turkey in the 2000s has three defining 
elements that require an in-depth assessment: 1) the political and ideological change 
within the PKK, which was shaped largely by Öcalan’s defense texts and prison notes; 2) 
the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) rise to power, which marked the beginning of 
a new phase in the Turkish state’s approach to the Kurdish question; and 3) the increased 
influence and visibility of Kurdish parties in the formal political arena, notably the 
Democratic Society Party (DTP) and its successor, Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).  
After Öcalan’s capture, the PKK declared a permanent ceasefire in September 
1999, in order to open up space for dialogue. This was followed by an extraordinary party 
congress in January 2000 in which the PKK’s party program underwent a complete 
renewal.  The extraordinary congress resulted in the approval of a new program (Program 
of 2000), which was a systemized edition of Öcalan’s defenses and included substantial 
changes in the party’s national undertakings. In the Program of 2000, “Democratic 
Transformation” replaced the concept of “Kurdistan Revolution” and the prime objective 
was defined as “bringing the sovereign power of Turkey’s oligarchic structure and its 
extensions on the Turkish and Kurdish peoples to an end.”234 The solution to the 
“national question” was described as “developing a democratic political system on the 
base of Turkey’s political wholeness and constitutional citizenship in which the free 
participation of Turkish and Kurdish peoples is realized.”235  
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As the Program of 2000 indicates, the change within the PKK was more than a 
transformation. According to the structure of the new program, the PKK essentially 
declared itself as a party of not only Kurdistan but also Turkey. Nevertheless, it is evident 
from Öcalan’s main defense that transformation of the party’s national standpoint did not 
mean the abandonment of the Kurdish national cause. Rather, in parallel with the 
theoretical discussions of the 1990s, Öcalan saw the role of the PKK and the Kurdish 
movement as fundamental to the goal of furthering the solution of the national question 
within the framework of democratic transformation. The first sentence of the introduction 
to his main defense makes this point clear: 
My defense is not so much based on detailed replies to the charges in the 
indictment prepared by the Chief Prosecutor [of the State Security Court], 
as it is about what I see as a more important topic: how to reach an historic 
reconciliation from a revolt under the leadership of the PKK, and increase 
the possibility of a solution to the Kurdish issue.236  
 
After 2000, the PKK’s ideological framework was established on the basis of 
Öcalan’s defense texts, which were published and accepted in the PKK congresses as the 
official party line. Within the defense texts he submitted to the Turkish courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights, Öcalan highlighted two concepts: “Democratic 
Republic” and “Democratic Confederalism.” Öcalan outlines an historical analysis of 
civilization, starting in the Middle East, and concludes it is the state that is the “original 
sin” of humanity.237 The democratic civilization that Öcalan’s defenses aspire to 
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construct in the region aims for a radical transformation of the entire Middle East through 
the development of pluralist democracy and civil society.238  
Öcalan’s proposed solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey is conceived in the 
light of his decentralized and democratized vision of the Middle East, in which he 
considers the PKK as the locus of the process of transformation. Öcalan sees the 
development and deepening of democracy as the key to the establishment of a 
Democratic Republic of Turkey, which will provide a lasting solution to the Kurdish 
question. The main mechanism for the unification of the Kurds, according to Öcalan, is 
the establishment of a democratic confederalism, which refers to the formation of self-
governing bodies throughout Kurdistan. The mechanism will offer a way out of the 
current stalemate characterized by the highly centralized states in the region and pave the 
way for the establishment of a Democratic Middle Eastern Union in the long run. 
In order to complement this ideological transformation, the PKK also underwent a 
process of organizational change and renewal. In its seventh extraordinary congress, the 
PKK first reorganized its guerilla forces, which resulted in the abolition of the old army 
front structure and replaced it with a new body, HPG (People’s Defense Forces). Not 
merely a technical adjustment, the new organization introduced the PKK’s new military 
strategy, which was designed according to the party’s new programmatic focus on 
“democratic transformation” and political struggle rather than armed struggle. The 
concept of “legitimate defense” was introduced to characterize the new military strategy, 
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which maintained the PKK’s capacity to carry out an armed campaign should the 
democratic political solution fail or the movement come under attack.239  
In the eighth congress of the PKK, which was held in 2002, the PKK converted 
itself from a party to a congress under the name KADEK (The Kurdistan Freedom and 
Democracy Congress). It declared the conversion from “party” to “congress” better 
captured the movement’s aspiration to become a non-power-envisaging entity. KADEK’s 
mission was explained as one of coordinating the various new organizations necessary to 
the democratic transformation project in Kurdistan. Within this framework, the Congress’ 
program conceptualized as a long-term objective the democratization of state and society 
across the countries in the Middle East with a Kurdish population and the construction of 
a Democratic Middle Eastern Union. In line with this objective, different parties were 
founded in other parts of Kurdistan in 2002, 2003 and 2004, respectively: the Kurdistan 
Democratic Solution Party (PÇDK) in Iraq, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria 
and the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) in Iran.  
KADEK was replaced by Kongra-Gel in November 2003, and was renamed as the 
PKK in 2005. Another body called the Council of Associations of Kurdistan (KKK) was 
established in 2005, which later took the name the Council of Communities of Kurdistan 
(KCK). The KCK was founded to put into practice the idea of democratic confederalism 
proposed by Öcalan in his defense to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 
2004, and as an alternative institutional framework to the nation-state system in the 
Middle East. As a loosely united confederal entity, the proposed political structure would 
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neither challenge the established and internationally recognized boundaries nor resort to 
nationalism or attempt to establish a nation-state.240 
Since his arrest in 1999 until 2005, Öcalan came under much criticism on grounds 
that the changes he proposed were no more than tactical moves. In response to these 
criticisms, Öcalan defined himself as pursuing a realistic policy by adopting alternative 
perspectives beyond the idealized solutions of “unlimited autonomy” or a “perfect state.” 
He asserts that the alternative options serve the purpose of maintaining the movement and 
provide for the development of a political solution without sacrificing the goal of 
independent Kurdistan: 
We need not abandon our principles in order to pursue a realistic policy. 
Herein we find the reason that prevents a solution to the Kurdish question: 
Dogmatism is confused with principle; compromise with surrender.241  
 
From 1999 to 2005, the PKK faced various difficulties including opposition from 
within the organization, which resulted in a serious split in 2005, and growing frustration 
among the party’s supporters due to lack of progress despite the permanent cease-fire and 
dramatic transformations with regard to the movement’s goals. The PKK’s strategic 
transformation did not fully lead to its acceptance as a democratic movement advocating 
for political change through non-violent means, at least on the part of the Turkish state 
and public in general. However, it gradually lessened the antagonistic state of relations in 
Turkey and put increasing pressure on the government to pursue a democratic solution. 
Through intensive theoretical and ideological deliberation, Öcalan and the PKK managed 
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to get the movement in order by 2005. Despite sporadic flare-ups, armed conflict did not 
return to the levels of the 1980s and 1990s.  
The Justice and Development Party and the Kurdish Question 
After Öcalan’s capture, Turkey was at a vulnerable crossroad. Benefiting from the 
nationalist pride Öcalan’s capture had elicited among many Turks, ultra-nationalist 
parties made a strong showing in Turkey’s parliamentary elections held on April 18, 
1999.242 On the other hand, against the backdrop of Turkish nationalist pride, Öcalan’s 
capture led to a spasm of Kurdish violence in Turkey and Europe. Instead of issuing a 
hard-line appeal for renewed struggle during his trial for treason that ended on June 29, 
1999 with a sentence of death, Öcalan issued his call for the implementation of true 
democracy to solve the Kurdish problem within the existing borders of Turkey.243 
Öcalan’s call for a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem played a significant role in 
preventing the outbreak of a zero-sum game that would bring Turkish and Kurdish 
nationalists into a violent confrontation. It is significant that both the implicit and explicit 
negotiations that took place between the state and the PKK since 1999, have been built on 
this emergent opportunity to solve the Kurdish issue within a democratic framework, 
which would result in a win-win situation for both sides.  
The Turkish state’s ability to take up Öcalan’s offer in 1999 followed an unsteady 
path. The decision of the government on January 12, 2000, to comply with the request of 
the ECHR for a stay of Öcalan’s execution was a clear indication of the government’s 
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recognition of Öcalan’s role in preventing the revival of armed conflict, which was 
essential to the development and deepening of democratization. Furthermore, a process of 
implicit bargaining began between the state and the PKK shortly after the capture of 
Öcalan, which led to several steps taken both by sides. The PKK decided to withdraw its 
guerilla forces out of Turkey upon Öcalan’s order to end armed conflict shortly after his 
conviction. In August 1999, President Süleyman Demirel met with mayors from the pro-
Kurdish People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) in order to engage in broad discussions, 
which was a clear signal the state was willing to recognize openly the legitimacy of 
certain forms of Kurdish political activity.244 
The process of implicit bargaining between the state and the PKK remained 
dominated by uncertain policy responses within the Turkish political system, which can 
be attributed to the continued influence of Turkey’s military establishment in the political 
arena as well as the concerns of the fragile coalition government in maintaining stability 
by avoiding open negotiation with either Öcalan or the PKK. The sudden arrest of three 
HADEP majors in February 2000, the reluctance to permit Öcalan to make statements to 
the press and restrictions put on his access to his lawyers, the continued emergency rule 
in several southeastern provinces despite the PKK’s abandonment of guerilla struggle, 
and finally, the Turkish military attack on the PKK units in northern Iraq in April 2000 
were evidence that the Turkish government would continue to pursue its own agenda. 
Nevertheless, although the progress towards a political solution was slow, Turkish public 
opinion regarding the Kurdish question changed dramatically in the wake of Öcalan’s 
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trial, which promised hope for the future establishment of peace and democracy in 
Turkey.245 
The rise of the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in 
November 2002 opened a new chapter regarding the approach of the state towards the 
Kurdish question for several reasons. The main barrier to finding a political solution to 
the Kurdish question in Turkey has always been the fact that there was a major conflict 
between the state and the Kurdish actors over the conceptualization of the Kurdish 
question and the foundations of the Turkish Republic. The leaders of Turkish political 
establishment were all from secular parties, the products of education and political 
experience imbued with nationalist and Kemalist beliefs, which represented the very 
ideologies the Kurdish movement struggled against.246 Until the early 1990s, the official 
approach of the state towards the Kurdish question was defined by its complete rejection 
of the problem. By the early 1990s, however, the government authorities started to make 
statements suggesting they recognized the “Kurdish reality” in Turkey.247 However, these 
rhetorical changes never translated into concrete practices in the political realm because 
of the failure to develop policies outside the Kemalist framework.   
The pro-Islamic AKP came to power in 2002 with a commitment to address the 
Kurdish question. The main difference between the AKP and its predecessors was that 
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the AKP represented an ideology that shares common faith with Kurdish nationalism in 
that Islamism, like Kurdish nationalism, was defined as an existential threat to Kemalism 
since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. At its launching in 2001, the AKP’s party 
program was skillfully crafted around universal themes of democracy and justice, 
expressed in a litany of phrases designed to resonate favorably with a wide cross-section 
of voters.248 In this context, there had been high expectations that the AKP government 
would address the Kurdish question from a democratic perspective. During the AKP’s 
eleven-year rule, Turkey witnessed a number of important developments regarding both 
the solution of the Kurdish question and democratization in Turkey. However, the 
question of whether these developments established real political change or followed the 
same general direction of their predecessors, but within an Islamic framework, remained 
questionable. More importantly, the question the extent to which these developments 
were viewed as “change” from the perspective of the Kurds requires analysis. 
Islamist discourse views the Kurds as fellow victims of the secular Kemalist 
republic and acknowledges them as people with a language and identity of their own.249 
As a party that seeks to appeal to a wide cross-section of voters, AKP chose to present 
itself as a “democratic conservative” party which can be defined as a pragmatic mix of a 
general commitment to Islamic values with universal themes of justice, democracy and 
human rights. Regarding the Kurdish question, AKP’s program put emphasis on “respect 
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for cultural diversities within the framework of the democratic state of law,”250 but did 
not put forward any concrete proposals. This strategy of avoiding specific policy 
commitments combined with moderate/conservative ideology allowed the AKP to appeal 
to various political groups that shared the common goal of a change of government, 
including the Kurds who saw the AKP as a potential challenger to the Kemalist 
establishment. However, after the AKP’s transition from opposition to power in 
November 2002, it became difficult for the party’s leaders to confine themselves to 
generalities. With no guidance to be found in their party’s Program and having not 
previously held office, AKP had two options: either continue in the same general policy 
direction as its predecessors or head in some new and untried direction.251 AKP opted for 
the status-quo.  
Throughout the AKP’s administration, the Kurdish question remained one of the 
top items on Turkey’s political agenda, particularly during the AKP’s second and third 
terms in office. Nevertheless, despite periods of both implicit and explicit negotiations 
between the state and the PKK, the AKP failed to develop any coherent policy on this 
most critical issue. The reason for this failure lies in the defining characteristics of the 
AKP’s approach to the Kurdish question, which can be summarized in the following way: 
the Kurdish problem is not about nationalism but rather forced secularism and Turkish 
nationalism of the type enforced by Kemalist ideology.252 Different from its predecessors, 
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AKP recognizes the “Kurdishness” of the Kurdish question, but calls for the 
subordination of such an identity to an Islamic one. In other words, from the perspective 
of the AKP, if Kurdishness is transformed and defined within an Islamic framework, then 
there will be no Kurdish question left to ponder. Thus, compared to its predecessors, 
AKP takes a different track with a similar bent, adopting an Islamist discourse but 
remaining loyal to the same statist framework as Kemalism, which was founded on the 
very exclusion of the Kurds. AKP’s strategy can be best described as “inclusion through 
exclusion,” which is based on the popularization of an alternative conception of 
Kurdishness aimed at discrediting the PKK-led Kurdish movement and presenting the 
AKP as the only genuine representative of the Kurds in Turkey.  
Why, then, did the AKP consistently seek dialogue and negotiate with the leaders 
of the PKK, especially after 2007, which marks the beginning of its second term in 
office? This can be explained by two important dynamics: 1) the emergence of a new 
wave of political mobilization led by the PKK that has effectively used both armed 
struggle and peaceful protest since 2005; and 2) the AKP government’s commitment to 
control the field of Kurdish politics in order to prevent possible PKK-led instabilities that 
would undermine its political power, particularly in the context of its fierce fight with the 
Kemalists to control state power.253   
The eleven-year rule of the AKP witnessed a fierce competition of power between 
the AKP-led moderate Islamists and Turkey’s Kemalist establishment, represented 
mainly by the Turkish military, which resulted in the clear victory of the former in 2010. 
                                                      
253 Ercan, Harun (2013). “Talking to the Ontological Other: Armed Struggle and the Negotiations between 
the Turkish State and the PKK,” Dialectical Anthropology, 37 (1): 119. 
165 
 
All engagements of the AKP, both with the PKK and the Kurdish parties in the formal 
political arena until the 2011 parliamentary elections, need to be understood within the 
context of this power struggle. During the five-year unilateral ceasefire declared by the 
PKK following Öcalan’s capture, the cessation of political violence was portrayed by the 
Turkish military simply as an indication of the PKK’s weakened military capabilities. 
The power of the AKP, on the other hand, was considerably fragile during its first term 
and the party’s primary concern was possible threats from the Turkish military.  
In this context, the PKK did not pose a major challenge to the AKP government 
until the completion of its ideological and organizational transformation in 2005. During 
this early period, AKP’s attention to the Kurdish question revolved mainly around 
building on the reforms that had already been enacted by the previous government within 
the framework of Turkey’s EU accession requirements. These measures were generally 
well received by the Kurds who saw them as a sign the Turkish state was finally 
beginning to fix past wrongs. Nevertheless, while removing some of the restrictions on 
Kurdish cultural expression, AKP carefully avoided engaging in any discussion about 
more politically sensitive demands such as the right to education in the mother tongue 
and administrative decentralization, which would risk unleashing a fierce national debate 
and put the government into conflict with Turkish nationalists and the Kemalist 
establishment.  
The AKP’s tentativeness gradually created skepticism among the Kurds that the 
AKP government was not genuine in its dealings with the Kurdish question. The PKK’s 
decision to call off the five-year cease-fire in June 2004, further complicated the AKP’s 
Kurdish policy. Confrontations between the PKK and the Turkish military proved that the 
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PKK had maintained its capacity for armed resistance, while on the political; the Kurdish 
movement displayed growing success in successive elections from 2004 to 2011, 
increasing both the representatives in the Turkish parliament and winning the majority of 
municipalities in the Kurdish areas. These positive developments for the Kurds created an 
urgency on the part of the AKP to refine its policies to manage the growing Kurdish 
challenge. 
The Democratic Opening and the Oslo Process 
Since the end of its first term in office in 2007, the AKP followed a two-fold 
strategy in its approach to the Kurdish question. The first strategy was to engage in 
negotiations with the leaders of the PKK at the Oslo talks, which started with preliminary 
contacts in 2006, continued with face-to-face negotiations from 2008 to 2010, and came 
to a halt in 2011. The unilateral ceasefire declared by the PKK in October 2006 needs to 
be seen in this light. The Oslo talks took place between the PKK and Turkish officials 
from the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) in complete secrecy and were aimed 
at negotiating confidence-building measures, controlling the armed conflicts and possibly 
reaching a final settlement on the issue.254 As part of the confidence-building efforts the 
two sides agreed in October 2009 on an initial return of thirty-four PKK fighters and 
refugees through the Habur post on Iraq’s border. Nevertheless, Habur process collapsed 
when the Kurds went to the border to celebrate the return of the guerillas and refugees, 
which was immediately depicted by the Turkish nationalists and the media as the PKK’s 
proclamation of “victory” and an insult to the Turkish national identity. The government 
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came under heavy pressure by the hard-line nationalists and the Kemalist opposition, and 
the process failed to serve its purpose when the returnees were later charged in Turkish 
courts, many of fled back to Iraq, and a planned return of diaspora exiles in Europe was 
cancelled.255 Öcalan’s lawyers explain the Habur incident as follows:  
Thousands of Kurds went to Habur to celebrate the return of guerillas. 
There was a reason for that. For the first time, their children were back 
home alive and not in coffins. For the first time, there was hope for peace. 
This was the reason for all the joy and happiness. However, upon reactions 
from the media and opposition parties, the government instantly stepped 
back. The idea of peace groups was negotiated between the government 
and Öcalan. They knew that the groups would come to Turkey. If the 
government was brave enough to stand by the Habur process and declared 
its support for the return of other peace groups, today we might have been 
at a completely different point within the peace process.256  
 
What is wrong with people cheering for peace? The reactions of the 
government and society are completely psychological and a result of 
sovereign mentality. It was thought that the whole idea of peace groups is 
turning into a demonstration of the PKK’s victory and the defeat of the 
government and Turkish army. Turkish society lost thousands of its 
children in this conflict. So, it was hard for a lot of people to put up with 
those scenes. It could have worked if the government was able to 
administer the process properly. The peace process could have continued 
if the government declared that those demonstrations were about peace 
and not victory. There are no winners and losers in a peace process. Peace 
is a win-win situation for all parties.257 
 
The second strategy of the AKP towards the Kurdish question in the post-2007 
period is the so-called “Kurdish opening,” which was initiated in July 2009 with the 
purpose of finding a democratic solution to the Kurdish question. Although it was 
depicted as a genuine attempt by the government to settle the Kurdish question, the 
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initiative was not a “spontaneous” act of democratization. There were ongoing low-
intensity confrontations between the Turkish military and the PKK in northern Iraq from 
early 2008. In order to break the stalemate, in early 2009, Öcalan declared that he would 
announce a “road map for the resolution of the Kurdish question” by August.  Öcalan’s 
declaration created a momentum within the government to pre-empt his plan and 
announce a counter “Kurdish initiative” that would render Öcalan’s plan useless.258 
Furthermore, in the municipal elections of March 2009, AKP lost against the pro-Kurdish 
Democratic Society Party (DTP) in the predominantly Kurdish towns in southeastern 
Turkey. Thus, the AKP’s Kurdish opening was indeed a response to Öcalan’s road map 
and its decreasing electoral popularity among the Kurds.  
After the initiation of the opening, AKP made a substantial effort to make sure it 
was pursuing all possible options without Öcalan’s involvement. To this end, when 
Öcalan finally gave his ‘road map’ document to his lawyers in August, it was confiscated 
by the İmrali prison administration.259 The credibility of the Kurdish opening, however, 
soon became questionable. First, the opening was born into an environment dominated by 
a repressive campaign against the Kurdish politicians and activists called “the KCK 
operations,” which started two weeks after the victory of the Kurdish movement in 
municipal elections in March 2009. Systematic waves of repression continued throughout 
the opening and led to the arrest of more than 1500 politicians, human rights activists, 
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writers, artisans, and leaders of civil society organizations.260 Consequently, in the eyes 
of the Kurds, the credibility of both the AKP and its Kurdish initiative was considerably 
damaged due to the fact that the opening went hand-in-hand with an official strategy 
aimed at paralyzing the legal Kurdish movement by closing the political system to it.     
Second, AKP failed to engage the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), 
one of the three opposition parties in the Turkish parliament, because of the DTP’s 
refusal to condemn the PKK, as demanded by the government as a precondition for 
negotiations. The other two opposition parties in the parliament, the Kemalist CHP 
(Republication People’s Party) and ultra-nationalist MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) 
also rejected the initiative as it soon became evident the AKP did not have any specific 
proposals regarding the opening. In addition, shortly after the Chief of General Staff İlker 
Başbuğ’s statement on August 25, 2009, regarding the military’s commitment to unitary 
and Turkish character of the republic, the “Kurdish” part of the initiative disappeared 
from the AKP’s discourse and the title of the plan became “democratic opening.”  
In late October 2009, the Habur incident brought the stalling democratic opening 
to a full halt. The Constitutional Court’s decision to ban the DTP for its alleged 
association with the PKK only made matters worse. The Peace and Democracy Party 
(BDP) quickly succeeded the DTP, but mass arrests and detentions against the BDP party 
members continued within the framework of the KCK operations. The democratic 
initiative news gradually disappeared from the media agenda only to be revived by the 
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AKP in January 2010, this time titled “National Unity and Brotherhood Project,” which 
was more of a move to save face rather than a direct contribution to the process. 
The Limits of the AKP’s Kurdish Policy 
The main problem with the AKP’s Kurdish opening was that it was not designed 
as a genuine attempt to solve the Kurdish question in dialogue with the Kurdish political 
actors. Rather, it was initiated as part of the AKP’s “containment” strategy towards the 
Kurdish movement, particularly in formal politics, in order to strengthen the claim that 
the AKP was the only true representative of the Kurds in Turkey.261 While the legal 
Kurdish movement was suppressed through the KCK operations, Öcalan was specifically 
kept out of the democratic opening process in order to consolidate the position of the 
AKP as the sole agent of the solution. Nevertheless, secretive talks with Öcalan and 
leaders of the PKK were already occurring through the Oslo process. The AKP did not 
succeed in administrating these parallel processes in a coherent way mainly because of its 
greater commitment to win the fight against the Kemalist establishment over providing a 
genuine solution to the Kurdish question.  
From early 2010 until the June 2011 parliamentary elections, the process of 
finding a democratic solution to the Kurdish question was stalled. The Kurdish actors 
continued to put forward proposals for negotiation, but did not receive any concrete 
responses from the government. On the political front, the pro-Kurdish non-governmental 
organization, Democratic Society Congress (DTK), and the BDP were voicing a solution 
titled “Democratic Autonomy,” which was an attempt to forge a new political paradigm 
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based on the direct exercise of people’s power through village, town and city councils.262 
Instead of autonomy based on “ethnicity” or “territory,” it suggested regional and local 
structures that would allow for the expression of cultural differences.263 In this respect, 
the democratic autonomy project is built on the idea of developing the autonomous 
capacities of people, through a more direct, less representative form of political structure 
that could be applied not only to the Kurdish region, but to the whole of Turkey. 
The democratic autonomy model is in line with the guidelines already listed in the 
European Charter of Local Self-Government adopted in 1985, and was ratified by forty-
one countries, including Turkey (with numerous reservations). The removal of the 
reservations and full implementation of the Charter has been part of Turkey’s EU 
accession requirements since 2005. In that sense, one might argue that the democratic 
autonomy model as well as the BDP’s and Öcalan’s earlier calls for local autonomy 
would bring Turkey into conformity with the EU guidelines. Although the democratic 
autonomy proposal did not receive any concrete policy responses from the government, it 
started a heated debate in Turkey regarding strengthening of local administrations. In 
2010 and 2011, the debate on democratic autonomy and local administrations also 
initiated a renewed phase of rapprochement between the Kurds and the Turkish left 
around the common theme of deepening the process of democratization in Turkey. This 
process paved the way for a wider political realignment in the June 2011 parliamentary 
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elections when the BDP formed a coalition with some twenty socialist parties and 
movements, which won thirty-six parliamentary seats.   
On the part of the PKK and Öcalan, the Oslo talks continued until the June 2011 
elections. Öcalan prepared three protocols on the principles to be followed and actions to 
be taken for ultimate peace. Some of the specific suggestions were the formation of a 
peace council, truth commissions, a democratic constitution, mutual forgiveness, political 
decentralization and recognition of Kurdish collective rights.264 Nevertheless, although 
Turkish authorities repeatedly stated the government would deliver its decision regarding 
the protocols after the parliamentary elections, the expected meeting did not take place, 
which practically ended the Oslo process. In the meantime, the AKP succeeded in taking 
the army and other elements of Kemalist bureaucracy under its tight control in 2011, and 
won its third election victory in June 2011 by getting fifty percent of the votes. Remzi 
Kartal explains how these developments were interpreted by the PKK: 
Democratic opening was not an initiative planned by the AKP. It was the 
AKP’s response to its defeat in southeastern Turkey in the 2009 municipal 
elections and to the public discussion which started as a result of Öcalan’s 
proposed road map. AKP started this initiative but it had no preparation or 
a specific project. That’s why it failed. That’s also the reason why the 
Habur process collapsed. In order to overcome the stalemate, once again, 
Öcalan made a call and the PKK declared “no-action period” until the 
2011 general elections. The PKK supported the AKP against the Turkish 
military with the expectation that the government will take the necessary 
steps for the solution of the Kurdish question after the elections. In the 
meantime, however, the AKP eliminated the power of the military and we 
saw that nothing changed after the elections. For us, the AKP government 
no longer has any credibility. From now on, progress on the solution of the 
Kurdish issue can be achieved only through mutual effort.265 
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From the perspective of the PKK, both the democratic opening and the Oslo 
negotiations were designed by the government as tactical diversions in order to both win 
the fight against the Kemalist establishment and implement a successful election 
campaign during the PKK’s “no-action period.” As the AKP lost its credibility in the 
eyes of the PKK, armed conflict resumed in 2011, shortly after the parliamentary 
elections and increasingly continued in 2012, until the historic Newroz statement of 
Öcalan. The statement renewed hope for peace and marked the beginning of yet another 
process of negotiation between the state and the Kurdish actors, this time openly 
including the PKK, Öcalan and the legal Kurdish parties. 
The AKP’s victory against the Kemalists was a positive step towards Turkey’s 
democratization, particularly in terms of eliminating the influence of the military in 
politics. However, marginalization of Kemalism in Turkey during the AKP’s rule was 
largely a consequence of the steps taken by the AKP to solve of the Kurdish question. 
Since the beginning of the AKP’s first term in office, it was mainly the Kurdish issue, 
particularly the PKK, that shaped the course of power struggles between the AKP and the 
Kemalists. In this context, political violence pursued by the PKK was the biggest 
challenge facing the AKP in its struggle against the military. The AKP-PKK negotiations 
should be understood in this light. The democratic opening and the Oslo process were 
essentially part of the AKP’s containment policy towards the Kurdish movement. The 
unintended consequence of this process was that it encouraged a shift in the “way of 
looking” at politics in Turkey, particularly regarding some important domestic issues 
which have long been considered as taboo.  
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When a tape recording of the Oslo meetings was leaked to the media in 
September 2011, the incident did not lead to a public indignation, which was a major 
indication of strong public support for peace through negotiations with not only the legal 
Kurdish parties, but also with the Kurdish actors that have long been considered as 
“terrorists” and “separatists.” It is important to recognize the role of the Kurdish 
movement in encouraging this shift in the mindset of Turkish society, which has made it 
possible for the AKP to carry out open negotiations with all the actors of the Kurdish 
movement, legal and illegal, since March 2013.  
The Road Ahead 
The AKP’s engagement with the Kurdish question has not brought sustainable 
results mainly because the AKP replaced the power of Kemalism in Turkey not with the 
power of people, but with its own party establishment. Therefore, the conflict between 
the state and the Kurdish movement over the conceptualization of the Kurdish question, 
which has been the fundamental barrier to any meaningful solution, still prevails. The 
risky nature of “peace,” which requires transformation of Turkey’s ideological and 
political structures that have long been based on specific ethno-national hierarchies, is 
still largely in contradiction to the AKP’s pragmatic, cautious and risk-averse approach to 
the Kurdish question.  
Nevertheless, alongside the debate over whether the negotiations between the 
state and the Kurdish movement were a “success” or a “failure,” it should also be 
recognized that the democratization discourse has gained considerable strength in Turkey 
since 2007. In their quest for a new definition of governance and citizenship in Turkey, 
the Kurdish actors saw the AKP’s rise to power as an opportunity for establishing 
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genuine peace and democracy in Turkey. Given the fifty percent voter support behind the 
AKP, the political environment in Turkey from 2007 to 2011 offered an opportunity to 
solve a number of important political problems, including the Kurdish question, through 
public consensus. The opportunity was missed, but the increased democratic 
consciousness in the country came back to haunt the AKP government in 2013 when the 
government faced mass-based protests known as the “Gezi Movement.” 
The Gezi movement started as a protest against the implementation of an urban 
management project in Istanbul in June 2013, but quickly gained momentum and spread 
to other cities. In a matter of days, the Gezi movement became a broad-based civilian 
resistance and expanded beyond its environmentalist focus to include subjects such as the 
restrictions on freedom of expression and the crackdown on opposition in Turkey. The 
AKP survived the Gezi protests, but its hold on power was severely shaken. By the end of 
2013, the AKP was also shaken by serious corruption charges, which put the legitimacy 
of the party at further risk. 
What makes this picture even more complicated is the slow pace of negotiations 
with the Kurds since March 2013, and the approaching local and general elections in 
Turkey in 2014 and 2015, respectively. Under these conditions, the AKP has once again 
turned to the Kurdish movement in order to maintain its power. As part of its preparation 
strategy for the elections, the AKP is increasingly using the Kurdish question and the 
nascent negotiation process with the PKK and Öcalan in order to strengthen its political 
leverage. The main manifestation of this strategy so far is the AKP’s efforts to establish a 
direct connection between the fate of the solution process and the continuation of the 
AKP’s majority power in the parliament. Considering the lessons of the past, it is 
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unlikely the Kurdish movement will continue to support the ongoing peace process unless 
genuine steps are taken by the AKP.266 First and foremost, these steps must include the 
necessary constitutional changes to provide all ethno-national groups in Turkey with 
equal rights as well as the dismantling of centralized political structures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
266 For an analysis of the ongoing peace talks in the context of the AKP’s corruption scandal see Çandar, 
Cengiz. “Kürtler Yolsuzluk Şaibesi Altındaki İktidara Omuz Verir mi?” (Would the Kurds Support a 
government Stained by Corruption Charges?) Radikal, February 21, 2014.  
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CHAPTER V 
KURDS IN SYRIA 
 
We demand a fundamental change to the oppressive system. There are 
some who hold up the slogan: the fall of the regime. In contrast we 
demand the fall of the oppressive authoritarian system. Our problems are 
not problems of powers. The ruling powers in Damascus come and go. For 
us Kurds, this isn't so important. What is important is that we Kurds assert 
our existence. The current regime does not accept us, nor do those who 
will potentially come into power. Our politics differ from a politics that 
seeks power. That needs to be clear.267  
 
Syria is the last destination of the wave of uprisings in the Arab world that started 
in Tunisia in early 2011, and gradually spread to a large number of countries in the 
Middle East. Although the outcome of the Syrian revolution remains unforeseeable given 
the violent handling of protestors by the Syrian regime, and a heterogeneous and 
fragmented protest movement, there is an increasing demand for the fall of the regime. 
Nonetheless, as the statement made by the chairman of the Democratic Union Party 
(PYD), one of the most influential Kurdish parties in Syria, indicates, the Kurdish 
position concerning the recent political developments in Syria differs fundamentally from 
the position of the Syrian opposition regarding the issues of regime change and 
democratization in the country.      
As the political events in Syria unfolded since March 2011, the relationship of the 
Kurdish parties to the Syrian opposition has become one of the most controversial 
matters in Syrian politics. Although they share the Arab oppositional groups’ discontent 
with the current regime, the Kurds’ participation in the Syrian uprising was limited and 
                                                      
267 KurdWatch, Interview with Salih Muslim Muhammad, Chairman of the PYD, November 8, 2011. 
Available at http://kurdwatch.org/html/en/interview6.html (Accessed November 14, 2012). 
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their regions remained have relatively calm. Since the beginning of the protest 
movement, the Kurds in Syria followed the strategy of becoming part of the revolution in 
order to further strengthen their case and criticize the dominant positions of both the 
regime and the opposition from a specific political position. In this regard, they 
demonstrated less for “toppling the regime” than for the Kurdish right to self-
determination and “changing the entire system.”    
Until the Qamishli revolt of 2004, and particularly the Syrian uprising of 2011, 
the Kurdish question in Syria was overlooked both by the academic and policymaking 
communities, while attention has been lavished mainly on the Kurds of Turkey and Iraq, 
and more modestly on the Kurds of Iran. This situation is often explained by the fact that 
the Kurds of Syria are less numerous than those of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, and more 
geographically dispersed, which accounts for their weaker mobilization in challenging 
the government in demand of their rights.268 Moreover, a major factor that distinguishes 
the Syrian Kurdish movement from its counterparts in Turkey, Iran and Iraq is that the 
Syrian Kurds have never taken up arms against the government of Damascus, while 
armed struggle has represented the primary mode of opposition for the Kurdish 
movements elsewhere. Therefore, the process through which the Syrian Kurdish parties 
were able to promote the “Kurdish issue” as a political problem to be resolved in Syria – 
a situation which normally emerged after a period of armed conflict in other parts of 
Kurdistan – was slower compared to Turkey, Iran and Iraq. 
                                                      
268 Vanly, Ismet Chériff (1992). “The Kurds in Syria and Lebanon” in The Kurds: A Contemporary 
Overview edited by Philip G. Kreyenbroek, Stefan Sperl, London & New York: Routledge, 112.   
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The Kurds constitute the largest ethnic minority in Syria, making up almost ten 
percent of the population, a not-inconsiderable proportion of Syrian society, and they 
have their own distinct language, culture and ethnic identity.269 Although the Kurdish 
movement in Syria was not as effective as it was in Turkey, Iran and Iraq in terms of 
influencing the movement for change, it played a significant role in linking the ethnic 
question to political goals in the country throughout the 1950s, and later during the 
Baathist regime. 
The growth of a national consciousness among the Syrian Kurds was affected 
largely by the arrival of Kurdish immigrants in Syria from Turkey where they faced 
persecution following the Kemalist rule’s brutal suppression of the Shaykh Said revolt of 
1926. In the long term, the Kurdish movement in Syria became an autonomous struggle 
in an environment promoting the growth and affirmation of Arab nationalism, a powerful 
antagonist to the aspirations of the Kurds. Since the 1990s, the steady increase in Kurdish 
outspokenness in articulating their demands in Syria, combined with dramatic changes in 
the Kurdish political landscape at the regional level, resulted in renewed efforts by the 
Syrian Kurds to assert themselves as important political players in their own right. These 
efforts gradually expanded the boundaries of the “Kurdish problem” in Syria beyond the 
narrow limits of an “identity movement” to encompass the broader role of a 
                                                      
269 The Syrian constitution (1973) calls the country “the Syrian Arab Republic” (Article 1), which implies 
that all its citizens are to be considered Arabs regardless of their ethnic origins. Therefore, there are no 
official statistics on the number of Kurds in Syria. For recent estimates of the Kurdish population in Syria 
see Nazdar, Mustafa (1993). “The Kurds in Syria” in A People Without A Country: The Kurds and 
Kurdistan edited by Gerard Chaliand, New York: Olive Branch Press, 194; McDowall, David (1996), 466. 
During February 2012, a new constitution was put to referendum which came into force on February 27, 
2012.  The new constitution did not include any changes with regard to the Arab character of the Syrian 
nation. The referendum was boycotted by both the Syrian opposition and the Kurdish parties.    
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“democratization” movement and respect for the human rights of all, a theme to which 
various groups could relate.    
Institutionalization of Kurdish Nationalism in Syria 
The Kurdish struggle to present their grievances by mobilizing through political 
parties dates back to the establishment of Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (KDPS) in 
1957. In fact, there have been many Kurds in positions of power and influence in Syria 
since the beginning of the French mandatory period through employment in the military 
and as deputies in the Syrian Parliament. Nevertheless, the Kurdish members of the 
parliament never presented themselves under the banner of a nationalist discourse, 
proclaimed their Kurdish background or promoted specifically Kurdish interests. They 
were considered “independents” who did not seek to create a political apparatus around 
their ethnic origin. Therefore, for the better part of the 1950s, the militancy of the 
politicized Kurds was associated with the Syrian Communist Party (SCP).270 
Towards the end of the French mandate in Syria, the political engagement of the 
Kurds could be classified into three camps: Arab nationalism, Communism, and Kurdish 
nationalism.271 Some of the Kurdish tribes supported the Syrian independence movement 
in 1946 alongside Arab tribes. In the absence of any well-defined Kurdish groups or 
political parties with a Kurdish nationalist agenda, some of the politically engaged Kurds 
sympathized with the SCP in late 1940s. During that time, there was a widely held 
perception among minorities of the Middle East that communism might be their only 
bulwark against the pan-Arabist plan. Nonetheless, despite the fact that the SCP largely 
                                                      
270 Tejel, 86. 
271 Ibid. 42. 
181 
 
influenced the development of Kurdish nationalist politics, the conflict between 
nationalism and communism soon resulted in the dilution of the Kurdish identity of the 
party. The reluctance of the SCP to support Kurdish nationalist aspirations made it 
necessary for the Kurds to create an organization that was both left wing and nationalist. 
The foundation of the KDPS addressed this demand by introducing the first 
popular Kurdish national party on the Syrian political scene. Syrian-Arab official 
discrimination against the Kurds, which became prominent after Syria gained 
independence from France in 1946, was the major impetus behind the rise of Kurdish 
nationalist activity in Syria. The struggle for Syrian independence was primarily fought 
not in terms of a “Syrian” nationalist discourse, but as one of “Arab” nationalism, which 
established pan-Arabism as the official ideology of the new state.272 The creation of the 
KDPS was a reaction to the ascending Arab nationalism in Syria in the 1950s and the 
exclusionary character of the emerging Syrian national identity, which denied the multi-
ethnic and multi-religious make-up of the country.   
The KDPS embraced the Syrian state as the institutional framework within which 
the rights of the Kurds would be sought, yet the party program explicitly promoted a 
nationalist discourse with a strong ethnic tone. Paragraph one of the program states that 
the party was founded in order to “protect the Kurds from mistakes, oppression, and from 
disappearing.”273 Paragraph four defines the goal of the party with regard to the Kurdish 
question by stating that “ . . . the KDPS demands special status for the four hundred 
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thousand Kurds in the Jazirah, in ‘Ayn al-‘Arab, and Çiyayê Kurmênc (Afrin region), in 
order to ensure their political, social, and cultural rights within the Syrian state.”274  
Paragraph two of the program not only takes a position on the form of 
government sought, but also sets forth the understanding that it is only through 
democracy that Kurdish rights can be secured: “Because the Syrian Democratic Kurds’ 
Party is a peace-loving and progressive party, it champions a people’s democracy in its 
homeland Syria.”275 Along with Kurdish nationalist positions, the program also reflects 
leftist principles and ideas. Paragraph five states: “The KDPS welcomes the Kurdish fight 
in Turkey, in Iran, and in Iraq, as well as the fight of all oppressed peoples for the 
liberation of their states from the imperialists. The KDPS will lend them a hand so that 
they secure their freedom.”276 Here it becomes clear the party had a regional approach to 
the Kurdish issue and adopted a broad conception of liberation that pertains not only to 
the Kurds but to all the oppressed people in the region.  
From its foundation in 1957 to the 1990s, the KDPS suffered heavily from splits 
deriving from internal divisions and ideological differences. Factionalism and 
fragmentation took a serious toll on Syrian Kurdish politics and created constant 
frustration on the part of ordinary Kurds who hoped for political strength. Nevertheless, 
the KDPS laid the foundations for the institutionalization of the Syrian Kurdish political 
scene and provided Kurdish nationalism in Syria with an organizational framework. The 
party was influenced greatly by regional events, particularly the evolution of the Kurdish 
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problem in Iraq. The leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq played a decisive 
role in the building of the KDPS program, which later served as a platform for the Iraqi 
Kurdish parties to influence Kurdish politics in Syria.  
Anti-Kurdish sentiment increased in Syria particularly after the union between 
Syria and Egypt in 1958. The newly created United Arab Republic (UAR) adopted a 
fiercely Arab nationalist rhetoric, which intensified anti-Kurdish propaganda and a 
campaign of arrest and detention against Kurdish political activists. In 1960, Gamal 
Abdul Nasser’s rule imposed a heavy crackdown on the nascent Kurdish political 
movement in Syria and arrested large numbers of members and associates of the KDPS. 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s uprising in Iraq in 1961 further fueled fears of a similar 
uprising in Syria and reinforced the perception that the Kurds posed a threat to Syria’s 
sovereignty, security and territorial integrity. In the provisional constitution drafted after 
the collapse of the UAR in 1961, Syria was formally described for the first time as the 
“Syrian Arab Republic,” which marked the denial of non-Arabs in the official ideology. 
This was followed by an extraordinary census in 1962 in al-Hasaka province, which 
arbitrarily stripped 120,000 to 150,000 Kurds of Syrian citizenship, leaving them without 
basic civil rights, and condemned to poverty and discrimination.277 The census allowed 
Syrian Kurds to pitch deeply into the discourse of victimhood, which continued to define 
Kurdish nationalism in Syria over the subsequent decades under the Baath rule.  
 
 
                                                      
277 Lowe, Robert, (January 2006). “The Syrian Kurds: A People Discovered,” Chatham House Briefing 
Paper, London, 4. 
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Hafez Al-Assad’s Game 
Kurdish nationalism in Syria was largely dormant during the 1970s and 1980s 
because of the weight of official suppression. Nevertheless, the reawakening of Kurdish 
political activity in the 1990s, which eventually culminated in the events of 2004, has its 
roots in the Baath era under the presidency of Hafiz Al-Assad. After the Syrian Baathists 
came to power in 1963, the KDPS was banned and the party leaders were thrown into 
prison. The Baathists attached great importance to the consolidation of the status of Arab 
nationalism as the central element of Syrian political culture, started a relentless 
Arabization campaign in the Kurdish inhabited areas of Syria278 and increased coercion 
on the cultural, economic, and political life of the Kurds.   
While the Baath policy towards the Kurds from 1963 to 1970 was marked by 
coercion as a method of managing the Kurdish problem, after Hafiz Al-Assad came to 
power in 1970, the regime adopted a more pragmatic approach by pursuing a policy of 
cooptation towards the Kurdish groups both within and outside of Syria. In Syria, besides 
the policy of repressing Kurdish political and cultural activity, Hafiz Al-Assad 
encouraged Kurdish participation in the Baath system. The Kurds were given positions in 
the military and the parliament only on the condition they would not embrace any 
particular consciousness with regard to Kurdish identity. Outside the borders of Syria, the 
regime provided the Kurdish groups fighting against Turkey and Iraq with relative 
freedom of action in Syria from the 1970s until the late 1990s, as part of its strategy to 
displace “its” Kurdish problem to the neighboring countries. This policy of cooptation 
                                                      
278 The Arab belt plan was put into effect in the Jazira province after the Baathists came to power in 1963. 
The plan anticipated massive deportation of the Kurds who were living in this area and their replacement 
by Arabs with the stated objective of “saving Arabism in Jazira”.  
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towards the Kurds of Turkey and Iraq not only served to facilitate the achievement of 
Assad’s regional ambitions, but also enabled him to keep the Kurdish movement in Syria 
under control by encouraging the polarization of Syrian Kurds between the partisans of 
the Kurdish movements in Turkey and Iraq.   
Assad’s game initiated the long-term Syrian strategy known as the “playing the 
Kurdish card,” which remained a crucial aspect of the Kurdish question as a regional 
phenomenon. Tension between Syria and Iraq, which manifested itself primarily in the 
struggle for Baathist ideological legitimacy in the 1960s, continued into the 1990s, and 
gave rise to increasing regional competition between the two countries, particularly after 
the 1991 Gulf War. During the 1970s, the conflict between the two major Kurdish parties 
in Iraq, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP), was the primary obstacle to any serious attempt by Syria to play the Kurdish card 
against Iraq. However, after the reconciliation between the PUK and the KDP in 1987, 
the ties between the Iraqi Kurdish parties and Damascus grew stronger. The weakening of 
the Baathist regime and the emergence of a Kurdish zone in northern Iraq following the 
Gulf War reduced Damascus’ interest in an alliance with the Iraqi Kurdish parties. 
However, both the PUK and the KDP kept offices in Damascus until 2003.  
The strategic alliance between Damascus and the Iraqi Kurdish parties ended after 
the American intervention in Iraq in 2003. The political gains made by the Iraqi Kurds 
after Saddam Hussein’s fall led to a shift in the Iraqi Kurdish parties’ approach toward 
the Kurdish issue in Syria. As a result of increased security, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership 
became more confident promoting the Kurdish cause in other countries. The implications 
of this change in the Iraqi Kurdish perspective were seen during the events of March 
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2004 in Syria and later during the Syrian uprising in which Masoud Barzani played an 
active role in uniting the Syrian Kurdish opposition.  
The conflict between Turkey and Syria dates back to the mandatory period when 
France transferred the Sanjak of Alexandretta from Syrian to Turkish control in 1939. 
The dispute over sharing the Euphrates River and Turkey’s water projects, which 
threatened Syria’s water supplies, further exacerbated already existing problems between 
the two states. In an effort to put pressure on Turkey, Assad took an interest in the 
Kurdish movement in Turkey in the 1980s, and allowed the Kurdish insurgent group, the 
PKK, to establish bases on Syrian territory from which the PKK militants were able to 
launch military operations against the Turkish army. The leader of the PKK, Abdullah 
Öcalan, who fled to Damascus before the 1980 coup d’état in Turkey, caused major 
friction between Damascus and Ankara until Öcalan’s expulsion from Syria in 1998.  
Although the tensions between Turkey and Syria slowly began to cool after the 
capture of Öcalan in 1999, the efforts to establish closer commercial and military ties 
between the two countries broke down as a result of the eruption of the Syrian uprising in 
2011. Turkish-Syrian relations once again became strained due to Turkey’s support of the 
Syrian opposition’s efforts to overthrow the regime as well as the alleged support of 
Bashar Al-Assad for the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria, which has close links 
with the PKK.  
Kurds in Syria served heavily in the armed struggles of the Kurdish movements in 
Iraq and Turkey, mainly in Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s insurgency in Iraq in 1961-1975 and 
in the PKK’s struggle in Turkey from the early 1980s to the present. Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, northern Syria became the primary breeding ground for the PKK. As 
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emphasized by Ismet Sharif Vanly, the cooperation between the PKK and the Syrian 
regime was of mutual interest to both parties: the PKK had a rear base in Syria for its 
military activities against the Turkish government and Hafiz Al-Assad had in the Kurds 
of Syria a shield against its internal and external enemies.279 Support from Damascus for 
the Kurdish parties of both Turkey and Iraq was available only on the condition that they 
would avoid any attempt at mobilizing the Syrian Kurds against Hafiz Al-Assad’s 
regime. Thus, until the late 1990s, Kurdish elements in Syria acted largely as President 
Assad’s personal guard against internal threats. 
Assad’s policy of cooptation of the Kurdish groups both within and outside of 
Syria had two conflicting consequences. On the one hand, the freedom of action enjoyed 
by the Iraqi Kurdish parties and the PKK came at the expense of the development of a 
Kurdish movement in Syria. The more dramatic struggles of the Kurds in Iraq and 
Turkey attracted the Syrian Kurds in great numbers to support the Kurdish cause in these 
countries. Nevertheless, the strategy of the Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish groups to avoid 
antagonizing their host and supporter resulted in denying the legitimacy of any Kurdish 
demands in Syria, a position that fit nicely with Assad’s desire to channel Syrian Kurdish 
nationalist discontent towards Turkey and Iraq.  
On the other hand, Assad’s desire to minimize Kurdish mobilization in Syria by 
supporting the Kurdish movements of neighboring countries led to the unintended 
consequence of strengthening Kurdish identity and Kurdish nationalist sentiments among 
the Syrian Kurds. The Kurdish population in Syria gradually became more conscious of 
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ethnic distinctions because of the weight of official suppression and the influential 
struggles of Kurdish groups across Syria’s borders. As Kurdish cultural and political 
activity was continuously restricted in Syria, membership in the Iraqi Kurdish parties and 
the PKK were the only spaces left for the Syrian Kurds for ethnic expression and 
militancy. While the Kurdish movement in Syria pragmatically kept quiet and avoided 
challenging the regime in the Syrian context, the activities of the PKK and the Iraqi 
Kurdish parties made it possible for the Syrian Kurds to remain politically mobilized. 
This situation laid the foundations for the eventual collapse of the strategy of 
“dissimulation”280 among the Kurdish groups in Syria in the 1990s.  
Strategic alliances between Damascus and the PKK, KDP and PUK served to 
create tensions between these three competing parties. Furthermore, the collaboration of 
these parties with the “Syrian state,” which is deemed an “enemy” for the Syrian Kurds, 
resulted in friction with the KDPS. The fact that the leaders of the PKK, KDP and PUK 
downplayed the problems of the Syrian Kurds because of the pressure from the Syrian 
“boss” was largely seen as a betrayal of the pan-Kurdish doctrine. Nevertheless, while 
using the Kurdish movement against Iraq and Turkey, Hafiz Al-Assad ironically 
contributed greatly to the consolidation of Kurdish transnational politics by encouraging 
the strengthening of cross-border relations between the Syrian Kurds and the Kurds of 
                                                      
280 Tejel explains the concept of dissimulation as follows: “This sociological concept means that under 
certain adverse sociopolitical conditions actors disguise their differences or distinguishing traits in order to 
challenge the official unanimist ideology at its deepest roots. But when conditions permitted, the formerly 
hidden group ceases to play this game of conformity and insists on being visible and exposing their 
differences.” Tejel. 83-84. 
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Turkey and Iraq. This led to a revival of Kurdish identity and empowerment of pan-
Kurdish ideal in Syria by “proxy.” 
As the Syrian Kurdish parties were unable to establish themselves as a significant 
political opposition in the country, the political and cultural activities of the better 
organized and stronger Kurdish groups of Iraq and Turkey helped Kurdish politics in 
Syria maintain a certain level of organizational capacity. It was notably the activities of 
the PKK that played a significant role in providing the Kurdish culture with greater 
visibility in the Syrian public sphere. The implications of this process were manifested 
particularly through the establishment of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) by the 
sympathizers of the PKK in Syria in 2003, which became the most influential Kurdish 
party in Syria.  
Reawakening of Kurdish Nationalism in Syria 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the position of the Kurds in Syria can be categorized 
into three groups: Those who were responsive to Hafiz Al-Assad’s policy of cooptation, 
namely, the Kurdish “clients” of the regime; the small partisan groups, which were 
mostly the splinters of the KPDS; and finally, those who joined the ranks of the Iraqi 
Kurdish parties or the PKK as a way to remain politically mobilized and express their 
Kurdish identity. Joining the Kurdish movements in Turkey and Iraq was very appealing 
for the majority of the Syrian Kurds within the framework of pan-Kurdish aims, while as 
Kurds of Syria, they remained mostly silent on Syrian issues. The small partisan groups 
largely opted for a policy of dissimulation, which was based on a refusal to submit to 
official repression while avoiding an open confrontation with the regime. By the 1990s, it 
was these groups that eventually broke away from the game of conformity and provided 
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the Kurdish movement in Syria with a vocal wing to challenge the Arabist ideology of 
the regime through greater visibility.  
Before the events of Qamishli, which took the Syrian authorities by surprise in 
March 2004, there was already a steady increase in Kurdish activism and outspokenness 
in Syria that had started in the 1990s. Periodic protests and confrontations were taking 
place, particularly on significant days such as Newroz (the Kurdish new year) or the 
anniversary of the 1962 census. The effort to raise the visibility of the Kurdish 
movement’s demands was further intensified after the establishment of the Yekîtî Party in 
1992, which was created by Kurdish partisan groups of diverse origins including the 
proponents of a Marxist ideology and Kurdish nationalism. Coming from the leftist 
strand that was primarily affected by the ideological debates of the Cold War, the Yekiti 
sought to draw youth into its ranks by focusing on the broader discourse of empowerment 
of civil society and respect for human rights, as well as the key events in “ethnic” 
memory, particularly the creation of Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq in 1992.  
As a clear indication of the collapse of the strategy of dissimulation, the Yekiti 
introduced a new repertoire of actions aimed at more “visibility” including publications, 
campaigning, protesting, demonstrations, and striking. Compared to the fairly modest 
demands of Kurdish parties in Syria in previous years, which were confined largely to 
cultural matters with no mention of self-government or regime change, the Yekiti 
adopted a more radical program. During the third party congress in November 1999, 
territorial demands, referencing a “Syrian Kurdistan” were incorporated into the Yekiti 
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program.281 On the Kurdish issue, the party advocated for the constitutional recognition 
of the existence of the Kurdish people. On a political level, the Yekiti stressed the need 
for a decentralized political system that would take into account the democratic balance 
between all the components of the Syrian society and demanded the Kurdish people 
manage themselves in their legislative, administrative and judicial matters in the Kurdish 
majority areas within the framework of a democratic parliamentary system.282 
The end of the strategic alliance between Damascus and the PKK after the 
expulsion of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in 1998, further increased the influence of 
the Yekiti on the Kurdish political scene in Syria. Although the capture of Öcalan and its 
effects on the PKK dealt a major blow to the Kurdish cause in general, the elimination of 
the PKK’s presence in Syria lent a more autonomous character to the Syrian Kurdish 
movement. As the PKK plunged into a crisis of reorganization after Öcalan’s arrest, the 
Yekiti aspired to fill the void left by the PKK. The Yekiti organized several large and 
bold human rights demonstrations in Damascus and Aleppo during the early 2000s. In the 
meantime, dramatic changes were taking place in the Syrian political arena after the death 
of Hafiz Al-Assad, which gave further impetus to Kurdish political activity.   
Towards the Qamishli Revolt 
By the early 2000s, there were two important developments that had major 
impacts on Kurdish politics in Syria: in the domestic field, a period of intense political 
and intellectual debate started to take place in after the death of Hafiz Al-Assad, which 
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282 The Yekiti party program amended and approved by the Sixth Conference in December 2009 is 
available online at http://yekiti-media.org/nuce.php?z=&id=33&z=en (Accessed February 8, 2013). 
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raised hopes for democratic change in Syria. At the regional level, the fall of Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq in 2003, and the subsequent gains made by the Iraqi Kurds provided the 
Syrian Kurds with encouragement to take a more active stance in demanding their 
cultural and political rights in Syria. As a result of these events, the stage of “visibility” 
that had been in the making on the Syrian Kurdish political scene over the past decade 
gained further momentum and consolidated the status of the Kurdish element in the 
opposition movement. 
Bashar Al-Assad’s takeover in 2000 raised hopes for change in Syria and it 
initiated a civil society movement known as the “Damascus Spring,” which made many 
people believe that young Assad might open up the country. From June 2000 to August 
2001, Syria’s long silenced civil society took advantage of this changed atmosphere to 
call for a democratic opening. Numerous discussion circles, debates, forums, and 
assemblies were formed all over the country with the purpose of addressing once taboo 
topics as political, economic and human rights reform, corruption, political prisoners and 
exiles, and the development of an autonomous civil society in Syria.  
In September 2000, leading intellectuals signed the “Manifesto of the 99,” which 
called for the repeal of the state of emergency and the emergency laws of 1963, the 
release of all political prisoners, the return of Syrians from exile, and freedoms of speech 
and press.283 It was followed by the “Manifesto of the 1,000” in January 2001, in which 
the demands for electoral reform and abolition of one-party rule were emphasized. 
Finally, in May 2001, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood published a National Charter from 
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exile in London calling for a modern, democratic Syria and the rejection of any form of 
political violence.284 The Kurdish parties and activists also took part in the Damascus 
Spring and made contacts with the Syrian opposition. The softening of the government’s 
approach to the Kurdish movement allowed the Kurdish political organizations to meet 
more openly and increase their activity.   
The regime’s initial reaction to the public demand for democratic change was 
encouraging. Hundreds of political prisoners, including the communists and members of 
Muslim Brothers, were released, and several of the prisons notorious for the brutal 
treatment of inmates were shut down.285 However, the democratization drive came to a 
rapid halt in February 2001, when the Baath party started accusing activists of weakening 
and discrediting state institutions, and harming the stability and unity of Syria. Civil 
forums were declared illegal and terminated, and pioneers of the civil society movement 
and other prominent human rights activists were arrested. The government tightened 
censorship and issued new guidelines on publications that  restricted the ownership of 
periodical publications to Syrian Arabs, suggesting that members of the Kurdish minority 
and stateless Kurds born in Syria were excluded.286 
Although Bashar Al-Assad’s regime initially adopted a reconciliatory attitude and 
made positive public statements in an attempt to subdue the demands for political change, 
it soon became apparent the government was not willing to undertake any real change. 
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Nonetheless, despite the end of Damascus Spring and the closed political context, 
between 2002 and 2004, Kurdish political actions in Syria in the form of demonstrations 
and protests increased dramatically in both frequency and scale. The fact that the return 
of suppression after the Damascus Spring was followed by a constant cycle of Kurdish 
protests clearly indicated a new level of confidence among the Kurds in Syria.  
The most important aspect of Kurdish activism in this period was that increased 
international attention on human rights reflected positively on the actions of the Kurds 
who started to frame their dispute with the state specifically in human rights terms. As the 
leading actor in organizing the protests, the Yekiti played a crucial role during this 
process and strengthened its position in the Kurdish movement. On December 10, 2002, 
International Human Rights Day, approximately one hundred and fifty members of the 
Yekiti demonstrated in front of the Syrian Parliament, shouting demands for citizenship 
cultural rights for the Kurds as well as respect for human rights in Syria. The signs 
carried during the demonstration read “Syria is the country of all, be they Arab or Kurd,” 
“We demand that the Syrian constitution recognize Kurds as the second official ethnicity 
of the country” and “We demand a definitive solution to the Kurdish question in the 
framework of national unity.”287 
The gathering of December 10, 2002, was certainly not the first public 
demonstration organized by the Kurds, but it was unique in many ways. First, the 
discourse of the protest was quite assertive in spite of the severely restricted political 
space in Syria. The demonstrators posed a direct challenge to the official ideology of the 
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Baathists by referring to the universal values against injustice and discrimination. 
Second, through the messages on the placards, the ideology of the regime was torn apart 
in the street, a space that had long been confiscated and manipulated by the state for its 
own glorification.288 Third, the demonstration indicated the Kurdish movement in Syria 
had managed to overcome its impotency and had revived the peaceful and democratic 
struggle it had long advocated. Finally, the gathering was a message to both those in 
power and the broader opposition in Syria that the Kurds’ capacity for action can no 
longer be underestimated.  
Yekiti’s strategy of greater visibility and the subsequent arrest of two Kurdish 
leaders led to disputes with other parties in the Syrian-Kurdish party spectrum that argued 
further confrontation with the government could be damaging. Nevertheless, despite the 
arrests and repression, demonstrations and public actions organized by the Yekiti 
increasingly continued in 2003 and 2004.  
On June 25, 2003, Yekiti organized a “parade of children” in front of the UNICEF 
building in Damascus, on the occasion of the World Children’s Day. Once again, a 
symbolic date was chosen as part of Yekiti’s strategy to associate Kurdish demands with 
universal issues. The banners were asking for freedom of cultural expression and 
language, particularly the right to teach in Kurdish language. This time, Yekiti did not 
find itself alone as other Kurdish parties agreed to participate. Broader participation was 
achieved on October 6, 2003, when Yekiti agreed to avoid overtly politicized messages 
and participate in a silent demonstration with other Kurdish parties to commemorate the 
census of 1962. Although, it was a retreat from the Yekiti’s offensive strategy, the 
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demonstration not only provided greater collaboration among the Kurdish parties but also 
made it possible, for the first time, for the Kurds and the Arab opposition as well as 
certain human rights organizations to act in concert in Syria. 
This cooperation further solidified on December 10, 2003, International Human 
Rights Day. The demonstration showed how dramatically things had changed in the one 
year after the December 2002 demonstration. Yekiti had broken its isolation and 
managed to obtain the support of a number of groups from both the Kurdish and Arab 
opposition. The number of participants in the December 2003 demonstration increased 
remarkably involving around a thousand people in front of the Syrian Parliament. 
In late 2003 and early 2004, a number of demonstrations took place outside court 
buildings in protest of the trials of political detainees, Kurdish and other. In February 
2004, the release of the Yekiti leaders, Marwan Usman and Hasan Salih, who were 
arrested after the December 2002 demonstration, mobilized 15,000 people who gave 
them a triumphant welcome to the city of al-Qamishli.289 On March 8, 2004, a counter-
demonstration was organized by the Kurdish and Arab parties in front of the Syrian 
Parliament in Damascus on the anniversary of the 1963 revolution through which the 
Baath Party had come to power. The same day, large crowds of Kurds spontaneously 
appeared in the streets in the majority of Kurdish towns to celebrate the recognition of 
federalism in Iraq. Another large gathering on March 8, 2004 took place in al-Qamishli to 
celebrate International Women’s Day. Despite the inclusive title, the celebration was 
used mainly as a “pretext” to affirm Kurdish identity in the public sphere.  
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The regularity of the demonstrations, the choice of symbolic dates associated with 
universal human rights, and the diversity of the actors involved – students, human rights 
associations, Kurdish and Arab parties – made the protests between 2002 and 2004 an 
undeniably new phenomenon in Syria. They represent not only the rapidly developing 
organizational capacity of democratic forces in Syria, but also the growing influence of 
the Kurds in the larger opposition movement. The security forces’ repression continued 
against the Kurdish leaders as well as other activists, with increased numbers of people 
taken into custody after each action. Four days after the events of March 8, the Qamishli 
Revolt erupted, which intensified the Kurdish struggle against the state and opened 
another chapter in the process of democratization in Syria.  
The Beginning of a New Era: The Qamishli Revolt 
If the period between 2002 and 2004 showed the potential of the Kurdish 
movement to become an active member of the opposition movement in Syria, the 
Qamishli revolt and the events that unfolded in its aftermath represented the 
transformation of this potential into a substantial political force. On March 12, 2004, the 
protest movement of the previous two years took a different turn after unrest at a soccer 
match in al-Qamishli resulted in six dead, all Kurds. This situation quickly led to the 
ethnicization of the incident. The outrage over the death of six Kurds was transformed 
into Kurdish nationalist rallies during the demonstrations and funeral marches on March 
13. A series of protests and violent incidents took place in Kurdish areas across Syria, 
including in other Kurdish towns in Jazira and further afield to Kobani, Aleppo, Afrin 
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and Damascus.290 Massive clashes occurred between protesters and the security forces. 
More than thirty people were killed, several hundred injured, and roughly two thousand 
people were detained and exposed to ill treatment.291  
It was particularly the young Kurds who took part in protests in large numbers. 
Grown up largely with ethnic discrimination and economic marginalization, they 
interpreted the events of March 12 as the state’s attack on the Kurdish community and 
reacted with nationalist symbols. The regularity of arrests and torture between 2002 and 
2004, had already reinforced solidarity among the Kurds in Syria and fueled Kurdish 
dissent against the state.  
The nationalist charge of the situation was intensified by the political 
developments in Iraq, which had an undeniable impact on the events in Qamishli. The 
Iraqi Transitional Administrative Law, which secured the autonomous status of the 
Kurdistan region of Iraq, was signed on March 8, 2012. This development had its own 
dynamic in Syria, both among the Kurds and within the government. While the change of 
circumstances in Iraq was a major inspiration for the Syrian Kurds, for the Syrian 
government, events in Iraq created the fear of a domino effect. The mass demonstrations 
in Qamishli and other cities confirmed this fear. Accordingly, the reaction of the Syrian 
state against the demonstrators was considerably harsh and the number of those killed or 
arrested was unparalleled in comparison to earlier events.292  
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As far as the scale of protests, the numbers involved, and the extent of the 
casualties, the Qamishli revolt was minor compared to Kurdish unrest in Turkey, Iran, 
and Iraq, but for Kurds in Syria, it was a momentous event. Qamishli not only redefined 
the Kurdish question in Syria, but also transformed the status quo between the Kurds and 
the Syrian government. Demonstrations of this magnitude had never before occurred in 
the history of the Kurds in Syria and the Syrian state faced the greatest popular challenge 
to its authority since the insurrection of the Islamic opposition led by the Muslim 
Brotherhood in 1982. For the first time, the protest movement united all the Kurdish 
parties and involved all the Kurdish territories in the country as well as the major Syrian 
cities with significant Kurdish populations, such as Damascus and Aleppo. This gave a 
powerful new expression to the existence of Kurds in Syria and underscored the symbolic 
unity of the Kurdish Syrian space. A Kurdish militant based in Germany clarified the 
importance of the events of March 2004, by stating, “the intifada of March delineated the 
map of Syrian Kurdistan.”293  
It is important to emphasize the popular and spontaneous nature of the uprising; 
Kurdish parties were certainly not the driving force behind the unrest. The 
demonstrations represented a genuinely popular expression of discontent and increased 
confidence in the public expression of Kurdish identity. At no other point in time was the 
Kurdish community’s potential to mobilize as high as it was in March 2004. However, 
instead of seizing the occasion to strengthen their ranks and create greater unity, the 
Kurdish parties chose to pacify the street in the immediate aftermath of the regime’s 
crackdown. Thus, the events in 2004 did not lead to political concessions by the 
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government. In June 2005, however, when mass rallies were held yet again, the approach 
of the Kurdish parties was different. Containing the riots was no longer the strategy in 
2005, although, opinions differed greatly on how to deal with the regime’s ban on 
demonstrations. A split in the party spectrum gave way to the emergence of a passive 
wing known as the “moderates” and a more active wing known as the “radicals,” which 
advocated for a more open confrontation with the state.  
The split among the Kurdish parties was already evident in the late 1990s after the 
establishment of the Yekiti and the reorganization of the PKK in Syria. The collaboration 
between the PKK and the Syrian regime came to an end in 1999, following the Syrian 
government’s decision to hand over Öcalan. The PYD was established in Syria in 2003, 
which immediately joined the ranks of the radical wing. Besides the Yekiti and PYD, the 
Azadi and the Future Movement, emerged as a result of the events in 2004, were the 
other members of the active wing.    
The split within the Kurdish party landscape was well suited to the regime’s 
traditional “divide and rule” policy, which was based on favoring one section of the 
Kurdish opposition while persecuting others. However, although the lines separating the 
“moderates” from the “radicals” hardened in 2005, the potential for a unified Kurdish 
movement in Syria had never been more present. The regime tried to prevent unified 
Kurdish action by favoring relations with the official representatives of the moderates to 
the detriment of the radicals. Nevertheless, it was apparent by 2005 that the traditional 
cooptation policy towards the Kurds in Syria was no longer a sustainable strategy to 
contain the Kurdish movement in the long term.  
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Another significant impact of the Qamishli revolt was that it gave rise to a 
previously unknown degree of solidarity, not only among the Syrian Kurds but also 
between the Syrian Kurds, the Iraqi-Kurdish, and the Turkish-Kurdish populations. 
Traditionally, it had been the Syrian Kurds who were engaged in the national movements 
of Kurds in neighboring countries. The Kurds of Syria not only held demonstrations to 
express concern over events that took place in Iraqi and Turkish Kurdistan such as the 
poison gas attack on Halabja and the arrest of Öcalan, but had also joined the armed 
movements of the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq. During March 2004, countless Iraqi and 
Turkish Kurds in the European diaspora, as well as in Diyarbakir (Turkey), Erbil, Dohuk, 
Sulaymaniyah (Iraq) demonstrated to show solidarity with the Syrian Kurds.294 The 
events of Qamishli not only reaffirmed Kurdish identity as a transnational phenomenon, 
but also legitimized the autonomous character of the Kurdish movement in Syria and 
reinforced the sense of “Syrian Kurdishness.”  
Evolving Relations between the Kurdish and Arab Opposition 
The demonstrations of March 2004 made the Kurdish capacity for mobilization 
acutely apparent to the Syrian opposition. The fact that a certain ethnic group was able to 
appear on the streets in such large numbers in defiance of the authorities was remarkable 
to other ethnic, religious and political groups in the country. The impact of the Qamishli 
revolt on the relations between the Arab and Kurdish opposition movements was twofold: 
first, the size of the Qamishli revolt forced Arab activists to recognize the Kurds 
constitute a political force in Syria that could no longer be ignored, and second, the 
growing Arab-Kurdish cooperation emerged in the wake of the Qamishli revolt ironically 
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crystallized the striking differences between Kurdish and Arab opposition groups’ vision 
of a democratic Syria.   
There had been certain level of cooperation between the Kurdish and Arab 
opposition groups since the Damascus Spring. However, prior to the events of Qamishli, 
the Kurdish issue had been largely ignored by the Arab opposition because of the 
perceptions regarding Kurdish secessionist aims. The events of March 2004 significantly 
brought the Kurdish question to the attention of Syrian opposition and led to increased 
contact between Arab and Kurdish leaders. Opposition groups issued a statement of unity 
and democratic change known as the Damascus Declaration in October 2005, which 
marked the official recognition of Kurdish opposition as a powerful political force in 
Syria. The document was signed by a large number of opposition figures and parties, 
including both secular and religious, Arab and Kurdish. The Declaration was an 
important initiative particularly because it included the Muslim Brotherhood, which was 
the most powerful Sunni-based Islamic opposition group in Syria. Furthermore, it was the 
first time the Muslim Brotherhood had publicly acknowledged the legitimacy of Kurdish 
grievances. The statement included an explicit reference to the status of the Kurds in 
Syria. The signatories declared that they were committed to:  
Find a just democratic solution to the Kurdish issue in Syria, in a manner 
that guarantees the complete equality of Syrian Kurdish citizens with the 
other citizens, with regard to nationality rights, culture, learning the 
national language, and the other constitutional, political, social, and legal 
rights on the basis of the unity of the Syrian land and people. Nationality 
and citizenship rights must be restored to those who have been deprived of 
them, and the file must be completely settled.295 
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However, despite the increased consciousness of Kurdish groups by the Arab 
opposition, cooperation remained limited because of the transformation of the Syrian 
Kurdish movement into a popular struggle. As the size of the Qamishli revolt 
conspicuously transcended the boundaries of Kurdish partisanship and underscored the 
mass base of the Kurdish movement in Syria, increased emphasis on the “identity” theme 
in the articulation of Kurdish demands radicalized the politicized ethnic divides in the 
country. Although the Damascus Declaration was an important step in terms of inserting 
the “Kurdish question” into the Arab opposition’s agenda, striking differences between 
the opinions of Kurds and Arabs regarding democratic transformation in Syria and the 
solution to the Kurdish problem soon became apparent.  
First, the limited Kurdish-Arab cooperation that took place in the aftermath of the 
Qamishli revolt soon fell victim to the mutual suspicions that had long been cultivated by 
the regime. The strongest opposition to the Baath regime during the 1970s and 1980s was 
the Sunni-based Islamic political groups, among which the Muslim Brotherhood was the 
most prominent. The Islamic insurgency that grew by the mid-1970s was eventually 
crushed by the bloody Hama massacre of 1982, in which thousands were killed including 
civilians. The Hama incident generally marked the defeat of the Islamic opposition 
movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria.  
The relations between the Kurds and the Syrian government at the time were 
generally defined by Hafez Al-Assad’s policy of alliance with the civil and religious 
Kurdish elites in order to keep the Kurdish nationalist movement in Syria in check and 
contain the Islamist threat in Syria. Collaboration with various Kurdish groups was 
strategically important for Hafez Al-Assad in order to maintain the stability of the regime 
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as the Sunni affiliation of the majority of the Kurds helped him tone down the Sunni 
opposition’s challenge to the regime’s legitimacy. A major implication of this 
arrangement was that the Arab Sunni majority regarded the Kurds as partners of the 
regime. Moreover, having identified themselves as secularist parties characterized mainly 
by a tendency toward Marxist and socialist discourse, Kurdish parties in Syria never 
embraced the Islamic doctrine, which always put them at odds with the Islamist 
movement.  
As second, Arab-Kurdish distinction was tied to the sudden outburst of Kurdish 
nationalism in 2004 that coincided with increasing U.S. and Israeli pressure on Syria as 
well as the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, creating a great deal of suspicion 
among the Arab nationalists who had shown support towards the Kurdish plight during 
the 2002-2004 protest movement. During the demonstrations of March 2004, there were 
explicit Iraqi-Kurdish references. The slogans “Free Kurdistan” and the use of nationalist 
symbols such as the Kurdish flag highlighted the territorial nature of Kurdish claims in 
Syria. The fact the demonstrators carried portraits of Iraqi-Kurdish leaders Masoud 
Barzani and Celal Talabani as well as of Abdullah Öcalan, suggested the Qamishli revolt 
represented the Syrian Kurds’ solidarity with the Kurdish movements in Turkey and Iraq. 
Furthermore, through the demonstrators’ references to the Iraqi government’s poison gas 
attack on the Iraqi-Kurdish city of Halabja in 1988, a direct parallel was drawn between 
the suffering of the Iraqi Kurds in Halabja and that of the Kurds in Syria in al-Qamishli.   
The references to the Iraqi-Kurdish experience played directly into the regime’s 
hands. The extremely violent repression of demonstrations risked fueling Kurdish 
nationalist sentiments and contradicted the Syrian regime’s traditional policy of 
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cooperation with certain groups and individuals in the Kurdish community. This renewed 
assault on the Kurds was mainly a result of the changing dynamics of the Kurdish 
question at the regional level and concerns over the regime’s internal legitimacy. Hence, 
it would be pertinent to interpret the regime’s violent crackdown on the Kurds both as an 
indication of the Syrian authorities’ concern over the growing American presence in the 
region, and as a response to the growing cooperation between the Kurds and Arabs after 
the Damascus Spring. This perspective suggests the regime intended to profit from the 
events in Qamishli by creating a schism between Arabs and Kurds in order to tighten the 
Arab ranks in defense of the regime and reorient the Sunni opposition towards 
Islamic/pan-Arab solidarity.296 
The Assad government exploited the military and political events in Iraq after 
2003 in order to “kill two birds with one stone.” On the one hand, playing on the Arab 
concerns for Kurdish secessionism, the regime justified the violent dispersal of 
demonstrations by promoting the importance of preserving Syrian national unity. The 
emergence of a more aggressive Kurdish strategy towards the government and parallels 
drawn by the Syrian Kurds between the fall of Saddam Hussein and a possible fall of 
Bashar Al-Assad were used by the regime to accuse against the Kurdish parties of 
seeking U.S. intervention in Syria comparable to that in Iraq. The regime and official 
media established explicit parallels between the riots of Qamishli and the deteriorating 
public order in Iraq, playing on the fear that Syria would plunge into a similar situation of 
ethnic and religious violence after a foreign intervention.297  
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On the other hand, playing on the secularists’ concern of a possible rise of 
Islamism in Syria, the regime presented itself as the only solution to safeguard Syria from 
falling into the same sectarian violence and chaos as experienced in Iraq. This argument 
particularly resonated with some secularist Kurds who opposed the rise of an Islamic 
power in Syria and an increase in the Sunni Arab majority in politics, to the detriment of 
ethnic and religious minorities. Despite their strong distrust of the Baath regime, for the 
majority of the Syrian Kurds, Bashar Al-Assad was a more preferable enemy than a 
regime dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The primary fear behind the regime’s efforts to fracture the opposition was the 
potential for cooperation between the Kurds and the Muslim Brotherhood, the two largest 
opposition groups in Syria. It was believed that the Syrian opposition’s ability to pose a 
real challenge to the regime was, to a large extent, contingent upon a compromise 
between the nationalist doctrine of the Kurds and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamic 
doctrine. Although the Damascus Declaration of October 2005 was a significant step for 
the Syrian opposition to surmount the mutual suspicions defined along the lines of 
religious-secular and Arab-Kurd, the regime’s strategy played on certain ethnic- and 
religiously-based fears in the Syrian society and took its toll on the nascent Arab-Kurdish 
cooperation that emerged following the Qamishli revolt. The radical wing composed of 
the Yekiti, Azadi, Future Movement and the PYD, despite praising the Damascus 
Declaration’s demands for democratic change, did not sign the text due to their 
reservations regarding the absence of a passage referring to the explicit recognition of the 
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Kurds as an independent national group with historic ties to the land along with the Arabs 
in Syria.298  
The Damascus Declaration proposed no clear solution to the Kurdish problem 
other than emphasizing it had to be resolved within a democratic and inclusive 
framework. Furthermore, the text’s special reference to Syria’s affiliation to Arab order 
was decried by some of the Kurdish groups as evidence of unceasing Arab chauvinism.299 
The territorial demands of the Kurds were seen unacceptable, particularly to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which rejected every autonomist plan for the Kurds and insisted on the 
general rhetoric of democratization in Syria and equality for all citizens as a solution to 
the Kurdish question.  
The fundamental problem was that while the majority of the Syrian opposition 
was confining the Kurdish question to the single issue of nationality rights and the return 
of citizenship to the stateless, the Yekiti and PYD and their allies were demanding the 
recognition of the Kurds as a separate nation and acceptance of the principle of 
administrative decentralization in Syria. After the launch of the Damascus Declaration, 
despite conciliatory declarations by the Muslim Brotherhood leadership concerning the 
cultural demands of the Kurds, there was widespread distrust among certain Kurdish 
parties upon seeing the reemergence of the Muslim Brotherhood as an organized force 
inside Syria.   
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The radicalization of ethnic divides in Syria after the events of Qamishli as well 
as the fracture between the Kurdish parties and the rest of the Syrian opposition during 
the negotiation process of the Damascus Declaration made it acutely apparent that the 
basis of the problem was in the concept of the nation state. The radical wing of the 
Kurdish parties attempted to place their actions and demands under a more universal 
human rights framework with an emphasis on administrative decentralization in Syria. In 
other words, Kurdish cultural, political, social and legal rights and demands for complete 
equality of Syrian Kurds with the other citizens were linked directly to the demands for 
the recognition of the Kurds as a separate nation with their historic ties to the Kurdish 
lands in Syria. However, according to the majority of Syrian parties and human rights 
associations in the opposition, the Kurds, rather than constituting a separate nation, were 
ordinary Syrian citizens who had been deprived of some of their rights. Recognition of 
the Kurds as a separate nation would mean the official recognition of Syria as a 
multinational country, which, in the minds of the Syrian opposition figures, was not 
compatible with the idea of “national unity” required by the concept of nation state. 
Accordingly, rather than a principle of democracy, administrative decentralization was 
seen primarily in the context of the “hidden objectives” of certain Kurdish parties, 
notably the radicals. 
As the wave of mass demonstrations and protests of the revolt of Qamishli cooled 
down at the end of 2005, the Syrian political arena consisted of three main forces. The 
first, Bashar Al-Assad, imposed a large-scale crackdown on all opposition groups in 
Syria and managed to stabilize the regime in the international arena by 2006. Departing 
from the Bush administration’s policy of sanctions and lumping Syria together with Iran, 
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Barack Obama adopted a new policy of engagement with Syria after he took office in 
2009. This shift in American policy towards Syria helped Assad reduce its international 
isolation. Regarding the relations between the Kurds and the Syrian regime, Bashar Al-
Assad took note of this new era marked by a strong public display of the “Kurdish 
problem” in the Syrian political sphere. In his attempt at defusing the Kurdish unrest and 
international human rights criticisms, the Syrian government publicly raised the issue of 
the 1962 census and the problem of statelessness for the Syrian Kurds for the first time. 
Nonetheless, these occasional gestures and statements contradicted the government’s 
policies, which, since 2004, have squeezed the political and cultural space available to the 
Kurds.300 The regime continued to favor relations with certain parties as official 
representatives of the Kurds, while increasing arrests and persecutions for others, most 
notably the Yekiti and the PYD, on grounds they sought to undermine the unity of the 
state through sectarianism.  
The Syrian opposition, which is the second of the three major political forces in 
Syria, established a broad-based alliance as a result of the social and political 
mobilization provoked by the Kurdish parties between 2002 and 2005. For the first time 
in decades, Syria’s bickering political parties, outspoken intellectuals, and civil society 
groupings came together, Kurdish and Arab nationalists found common ground, and 
socialists, communists, liberals and Islamists showed a willingness to unite over a single 
platform of democratic change and respect for another.301 The most crucial aspect of the 
Damascus Declaration was the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular groups 
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were finally able to set aside their mutual suspicions and collaborate with the shared goal 
of democratic transformation in Syria. Nevertheless, while the secular and Islamist camps 
in the opposition managed to mitigate popular suspicions against each other, each camp 
continued to maintain its strong opposition to certain “identity” demands by the Kurds. 
Although the Syrian opposition, for its part, established ties with the Kurdish parties 
following the events of Qamishli, their refusal to look at the “Kurdish problem” beyond 
the nation state framework persisted.  
In the wake of the Qamishli uprising, the Kurdish movement in Syria emerged as 
the “third force” within the movement for change in the country. The oppositional 
coalition formed by the Damascus Declaration set off alarm bells for the regime, 
particularly in terms of the reinstatement of an Islamist presence in the public sphere in 
Syria. Given the fact that the fundamental ideological principle of the Baathist regime 
was Arab nationalism, the striking rise of the Kurds within the opposition raised an even 
greater concern for the preservation of the last remaining pillar of the regime’s 
ideological legitimacy. The Syrian opposition shared the Kurdish goal of advancing 
democracy in Syria, all the while maintaining their strong opposition to the recognition of 
the Kurds as a separate nation and their demands for decentralization. Although the 
radical wing of the Kurdish movement strived to place its actions in a more universal 
framework, emphasized human rights and peaceful coexistence of different nationalities, 
the identity theme embedded in the demands resulted in the exclusion of the movement 
by both the regime and the opposition. 
After the events of Qamishli, a new equilibrium was put into place between not 
only the Kurds and the regime, but also the Kurds and the Syrian opposition. For the 
211 
 
regime, Kurdish national identity was no longer the marginal political question that could 
be dealt with through the traditional cooptation policy.  As for the opposition, the Kurdish 
movement became a major political force that constantly pushes the boundaries of the 
discourse of human rights and democratization promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood and 
other Arab opposition figures. Hence, accommodation with the Kurds in Syria became 
largely contingent on the capacity of both the regime and the opposition to meet the 
economic, political and cultural expectations of the Kurdish movement. While the 
question of how the aspirations of those politicized and radical Kurds would evolve 
remained on hold during the years following the Qamishli revolt, the spread of the Arab 
uprisings to Syria in 2011 opened a new chapter in the complex relationships among the 
Kurds, the Assad regime, and the Syrian opposition. The Kurdish movement, once again, 
emerged as a crucial player whose political leverage became critically important in 
tipping the scales of the emerging political instability.   
Syria: The Arab Spring’s Final Destination  
When a series of pro-democracy uprisings hit the Arab world in late 2010, Bashar 
Al-Assad was confident that the spread of ongoing protests in other Arab countries to 
Syria was unlikely. Assad’s belief in the stability of Syria was derived primarily from his 
contention that the state was aligned with its people in terms of its foreign policy.302 
Assad’s argument was based mainly on Syria’s defiance towards the U.S, and support for 
the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance movements, which have long been the primary 
tools of the regime to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of the Syrian people. However, 
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the other side of the coin, the domestic field, had been marked by sporadic social unrest 
and demands for reform towards democracy and open government since the Damascus 
Spring. The protests that started in Syria in March 2011, eventually proved Assad wrong 
and Syria became the last Arab country to join the wave of uprisings sweeping across the 
Middle East.      
The Kurds have been active in the protests since the beginning of the uprising. 
There has been a large-scale mobilization, particularly among the Kurdish youth, in the 
form of street demonstrations. However, it is important to distinguish those activities 
from the official stance of the Kurdish parties in Syria, which largely avoided voicing 
open support for the Syrian opposition. The fact that the party-based Kurdish opposition 
maintained a low profile throughout the uprising did not derive from a reluctance to 
support regime change. Rather, it needs to be viewed more as a continuation of with the 
Kurdish position to act as a “third force” in the movement for change in Syria. 
Anti-regime sentiment is deeply rooted among the Kurds in Syria given the 
discriminatory policies of Syrian Arab Baathism throughout the twentieth century. 
Furthermore, the Kurds have clearly shown they would not refrain from confronting the 
regime and resisting its oppressive policies after 2004. However, as Syria’s conflict 
expanded, and many young Kurds joined the calls for the downfall of the regime, 
skepticism grew among the Kurdish parties that the Arab-dominated Sunni opposition 
lacked the inclusive vision necessary to satisfy the various minority groups in Syria. 
Hence, contesting the opposition’s “anti-regime” rhetoric, the Kurdish response to the 
uprising was marked more by an “anti-systemic” stance, which was based on challenging 
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both the regime and the Arab opposition on their exclusionary policies and insistence 
upon a particularist identity in Syria.  
As the Kurds opted to remain on the sidelines of the Syrian uprising, their mode 
of participation in the ongoing upheaval was shaped by a complex set of factors including 
the Kurds’ representation on the Syrian National Council (SNC) and National 
Coordination Body (NCB), the two main opposition coalitions established after the 
outbreak of the protests; the formation of a third body, the Syrian Kurdish National 
Council (KNC); the role of the PYD, which was facing alleged claims for getting support 
from the Assad regime; and the role of Turkey. 
The Kurds and the Syrian Opposition in the Wake of the Syrian Uprising 
Efforts to incorporate the Kurds into a unified opposition in Syria were 
problematic from the beginning of the uprising. The Kurds’ skepticism approach of the 
opposition stemmed mainly from the predominantly Arab nationalist and Islamist 
ideology put forth by the opposition as well as its dependence on the sponsorship of 
Turkey whose inability to solve its own Kurdish problem was worrisome for many Kurds 
in Syria.  
The Kurds attended successive meetings held by the opposition in Turkey and 
Brussels after the outbreak of the protests, which resulted in the establishment of Syrian 
National Council (SNC) in October 2011, an opposition coalition composed mostly of 
exiles. However, despite the shared goal of overthrowing the Assad regime, it quickly 
became evident the Kurdish and Arab opposition groups had largely differing visions of 
Syria’s future. The Kurds were estranged immediately after the establishment of the SNC 
when the Arab opposition groups and the Kurdish parties remained sharply at odds over 
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Kurdish demands for recognition as a distinct people within Syria, with their own cultural 
and linguistic rights under some form of "political decentralization."303 In the “Mission 
and Program” of the SNC, the opposition’s vision for post-Assad Syria was described as:  
The new Syria is a democratic, pluralistic, and civil state; a parliamentary 
republic with sovereignty of the people based on the principles of equal 
citizenship with separation of powers, smooth transfer of power, the rule 
of law, and the protection and guarantee of the rights of minorities.304 
 
The SNC’s political program also envisioned a transitional constitution for the 
post-Assad era, which included guarantees for the recognition of Kurdish identity and 
national rights: 
The constitution guarantees national rights for the Kurdish people and a 
resolution to the Kurdish question in a democratic and fair manner within 
the framework of the unity of Syrian territory and people, as well as the 
exercise of rights and responsibilities of equal citizenship among all 
citizens.305 
 
Regarding the establishment of democratic rule in Syria and the solution of the 
Kurdish question, the SNC maintained the language of the Damascus Declaration by 
putting emphasis on the opposition’s commitment to protect the minorities and their 
rights, including the Kurds, in the Syria’s new constitution after the toppling of the Assad 
regime.306 While the SNC documents fulfilled the basic Kurdish demands for equal 
citizenship and an end to government discrimination, they fell short of the more 
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306 Weiss, Michael, “Why Syria’s Kurds Will Determine the Fate of the Revolution,” The New Republic, 
November 16, 2011.  
215 
 
fundamental demands for the recognition of the Kurds as a distinct “nation” in Syria and 
their right to self-determination according to the international conventions and 
agreements.  
Besides the concerns over constitutional guarantees for Kurdish rights in the post-
Assad era, the larger factor that fueled Kurdish skepticism towards the SNC was the 
Council’s dependence on its host nation, Turkey, and particularly its ruling Islamist 
Justice and Development Party. The Kurdish question was the prism through which 
Turkey approached the Syrian uprising because any constitutional recognition of the 
Kurds in Syria would have inevitable repercussions for Turkey’s own Kurdish problem. 
Thus, the close relationship of the AKP to the Muslim Brotherhood and the pro-
intervention stance of the SNC were alienating for most of the Kurdish parties that were 
concerned about the influence of a Turkish agenda aimed at marginalizing the demands 
of the Kurds and giving the Syrian Islamists a larger role in the opposition. 
The Kurds remained wary about joining forces with the SNC anticipating they 
might be oppressed by a new Islamic Arab government in the post-Assad era if no power-
sharing guarantees were put in place. Those concerns were not unfounded. Dominated by 
an Arab/Islamist agenda advanced by the Muslim Brotherhood, the SNC failed to attract 
significant representation from the country’s diverse ethnic and religious groups such as 
the Kurds as well as the Christians, Alawites and Druze. Furthermore, the delegates of 
the Council refused to change the name of the country from the “Syrian Arab Republic” 
to “Republic of Syria,” which resulted in a walkout by almost all the Kurdish political 
parties at the Syrian National Salvation opposition conference held in Istanbul, Turkey, 
on July 16, 2011. 
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The opposition, on the other hand, accused the Kurds of not adequately 
supporting the uprising against the Assad regime. The accusations against the Kurds were 
partly based on the fact that several Kurdish parties were members of the National 
Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NCB), an internal opposition group formed 
in June 2011, which was largely made up of secularist, leftist Arabs and Kurdish groups. 
The creation of the NCB was intended to rival the radical anti-regime line of Turkey 
conferences in the spring and summer of 2011, which resulted in the creation of the 
SNC.307 Although the NCB believed the Syrian regime had to be replaced by a 
democratic government, the coalition adopted a more moderate stance that encourages 
reform and dialogue instead of an open confrontation with the regime. The members 
declared they stood on the side of the revolution, yet were staunchly opposed to foreign 
intervention supported by pro-Western exiles. In this respect, the group’s political line 
was generally determined by an anti-imperialist ideology and strong opposition to 
Western influence in the Middle East, as well as the severe security constraints facing its 
Syrian-based leadership.    
The conservative Sunni groups, particularly the exiles, viewed the NCB’s strong 
secularist and anti-imperialist credentials with great suspicion. The group was accused by 
the supporters of the SNC of “treachery” and being on the regime’s side. Accordingly, 
the NCB remained considerably unattractive to Sunni Islamist opinion, which limited the 
coalition’s popular outreach. Its strong secularist and anti-sectarian message encouraged 
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more minority participation than the overtly Sunni dominated SNC, which later came 
under criticism on the grounds it lacked effective minority representation.  
Given its moderate stance, the NCB, to a certain degree, was tolerated by the 
Assad government because it was in the interest of the regime to both agitate against 
foreign intervention and create infighting by the opposition, which was of great benefit to 
Assad. In addition, the government also wanted to send the message that as long as the 
opposition remains open to dialogue and stay clear of foreign ties, they will be able to 
express themselves freely. Aware of the regime’s self-interested motives, the NCB, in 
return, maintained a pragmatic stance by taking advantage of this room to maneuver, 
while carefully confronting accusations of being pro-regime by avoiding any action that 
would confer legitimacy on the government.308 
The regime’s attitude towards the Kurds in the early days of the uprising emerged 
as another major factor that strained the relationship between the Kurds and the Arab 
opposition. When the uprising broke out in March 2011, fearful of the Kurds’ ability to 
gear up the unrest, the regime promptly made political overtures to the Kurds. After half 
a century of regime indifference, the citizenship issue was suddenly resolved by a 
presidential decree in April 2011. Concerned primarily with diverting precious resources 
to the anti-regime demonstrations taking place in majority-Arab cities, the regime 
pursued the strategy of maintaining the loyalty of minority groups and depicting the 
uprising as an essentially Sunni Arab sectarian revolt.309  
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The Kurds had little sympathy for the regime and the memories of the Syrian 
Arabs’ indifference towards the brutal regime crackdown on the Kurds in 2004 were still 
fresh. For the Kurds, being at the forefront of the protest movement not only carried the 
risk of harsh regime repression, but also might have allowed the regime to play up the 
ethnic divide and rally Arab support against “Kurdish secessionism” just as it had in 
2004. Hence, the Kurdish parties kept any inclination to protest in check in order to spare 
the Kurdish areas violent confrontation, and to benefit from the regime’s weakness to 
gain concessions regarding Kurdish rights. As a consequence, both the demonstrators and 
the government forces in Kurdish areas kept a low profile throughout 2011 to minimize 
the risk of clashes. This situation was interpreted by the radically anti-regime Sunni Arab 
opposition as an indication the Kurdish parties bet on a dialogue with the regime to the 
detriment of the revolution.  
Establishment of the Syrian Kurdish National Council 
Despite the fact that both the Kurds and the regime were intent on minimizing 
risks of confrontation in accordance with their own individual political concerns, this 
situation in no way meant that the Kurdish opinion of the regime, shaped by decades of 
repression, had shifted. According to the Kurdish parties, discrimination against the 
Kurds was not limited to either the regime or the opposition groups who would 
potentially come to power in case Al-Assad falls. In that sense, for the Kurdish parties 
and activists at large, the problem of the Kurds was not necessarily with the regime, but 
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with the political and social structure that works to exclude them, disrupts their 
livelihood, and attempts to Arabize them.310  
Hence, rejecting both the opposition and the regime and determined to keep the 
Kurdish areas free from fighting between the rebels and the government forces, the 
Kurdish parties took matters in their own hands by establishing their own opposition 
coalition in late 2011, the Syrian Kurdish National Council (KNC). The KNC was 
officially formed on October 26, 2011 in Erbil, Iraq, under the sponsorship of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government, following the creation of the SNC. The mission of the 
KNC was to find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue within the framework of a 
democratic and pluralistic Syria, while emphasizing that the Council is part of the 
revolution and refusing all negotiations with the regime.311  
The KNC lists four main demands for the Kurds in the post-Assad era:   
1.  Political decentralization for the government that would be based on 
the recognition that Syria is a multi-cultural, multi-lingual, and multi-
ethnic country. 
  
2.  A secular state. 
3.  Constitutional recognition of the Kurdish issue, a constitutional 
assurance that the Kurdish people are on their historic land, and the lifting 
of all discriminatory policies that have been deliberately applied to the 
Kurdish people such as the Arabization policies in Syria, the Arabized 
name changes of existing towns and villages and demographic changes. 
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4.  The recognition of the Kurds’ right to self-determination in a form that 
would be decided in a national Kurdish referendum within the integrity 
and unity of the Syrian land.312  
Dr. Abdulhakim Bashar, Chairman of the KNC, asserts that it is not only the 
Kurds, but also the Druze, Ismailis, Alawites and Christians in Syria who have been 
ignored by the SNC, which is responsible for the failure of Syria’s minorities to 
participate as united communities in the revolution. He underscores the importance of 
political decentralization in Syria, particularly in the context of achieving an effective 
transition to democracy, which requires giving guarantees and assurances to the 
minorities befitting of their rights and benefits.313 He explains the role of the Kurds 
within this process as follows:  
We (the Kurds) are more organized and recognized as a society within 
Syria and other Arab countries than other minorities. If we do participate 
(in the revolution) more actively, other minorities will feel more assured 
and follow suit. The regime has tried to convince the world that the 
conflict is between them and the Arab Sunnis. We want to prove that 
wrong. The revolution is not sectarian but it is being threatened by 
sectarian interests.314 
 
In its inaugural session, the KNC voted against a demand to overthrow the regime 
and restricted itself to a more general call for democracy. It was declared that:  
The crisis in Syria can only be resolved through a change in the 
authoritarian and totalitarian system and its organizational, political, and 
intellectual structures. The security state must be dissolved and a more 
secular, democratic, diverse, parliamentary, and decentralized state must 
be constructed.315 
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Alongside the protests organized by youth groups, the KNC staged 
demonstrations to promote its particular agenda. Rather than solidarity with the 
nationwide rebellion, street protests organized by the Kurdish parties specifically voiced 
demands for Kurdish self-determination and systemic change. A member of the KNC 
explains the Council’s position in the following way:  
It’s not that we don’t want the regime to fall. Let it fall 1,000 times. But if 
the political infrastructure stays the same, regardless of whether the 
regime stays or goes, we as Kurds won’t have our rights. So we need to 
change the whole system, because the infrastructure hammers in the idea 
of a centralized state.316 
 
The SNC made repeated attempts to incorporate the KNC, as bringing in a major 
minority group was crucial for the SNC to claim that it represents a broad spectrum of the 
opposition. Nonetheless, the talks between the SNC and KNC collapsed in January 2012 
when the SNC refused to provide in written guarantees of political decentralization and 
the right to self-determination for the Kurds within Syria’s territorial unity.317 The 
attempts of the SNC to integrate the Kurdish parties continued in the “Friends of Syria” 
conference convened in Tunis in February 2013. Burhan Ghalioun, the head of the SNC, 
sought to reassure the Kurds by stating that the new Syria will have a decentralized 
government through the empowerment of local authorities. However, it was noted that 
the SNC is open to discuss only “administrative” decentralization and refuses any form of 
“political” decentralization that implies formal autonomy or federalism. Given the SNC’s 
weak position on the Kurdish demands, all the Kurdish parties in the SNC, with the 
exception of the Future Party, suspended their membership and joined the KNC.  
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Tensions between the KNC and the SNC escalated further when the latter 
published a new document in April 2012,, titled “National Charter: The Kurdish Issue in 
Syria.” The document confirmed the SNC’s “commitment to constitutional recognition of 
the national identity of Kurdish people, and consider the Kurdish issue part and parcel of 
the national discourse, and recognize the national rights of the Kurdish people within the 
framework of the unity of Syria’s land and people.”318 The document also called for the 
“expansion and empowerment of local government” in order to mitigate Kurdish 
demands for decentralization. However, these overtures did little to advance SNC-KNC 
negotiations as the document excluded language recognizing the Kurdish nation within 
Syria living on their historical land. Furthermore, immediately following the publication 
of the document, Burhan Ghalioun stated in an interview there is no such thing as “Syrian 
Kurdistan” and that the Kurds should not be taken over with the illusion of federalism, 
equating it with a demand for secessionism.319 Ghalioun’s statements caused renewed 
protests from the KNC and in Kurdish areas in Syria.  
The Kurds became further alienated during the Arab League-hosted opposition 
meeting in Cairo in July 2012, when Arab participants refused to include the term 
“Kurdish nation” in the meeting’s final declaration, which resulted in the withdrawal of 
Kurdish groups from the conference. It was stated by the Arab groups that the term 
“Kurdish nation” was rejected because of the “consequences” it might have. For Kurds, 
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on the other hand, the stance of the Arab opposition signified the possibility of a new era 
of persecution against them in the future.320  
The Kurds’ relationship with the Syrian opposition did not markedly improve 
after the decision of the SNC to unify with several other opposition groups, which 
resulted in the creation of the Syrian National Coalition in Doha, Qatar in November 
2012. The members of the KNC participated in the preliminary talks. Nevertheless, 
immediately after the formation of the Coalition, its leader, Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, 
stated that the Kurdish demands on a new constitution would be discussed only after the 
regime’s ouster. As the new coalition insisted on postponing negotiations over the future 
status of Kurds after the regime’s fall, the relations between the KNC and Syrian 
opposition once again came to an impasse. It was declared that the KNC refused to 
participate in the Syrian National Coalition unless written the opposition provided 
guarantees that Kurdish demands will be satisfied in the post-Assad state. 
The Role of the Democratic Union Party 
The PYD has considerable popular support in the Kurdish regions in Syria, which 
goes back to the support base the PKK built among the Syrian Kurds during the 1980s 
and 1990s. The establishment of the PYD in Syria in 2003 was the PKK’s response to its 
weakened presence in Syria due to the improved Turkish-Syrian ties following the 
capture of Abdullah Öcalan. As the relationship between the PKK and the Syrian regime 
deteriorated after 1999, members of the PYD were exposed to widespread arrest and 
persecution during the regime’s brutal repression of the Qamishli uprising in 2004. 
Nonetheless, this situation changed when Turkish-Syrian relations once again became 
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strained because of Turkey’s active support for the Syrian opposition after the eruption of 
the 2011 uprising. Bashar Al-Assad quickly revived the old policy of playing the 
“Kurdish card” by seeking to co-opt the PYD to strengthen his leverage vis-à-vis Turkey 
by using the threat of an empowered PKK. While this shifting landscape offered the PYD 
an opportunity to strengthen its presence in Syria, its reluctance to confront the regime 
prompted increasing charges of collusion. 
The link between the PYD and the PKK has been a major matter of controversy 
for both the Syrian opposition and Turkey because of concerns over preventing the PKK 
from regaining power in northern Syria. The PYD leaders never denied PYD’s affiliation 
with the PKK. Salih Muslim, the chairman of the PYD, has noted the PKK and the PYD 
share the same ideology and respect for Öcalan’s leadership, but underscored that the 
organizational structure of the two parties is different and that the PYD is a distinct 
organization that acts according to the distinct characteristics of politics in Syria.321 
Muslim acknowledged that the PKK and the PYD consult to each other in making 
decisions, yet the PKK respects that the PYD is in charge in Syrian Kurdistan and can do 
what is best for Syria’s Kurds.322  
Since the beginning of the uprising, PYD demonstrations were more pro-Kurd 
than anti-regime. In other words, rather than adopting the discourse of “regime change,” 
the PYD focused on bolstering the position of the Kurds within the uprising as well as 
boosting its standing on the ground in Syrian Kurdistan. The fact the PYD abstained from 
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using anti-regime language, coupled with its reputation as the successor of the PKK’s 
legacy in Syria, quickly put it in the spotlight on accusations of siding with the regime. 
Nonetheless, the accusations against the PYD relied largely on “suspicions” and 
“speculations” rather than any credible evidence.323 After the eruption of the uprising, the 
relationship between the PYD and the regime could be best explained in the context of 
their coinciding interests under the existing political circumstances in Syria. The regime 
sought to contain anti-regime protests by benefiting from Kurdish-Turkish and Turkish-
Arab tensions while the PYD seized the opportunity to consolidate its position and 
advance the Kurdish cause in Syria. While the positions taken by the two towards each 
other developed mainly out of convenience, their relationship remained essentially 
contentious. The growing influence of the PYD in the Kurdish regions of Syria weakened 
the regime’s hold in the country’s northeast. The PYD, in the meantime, came into 
conflict with both the Arab and other Kurdish opposition groups due to persistent 
allegations of cooperating with the government.  
In July 2012, significant developments took place in Syria that directly affected 
both the uprising and the Kurdish opposition. In mid-July, the PYD drove out 
government officials and security forces from several Kurdish cities, effectively taking 
control of these territories. On July 21, 2012, an ultimatum was issued by the PYD 
calling on all members of the Syrian army to withdraw from the Kurdish areas or face 
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consequences.324 By July 24, 2012, the PYD forces took control of all the Kurdish areas 
in Syria except for the city of Qamishli, following the withdrawal of the government 
security and political units from these areas. Anti-PYD actors, particularly Turkey, 
claimed that the capture of Kurdish towns by the PYD without resistance from the 
government forces is further proof of collaboration between the PYD and the regime. 
Nonetheless, the PYD pointed to the weakening of the regime and the Kurds’ 
organizational power as reasons for the government’s decision to avoid confronting the 
Kurds. In a BBC interview Salih Muslim underscored that observation:  
As the clashes were spreading all over Syria, we took action to protect the 
Kurdish regions from violence. We are able to govern ourselves. We have 
the power for to do so. We warned them (government forces) to leave the 
Kurdish areas. Otherwise we would resort to different measures. They 
were aware of the people’s demands and that’s why they gave in without 
blood being spilled.325 
 
It is true that despite sporadic clashes between the regime forces and the Kurds, 
the main Kurdish towns and cities in northern Syria were secured without much of a 
fight. The importance of July 2012 for the regime was that the Arab opposition launched 
an offensive in Damascus. For the first time, the uprising spread to the capital, which was 
alarming for the government. Bashar Al-Assad had loosened his grip on the Kurdish 
regions, which allowed him to tighten it elsewhere. Enhanced PYD control in the 
country’s north was potentially beneficial for Assad in terms of constraining the Arab 
opposition and preventing them from taking control of the border areas, which provided 
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the regime a further opportunity to exploit both the Turkish and Arab fears of Kurdish 
secessionist aspirations.  
However, the regime was also aware of the Kurds’ organizational capacity and its 
ability to mobilize on a large scale since the events of Qamishli in 2004. The PYD, in 
particular, draws its strength from its effective organization. After it was officially 
established in Syria, the PYD formed local committees that were in charge with specific 
activities in Kurdish regions. The local committees were formed mainly for the 
organization of Kurdish society as part of the PYD’s “democratic self-governance 
project,” which was accepted in the third party conference in 2007. After the beginning of 
the unrest, those committees took a more active stance by opening cultural and language 
centers throughout Kurd-populated areas. The fact that these activities met no 
government resistance played a significant role in raising suspicions about Baath-PYD 
collaboration. Nonetheless, Salih Muslim states that: 
The regime has had no possibility to attack us. If it does attack us, it will 
see what happens. We are profiting from the unrest. It is a historical 
chance for us. We have a right and we are making use of it.326  
 
Muslim also explains the purpose of these activities in the context of PYD’s 
vision of the future of the Kurds and democracy in Syria: 
These are concrete steps to democratic autonomy. By this we do not mean 
autonomy that needs to be clear. It’s a matter of creating a new society 
from the bottom up. It’s about culture, institutions, structure, organization, 
towns, and cities…the PYD advocates for a free, democratic and plural 
Syria in which all minorities are recognized and respected within the 
country’s political framework. In this sense, what has been achieved so far 
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in Western Kurdistan could be seen as a model for the rest of the 
country.327 
 
The PYD also established a militia named People’s Protection Units (YPG), 
which are responsible for maintaining order and protecting the lives of the people in 
Kurdish-inhabited areas. The YPG was established after the 2004 Qamishli clashes, but it 
did not become active until the 2011 uprising. Since the uprising, the YPG has functioned 
as a defensive security force in the Kurdish areas, deploying forces in cities, forming 
security check points, and controlling the boundaries of majority-Kurd populated areas as 
well as border areas alongside Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey.  
On the ground, Arab rebel groups have largely stayed away from Kurdish-
majority areas. Similar to the strategy pursued with respect to the regime, the PYD 
leadership repeatedly warned the armed Arab opposition group, Free Syrian Army (FSA), 
to not intrude into Kurdish areas. The main concern of the PYD as well as the other 
Kurdish parties is to protect the Kurdish areas from Arab-Baath clashes as it is well 
known that once the FSA enters Kurdish towns, it will attract regime forces to intervene 
as well. The FSA, on the other hand, despite its priority to overthrow the regime, is 
unwilling to project weakness by allowing the Kurds to assert control in certain parts of 
Syria. With more important battles to wage elsewhere in the country, the FSA heeded to 
the warnings of the Kurds in practice, while at the same time adhering to its refusal to 
concede to Kurdish demands for political decentralization in principle. Although the 
FSA’s continued efforts to form battalions in Kurdish areas caused tensions between the 
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FSA rebels and YPG militias, the parties signed a truce on 5 November 2012, agreeing 
on cooperation in fight against the Assad regime.328  
The actions of the PYD created discontent on all fronts. Turkey claimed that the 
PYD took control of the Kurdish areas in coordination with the regime, while the KNC 
and Arab opposition accused the PYD of betraying the revolution by collaborating with 
the government. Nevertheless, regardless of how each party interpreted the events, the 
movement of the PYD drew substantial world attention to the Syrian Kurds. As	 of	
November	 2012,	 the	 PYD emerged as the dominant force on the ground in Syrian 
Kurdistan and established itself as a powerful third force in Syria that is willing to 
confront Turkey, the Arab opposition, and the Assad regime. 
Intra-Kurdish Party Relations 
Since the beginning of the uprising, the PYD has been exposed to much criticism 
by the other Kurdish parties because it primarily strives to consolidate its own position 
and monopolize the Syrian Kurds instead of working to advance the Kurdish cause. The 
party was also exposed to numerous allegations of threatening and kidnapping Kurdish 
activists from both the SNC and KNC, which were all rejected by Salih Muslim. 
Moreover, membership of the PYD in the NCB further exacerbated the claims that the 
party is co-opted by the Assad regime.  
On July 11, 2012, the PYD and KNC decided to take a united stand against Assad 
and signed an agreement to jointly administer the Kurdish areas in Syria that were 
liberated from the Assad regime with the newly-created Supreme Kurdish Committee 
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(SKC). Until this accord (the Erbil Agreement), the Syrian Kurdish scene was largely 
defined by an uneasy rivalry between the KNC and the PYD. When the KNC was 
established in October 2011, the primary reason behind the PYD’s refusal to join was the 
KNC’s ties with the alliance between Turkey, the US and Kurdistan Regional 
Government. The fact the KNC was formed under the sponsorship of KRG distanced the 
PYD particularly because of the party’s concern over a possible Turkish influence on 
Kurdish politics in Syria. Salih Muslim claimed that the PYD would not work with 
anyone who supports foreign intervention and that the PYD would join the KNC on the 
condition that the Council openly denounces its support for Turkish intervention in Syria. 
The Erbil Agreement was the result of the two Kurdish camps’ recognition of 
their own vulnerabilities. The discontent among the Kurdish opposition groups regarding 
the rise of the PYD had been mixed with an awareness concerning its efficiency. 
“Whether we want it or not, the PYD is currently the strongest force in al-Qamishli,” said 
Azad Muhiyuddin, a member of a Kurdish youth group. “Without the PYD nothing 
works. What the PYD has accomplished in fifteen days, the KNC could not achieve in 
five months.”329 Although the KNC was critical of the cultural and military activities of 
the	PYD, the local committees and security forces organized by the PYD in the Kurdish 
areas played a significant role in filling the vacuum caused by the state’s weakening 
power and it effectively responded to the Kurdish populations’ thirst for strong and 
efficient leadership. Lacking both the grassroots support and a military force, it became 
increasingly hard for other Kurdish groups to avoid cooperation with the PYD. 
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As for the PYD, cooperation with the KNC was a necessary step in order for the 
party to strengthen both its domestic and international legitimacy. While the KNC enjoys 
international partners, the PYD has been largely isolated internationally despite being 
strong locally. There has also been a widespread expectation among Syrian Kurds, 
including the supporters of the PYD, that the Kurdish parties work together to secure 
Syrian Kurdish rights. Despite the strong domestic support it enjoys, it has been 
increasingly difficult for the PYD leadership to ignore this expectation. In that sense, the 
reconciliation reached through the Erbil Agreement was significant for the PYD in terms 
of both maintaining local legitimacy and countering the accusations of loyalty to the PKK 
and the regime by reassuring the Kurdish public that Syrian Kurdish interests are the 
party’s priority.  
The creation of the Supreme Kurdish Committee was an important step in terms 
of overcoming mutual suspicions. Nevertheless, tensions persisted mainly because of the 
fact that the PYD remained dominant in administering the Kurdish towns and 
commanding the Kurdish militia. As a single party, the PYD’s organizational capacity 
largely derives from its ability to make decisions and execute tasks quickly, whereas the 
fact that the KNC has to accommodate the interests of fifteen different parties greatly 
hampers its ability to organize effectively. Despite the conciliatory rhetoric of the Erbil 
Agreement, distrust persisted on both sides. Both the PYD and the KNC accused each 
other of pursuing separate agendas instead of committing to the authority of the SKC. For 
the KNC, the relationship of the PYD with the PKK and the regime continued to be a 
controversial issue. The PYD, for its part, expressed concern over fragmentation within 
KNC and its dysfunctional decision-making procedures.   
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The implementation of the Erbil Agreement remained fragile. However, despite 
attempts by both parties to suspend their membership during the months following the 
accord, by late 2012, both the PYD and the KNC came to the conclusion that none of 
them could afford antagonizing the other and that preventing Kurdish infighting should 
be the priority of all the Kurdish parties in Syria. Although they hold different visions for 
the Kurds’ role in a post-Assad Syria,330 the PYD and KNC reflect common concern over 
the Arab opposition’s reluctance to recognize Kurdish rights, judging from the 
dominance of Muslim Brotherhood in the SNC and its vision of the new order that will 
eventually emerge in Damascus.  
The Erbil Agreement created an opportunity for both camps to focus on the 
common desire to resist both the regime and Arab domination. The unfolding of the 
Syrian Kurdish political scene as a battleground between the pro-PKK and pro-Barzani 
forces only played into the hands of the regime and the Arab opposition which seek to 
benefit from Kurdish infighting. Furthermore, the lack of unity among the Kurdish 
political forces on the ground severely diminished the international backing that Syrian 
Kurds strongly need in order to increase their leverage vis-à-vis the Arab opposition and 
achieve Kurdish demands in the post-Assad Syria. Despite their ideological and political 
affiliations with their external sponsors, both the PYD and the members of the KNC must 
forge a political role that is attuned to local realities. Continued efforts to implement the 
Erbil accord despite continuing tensions are primarily the result of the understanding that 
                                                      
330 The purpose of the KNC was mainly to achieve a federal Syria similar to the status that the Kurds 
achieved in Iraq. Whereas, the PYD mainly promoted the “democratic autonomy” project formulated by 
Abdullah Ocalan, which is based on a bottom-up organization of Syria’s different regions according to their 
distinctive national, religious, economic and cultural characteristics.  
233 
 
a strategy of reconciliation in the name of Syrian Kurdish unity has the best chance of 
succeeding.      
The Role of the Regional Actors in the Syrian Uprising 
The Syrian uprising has significant potential to challenge the status-quo in the 
Middle East as the consequences of a possible regime change in Syria are likely to affect 
the foreign policies of a number of critical players in the region. As far as the Kurdish 
question in Syria is concerned, this is shown in the relationships of the PYD and the KNC 
with three important actors: Turkey, the PKK and the Kurdistan Regional Government. 
Throughout the first half of 2012, the KRG President Massoud Barzani made a 
concerted effort to reconcile the two Kurdish blocs in Syria. His attempts finally 
succeeded in July 2012 with the conclusion of the Erbil Agreement between the PYD and 
the KNC. The Erbil Agreement highlighted a number of concerns held by Barzani. By 
hosting the founding meetings of the KNC, Barzani aimed at enhancing his potential role 
in Syrian Kurdish politics by uniting the fragmented Kurdish parties in the country. 
Nonetheless, Barzani’s involvement with the Syrian Kurds was largely shaped by both 
the long-term tensions between the PKK and Barzani’s KDP, and the KRG’s close 
relationship with Turkey, whose primary aim was to contain the influence of the PYD in 
Syria. 
Given their different ideological roots, Abdullah Öcalan’s PKK and Barzani’s 
KDP have always presented two competing paradigms of Kurdish nationalism. The 
PKK’s Marxist-Leninist background was set against the KDP’s conservative-tribal 
character. The PKK abandoned most of its Marxist-Leninist thinking by the early 1990s, 
but remained essentially opposed to tribalism. Furthermore, the relationship of each party 
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with Turkey has been in stark contrast since 2007, when the KRG started to develop 
strong economic ties with Turkey in order to reduce the Iraqi Kurds’ dependence on 
Baghdad as opposed to the PKK’s continued struggle against the Turkish government for 
the political and cultural rights of the Kurds in Turkey.  
Barzani’s strategy of supporting the KNC after the eruption of the uprising served 
the purposes of both expanding the KPD’s sphere of influence among the Syrian Kurds 
vis-à-vis the PKK, and mitigating the concerns of Ankara, which saw Barzani as an ally 
in containing and marginalizing the PYD. However, given the political and military 
strength of the PYD, it soon became apparent that this strategy was not sustainable in the 
long run, particularly in the context of the pan-Kurdish ambitions of Barzani. There is no 
doubt Barzani has considerable influence over the Kurdish populations in Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq and Syria given the international legitimacy enjoyed by KRG as well as the respect 
for long-term political and military struggle conducted by the KDP throughout the 
twentieth century under the leadership of his father, Mullah Mustafa Barzani. 
Nevertheless, since its launch in the 1980s, the PKK movement has posed a serious 
challenge to the KDP by achieving extensive grassroots support not only among the 
Kurds of Turkey, but also in other parts of Kurdistan. In this respect, the Erbil Agreement 
underscored both Barzani’s acknowledgement of the strength of the PKK and the 
recognition of the political and military risks associated with PYD-KNC fighting.  
Given the memories of a bloody civil war between the KDP and PUK in the 
1990s, Kurd-to-Kurd warfare is highly unpopular among the Kurds across the Middle 
East. Both the KDP and PKK are aware that they cannot ignore the expectations of the 
masses for Kurdish unity. Besides, it is well known that any Kurdish infighting in Syria 
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will have implications for the already delicate PKK-KDP relations in northern Iraq. Thus, 
Barzani’s efforts to establish a PYD-KNC pact reflects a careful balancing act between 
avoiding a PKK-KRG conflict in Iraq, refraining from antagonizing the KRG’s regional 
ally, Turkey, and a quest for enhancing his regional image among the Kurds.  
Turkey’s policy towards the Kurdish issue in Syria is shaped entirely in the 
context of the long-term battle between the PKK and the Turkish government. It was 
alarming for Turkey when the PYD took control of several Kurdish towns in northern 
Syria in July 2012. Perceiving these developments as a manifestation of the PKK’s 
growing power in Syrian Kurdistan, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
immediately declared that Turkey had the “undisputed right” to intervene if the PKK 
were to set up camps in Syria.331  
Looking back on what happened in Iraq after the US intervention in 2003, 
Turkey’s major concern is the possibility that Syrian Kurds might enjoy the same 
autonomy in the post-Assad Syria as did the Kurds in post-Saddam Iraq. However, a 
possible unilateral Turkish intervention not only lacks international backing but also 
carries the risk of causing conflict between Turkey and PYD’s armed militia with direct 
consequences for Turkey’s own Kurdish problem. The revival of the peace talks between 
Turkey and the PKK in the first half of 2013 put further pressure on Turkey to soften its 
policy towards the Syrian Kurds. Thus, Turkey increasingly turned to its ally, the 
Kurdistan Regional Government, in order to maintain influence over the course of events 
shaping the Syrian Kurdish politics throughout the uprising.  
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Although Turkey gave Barzani a leading role in containing the PYD, the interests 
of the two actors are likely to diverge in the long term. Since the development of closer 
economic and diplomatic ties between Turkey and KRG after 2007, Turkey constantly 
put pressure on Barzani to fight against the PKK in Qandil Mountain. However, these 
pressures never led to a Turkish-KRG military cooperation against the PKK. Barzani 
declared the KRG is principally opposed to a military solution of the Kurdish problem in 
Turkey and that the peshmerga forces would not take part in any military operation 
against the PKK within Iraqi territory. Barzani’s refusal to confront the PKK derives 
from both his unwillingness to get involved in a Kurd-on-Kurd military confrontation, 
and the popularity of the PKK among the Kurdish youth in Iraqi Kurdistan.  
Since 2011, Turkey used the same strategy of putting pressure on Barzani to limit 
the influence of the PYD in Syria by playing on the competition between the KDP and 
PKK and Barzani’s pan-Kurdish ambitions. From the perspective of Turkey, the Erbil 
Agreement represents a strategy of containing the PYD by increasing the voice of the 
pro-Barzani KNC in the decision-making procedures concerning the Kurds in Syria. For 
Barzani, the Erbil Agreement serves more to “integrate” the PYD, as opposed to 
“containing” it, with the expectation the PYD would be encouraged to cut ties with the 
PKK in order to become a political body focused exclusively on the Syrian Kurdish 
interests. This strategy gives Barzani additional leverage over Ankara by strengthening 
the KRG’s soft power by putting it in the position to be a possible mediator between 
Turkey and the PYD, similar to the role Barzani is willing to play in the peace talks 
between Turkey and the PKK. 
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The peace process that took effect between the PKK and Turkey in early 2013 is 
undeniably tied to the developments in Syria with important effects on Iraq. The 
possibility of the emergence of a decentralized Syria similar to the federal structure in 
Iraq after the collapse of the Assad regime coupled with the rise of the PYD among the 
Syrian Kurds, prompted Turkey to launch a solution process. The PKK, on the other 
hand, uses the power of the PYD in Syria as leverage against Turkey during the peace 
negotiations. As a response to the Turkish fears of the emergence of another autonomous 
Kurdish region across its borders, the PYD leader Salih Muslim repeated several times 
that he is ready to engage in dialogue with Turkey and that the PYD has no intention of 
threatening Turkish security.332      
The relations between Turkey and PYD largely echo the pre-2007 situation 
between Turkey and KRG. Nonetheless, a more sanguine approach towards the alliance 
between the KNC and PYD and the emerging Kurdish region in Syria might, in fact, 
provide Turkey with significant opportunities to consolidate its regional power. Turkish 
support for the Syrian Kurds will not only make significant contributions to the ongoing 
peace process in Turkey, but also expand Turkey’s role in the evolution of the Kurdish 
question in the Middle East. Lacking significant international support and largely 
alienated from the Tehran, Damascus and Baghdad regimes, the Kurds of the Middle East 
are increasingly looking to Turkey as their only potential ally in the region. Salih 
Muslim’s statements since the Erbil Agreement confirm this stance, but on the condition 
that Turkey solves its own Kurdish problem in a democratic way and recognizes the 
rights of the Kurds in the region. 
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CHAPTER VI 
KURDS IN IRAN 
 
It was a sensitive time and the world media was watching Iran. Kurdish 
participation in the protests would have shown that the Iranian movement 
was not only the Green Movement, and that the Kurdish movement was 
part of it. Because Kurds make up only twelve percent of the population in 
Iran, they cannot change Iran alone.333  
 
The post-presidential election protests in Iran in 2009 had grown into a major 
popular opposition movement that posed a great challenge to Iran’s power structure. It 
was a unique phenomenon that had not occurred since the Iranian revolution that took 
place nearly 30 years ago. The Kurdish areas in Iran as well as the other areas populated 
predominantly by Iran’s ethnic and religious minorities remained mostly calm and did not 
join the so-called Green movement. Commenting on the Green movement’s approach to 
the ethnic movements in Iran, Abdullah Muhtadi, the leader of one of the major Iranian 
Kurdish organizations, the Komala, emphasized, “the Green movement’s platform was 
not very clear and did not include anything that would please the Kurds.”334  
Muhtadi’s statement is significant in the context of the multi-ethnic and multi-
cultural structure of Iranian society, which goes back to pre-Islamic times, but this 
diversity has become a significant component of Iranian political life particularly during 
the post-constitutionalism era. Rather than homogeneous, the Iranian citizenry is a 
differentiated community with important crisscross divisions in terms of socioeconomic 
class backgrounds, genders, cultural practices, provincial and ethnic ties, and political 
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aspirations.335 In this respect, while the Iranian Kurdish movement has common ground 
with Kurdish movements in other parts of Kurdistan, its development in the Iranian 
context has been considerably intertwined with the broader problem of national 
minorities in Iran. 
Although Iran had several characteristics favorable for the development of 
nationalism in the pre-modern period, such as the concept of a territorial Iran, the Persian 
language and Shia Islam, the phenomenon of nationalism has become a major key to 
understanding Iranian attitudes and political behavior in the twentieth century. There 
have been many different conceptions of Iranian nationalism in the modern era, including 
linguistic, territorial, ethnic and religious. Firouzeh Kashani-Sabet points out that “what 
is unique to the nationalist discourse in Iran is the way in which the varying emphasis on 
these complementary but often competing articulations of nationalism has transformed 
Iranian politics in radical ways.”336 In this regard, different constructions of nationalism 
have generated a contentious sociocultural sphere at various stages of Iran’s modern 
history.  
Among the various articulations of Iranian nationalism, the policies of centralism 
and the emphasis on territorial integrity remain to be the most persistent themes when 
addressing the national question in Iran particularly after the inception of the first Pahlavi 
state in 1926. This situation created a relatively stable type of relationship between the 
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state and minority groups in Iran that was manifested in the successive regimes’ 
perception of Iran’s national diversity as more of a “problem” than as a matter of 
pluralism and democratic participation. While the definition of “Iranianness” was 
affected by dramatic alterations in the understanding of nationalism in Iran throughout its 
modern history – ranging from the secular nationalism of the Pahlavi State to the 
religious focus of the Islamic Republic – minority-state relationships have been 
principally marked by “continuity” rather than “change.”  
Abbas Vali observes that Kurdish nationalism in Iran has its roots in the political 
and cultural processes and practices of the construction of the modern nation state and 
national identity in Iran.337 If the revolution of 1905-6 marks the birth of Iranian 
nationalism, Kurdish responses to the politics of territorial centralism and the cultural 
process of the construction of a uniform Iranian national identity pursued by the Pahlavi 
state mark the formation of a Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran, which culminated in 
the Republic of Mahabad in 1946.338 The Mahabad Republic not only marked the advent 
of modern nationalism in Kurdistan, but it also defined the Kurdish issue in Iran as a 
denial of the Kurdish identity by the sovereign power and the Kurds’ resistance to this 
denial.  
The establishment of the Republic of Mahabad, along with the Azerbaijani 
movement in northern Iran during 1945-46, played a significant role in transforming the 
discursive articulation of the “national question,” which was mainly defined in terms of a 
single Iranian national identity that eclipsed ethnic loyalties. In effect, the nationalist 
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movements of the Kurds and Azeris transformed the national question in Iran into an 
“ethnic question” and challenged the democratic promise of the constitutional movement 
of 1906 on grounds it failed to recognize the ethnic and cultural diversity of the Iranian 
society. 
In the essentially settled territorial self-understanding of Iran, the ethnic challenge 
the Kurdish and Azerbaijani movements posed was portrayed as a threat to the territorial 
integrity and unity of the Iranian nation. Additionally, the fact the ethnic challenges to the 
sovereign power emerged as Soviet-backed movements expanded the anti-imperialist 
scope of the Iranian national discourse and consolidated the territorial conception of 
Iranian nationalism, which was defined in terms of ethnic separatism and external 
intervention. The popular appeal of this anti-imperialist narrative has historically been 
facilitated by the association of domestic problems with external threats, which became 
an integral part of Iran’s intricate political culture. The oil nationalization of 1951, the 
Iran-Iraq war of 1980s, and the recent discussions on Iran’s nuclear program enabled 
successive governments to unite and rally the Iranian people around a common discourse 
of national strength, defense, and national pride. In this context, the reality of Iran’s 
ethnonational diversity has often been represented as a national security issue in official 
state discourses rather than a political question of how to respond to the demands of 
ethnic minorities for equal rights. 
The Status of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Iran 
The question of minorities has often remained obscure in Iranian nationalist 
historiography. The nationalist ideas promoted by the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 
were oriented towards establishing a modern nation state, protecting Iran’s autonomy vis-
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à-vis foreign powers and consolidating democracy through greater citizen participation in 
political life. Although the Constitutional Law of 1906 sets forth the institutional form 
and organizational structure of the state, the conditions of citizenship were explained 
vaguely and the concepts of citizen and citizenship were not explicitly addressed. Rather, 
Iranians are considered “subjects” of the monarch. The rights and obligations commonly 
associated with citizenship in the modern democratic sense of the term appear in this 
notion of “subject” in the Constitution.  
The constitutionalist discourse introduced the millat (the people) as a unified 
force and the source of sovereignty, invested with the right to determine the policies of 
the government through its representatives to the Majlis (Parliament).339 In the 
constitutionalist discourse, millat signified everyone regardless of professional, social, or 
religious status.340 In defining the constituent elements of the millat, the constitutionalists 
emphasized language as the essential component of national identity, which resulted in 
attempts to purify the Persian language of Arabic terms and to dissociate Iran from Islam. 
In their struggle for a new identity, the emphasis on pre-Islamic history and the Persian 
language emerged as important components of a strategy for breaking away from Arab-
Islamic culture and identity and forming a new political conceptualization.341   
The Constitutional Law of 1906-07 does not contain an ethnic definition of the 
conditions of citizenship and remains silent on the subject of minorities. The ethnic and 
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cultural diversity of the Iranian society were subsumed under the general notion of the 
Iranian people, whose identity was defined by pre-Islamic history and the Persian 
language. Using this framework, Millat was defined as a people speaking in one language 
and provided the primary discursive condition for the articulation of the Constitutionalist 
language and identity. Although the Constitution contains a separate section on the 
institutional framework for local administrations, the ethnic and linguistic particularities 
of certain provinces simply were not taken into consideration. The local and regional 
languages, including Kurdish, were neither recognized nor denied.   
The marginalization of ethnic differences in the Constitutional era revealed the 
latent authoritarianism of the discourse of modernization, which required unity, 
permanence and the incorporation of citizens into Iran’s nascent democratic polity on the 
basis of the rights and obligations defined in the Constitution. The incorporation of 
citizens on the basis of a collective identity was precluded by the silence of the 
Constitution on the ethnic and cultural diversity of Iran. Soon, however, the emerging 
Iranian nationalism broke this silence through the official public discourse, particularly 
after the rise of the Pahlavi State, with an argument for national revival and progress that 
was premised on the need for political and economic modernization requiring political 
and administrative centralism.342  
Reza Shah Pahlavi (1926-1941) extended state control over all aspects of life – 
the economy, transportation, education, language, culture, media, foreign trade, and 
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religion.343 History and language were the primary constituent elements of the emerging 
Iranian nationalism under the Pahlavis. In his attempt to diminish the influence of Islam 
in Iran, Reza Shah sought to shape Iranian nationalism by infusing it with a distinctly 
secular ideology. The state ideology advertised “Iranians” as a “pure Aryan race” in order 
to de-emphasize Arab and any Islamic influences on Iranian history. Hence, pre-Islamic 
culture and Persian language were officially promoted while writing or speaking in non-
Persian languages in public places was declared illegal and punished.344 During Reza 
Shah’s reign, all school textbooks were printed in Persian by the authorities in Tehran, 
and the teaching of any other languages was strictly prohibited.345 
The policies of territorial centralism and the construction of a uniform Iranian 
national identity were pursued by force by the first Pahlavi state from 1926 to 1941, and 
then, after a short lull, enforced again by the second Pahlavi state until 1979.346 The 
Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the downfall of the monarchy did nothing to effectively 
change the national dynamic. Despite the dramatic and significant shift from the secular 
nationalism of the Pahlavi State to the religious focus of the Islamic Republic, relatively 
little change was seen in minority-state relations following the Islamic revolution.347 The 
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Islamic Revolution emphasized religious identity as supranational and supra-ethnic, and 
like the linguistically-defined conception of national identity promoted by the Pahlavis, 
the Republic refused to recognize heterogeneity in Iran.  
After years of difficulties under the monarchy, minorities expected the Islamic 
Revolution would enhance their position and afford them greater autonomy and cultural 
rights. Some believed Ayatollah Khomeini’s calls for the revival of the Islamic 
community would promote the recognition of the ethno-religious pluralistic nature of 
society and pave the way for the acknowledgement of the loyal, but autonomous ethnic 
areas. However, hopes for decentralization and greater rights for minorities were dashed 
early on as the new government continued to enforce the extant system and proved to be 
largely negligent of the ethnic issue in Iran. The Islamic Republic created a centrally 
controlled system similar to the Shah but, did it within an Islamic framework. 
The most striking and obvious contrast between the Pahlavi and Islamic 
Republican State is the use of Islam as an element of common culture. Although the 
Pahlavis identified themselves as Muslims, religion was not used as a basis for 
identification with the state. Rather, the monarchy sought to develop and extend the sense 
of Iranian nation defined primarily in terms of Persian language and literature and pre-
Islamic history. Islam is taken as the focal symbol of identity between the state and the 
people in the Islamic Republic, and is central to the common culture promoted by the 
state.348 However, the revolution imbedded Shia Islam as the main pillar of the Iranians’ 
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collective identity, which prompted grievances by the Sunnis who were mostly Turkmen, 
a minority of Arabs, Balochs and Kurds. According to the Shia leadership, to talk about 
ethnic minorities in the Islamic domain was considered an offence against true religion.  
In November 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini explained why the mention of ethnic 
minorities had been eliminated from the common culture: 
Sometimes the word minority is used to refer to people such as the Kurds, 
Lurs, Turks, Persians, Balochs, and such. These people should not be 
called minorities, because this term assumes that there is a difference 
between these brothers. In Islam, such a difference has no place at all. 
There is no difference between Muslims who speak different languages, 
for instance, the Arabs or the Persians. It is very probable that such 
problems have been created by those who do not wish the Muslim 
countries to be united. They create the issues of nationalism, of pan-
Arabism, pan-Turkism, and such isms, which are contrary to Islamic 
doctrines. Their plan is to destroy Islam and the Islamic philosophy.349 
 
Ethnic differences lie at the intersections of religious differences in Iran. Most of 
the Sunnis constitute distinct ethnic minorities residing in the Kurdistan, Sistan and 
Balochistan, Golestan and Khuzestan provinces.350 Under the Constitution of Islamic 
Republic, only certain religious minorities, such as Zaroastrians, Christians and Jews, are 
recognized.351 The constitution does not recognize ethnic minorities and the government 
does not use ethnicity or language as a variable in conducting the national census. Thus, 
it is difficult to find accurate numbers on the different ethnic groups in Iran. Estimates 
suggest that fifty-one percent of Iran’s population is ethnic Persian with the rest being 
Azeris (twenty-four percent), Gilaki and Mazandarani (eight percent), Kurd (seven 
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percent), Arab (three percent), Lur (two percent), Baloch (two percent), Turkmen (two 
percent), and other (one percent).352  
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic establishes the principle of equality in 
Article 19, which states that “all people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to 
which they belong, enjoy equal rights; and color, race, language, and the like, do not 
bestow any privilege.” The constitution also has specific provisions guaranteeing equal 
rights to minorities. Article 15 of the constitution states that: 
The official language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is 
Persian. Official documents, correspondence, and texts, as well as text-
books, must be in this language and script. However, the use of regional 
and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching 
of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian.  
 
Persian, despite being the official language, is the mother tongue of barely half of 
the population in Iran. Other languages include Turkic, Kurdish, Balochi, Luri, Arabic, 
Gilaki, Assyrian, and Armenian. 353 As a state entity, Iran is constitutionally at ease with 
its ethnic minorities and the Islamic Republican state has not passed sweeping laws to 
restrict minority language publications or cultural activities. Nor does the Islamic 
Republic proclaim itself for Persians in an exclusive way. Its constitution recognizes the 
national minorities’ right to use their languages in the mass media and education so long 
as they are used in conjunction with Persian.  
Although the constitution allows the teaching of local and ethnic languages in 
schools, no permanent measures have been introduced in Iran’s education system to 
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facilitate teaching in minority languages or to teach such languages as a second 
language.354 Even if Article 15 is fully implemented, it falls short of guaranteeing the full 
scope of human rights associated with the use of one’s mother tongue. While it permits 
the use of local languages in media and education, the phrase “regional and tribal 
languages” includes no recognition of the linguistic identities of national and ethnic 
minorities or of the mother language as a fundamental principle. Further, the article does 
not obligate – only “allows” – the state or private sector to provide instruction of 
literature or presentation of mass media in ethnic languages.355 
The use of the Kurdish language in print and education in Iran is frequently 
thwarted. The ability to teach Kurdish in schools has long been an issue of contention 
between the Kurds and the central government. There are no Kurdish public schools in 
Iran. There are Kurdish courses in both public and private universities in Tehran, but not 
in the areas inhabited by the Kurds.356 The state-run radio and television broadcasts are 
predominantly in Persian and only a limited number of programs are run in minority 
languages.357 There are media in the Kurdish language, but this is subject to censorship as 
is any other media in the country. There is no Kurdish television channel but some 
programs broadcast in Kurdish on the general channels.358 Self-censorship is best strategy 
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to survive for many media-outlets. The regime establishes boundaries on discourse and 
topics such as regional ethnic demands are off limits.359 Journalist accounts and news 
media publishing in Kurdish or coverage of Kurdish-related issues have been targeted by 
the regime, especially since President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad took office in 2005.  
The Islamic Republic clearly broke with the Pahlavi practice of disallowing the 
use of regional languages in broadcasting and publications. Problems arise when Kurdish 
rights activists link their human rights work - drawing attention to the government’s 
failure to observe international human rights standards - to their Kurdish identity.360 In 
other words, while limited space exists to assert Kurdish cultural identity, there is no 
space to operate as Kurds politically. Kurds seeking to express their views or beliefs in 
connection with their opposition politics face the same restrictions as all Iranians. Thus, it 
can be said that it is the destruction of the political organization of the Kurds rather than 
their ethnic identity per se, that forms the strategic objective of successive regimes in 
Iran, particularly in the context of the persistent emphasis placed on politics of territorial 
centralism. 
When analyzing the role of minority politics in the Islamic Republic, it is 
important to note the central problem lies more with the implementation than with the 
law itself. Though the correct implementation of the constitution could contribute to the 
solution of Iran’s ethnic issues, the aforementioned provisions were never fully 
implemented and had little potency in reality. The essence of the legal problems facing 
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Iran’s national minorities is not that there is a body of discriminatory, anti-minority or 
Persian-first legislation. Rather, the ethnic movements in Iran face the same obstacles 
confronted by other pluralistic, secular political movements in the country – that much 
law in the Islamic Republic permits arbitrary clerical rule and fails to protect basic 
freedoms.361 Constitutional provisions establishing the right to freedom of expression, 
political participation and other basic freedoms are rendered impotent by clauses 
asserting the primacy of undefined Islamic interests.362  
The Legacy of the Republic of Mahabad 
The discourse on the rights of ethnic and religious minorities officially became 
part of Iran’s political agenda during the post-revolutionary period and importance of the 
ethnicity in the discussion on democratization in Iran increased in the 1990s. The issue of 
minority rights became part of the political agenda during the reform movement of the 
1990s, which was evidenced in the slogan of Mohammad Khatami’s presidential election 
campaign in 1997, “Iran for all Iranians.” To better understand of both the pro-democracy 
movement in Iran and the role of ethnicity in the evolution of the democratization 
discourse, one needs to focus on the process that resulted in the establishment of the 
Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1946. 
The Mahabad Republic is generally addressed in academic discourse from two 
perspectives: as a symbol of Kurdish nationalism and statehood in the twentieth century 
and as an attempt at Kurdish independence that was victimized by the power politics of 
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the Cold War era and Soviet expansionism in the Persian Gulf. Western scholarship 
explains the Kurdish movement of 1945-46 in terms of Soviet communist intentions 
rather than from the perspective of the Kurds’ legitimate rights to self-determination or 
self-rule.363 Unified by the ideological and political perspectives of anticommunism, 
these accounts protected the monarchical system that was a stronghold of the West 
against the USSR and avoided highlighting the struggle of the peoples of Iran for 
democracy, rights, and freedom.364 Besides providing historical and descriptive accounts 
of the rise and fall of the Republic, the literature generally falls short of portraying the 
Mahabad Republic as a genuine national struggle of the Kurds, particularly in terms of its 
repercussions for the transformation of the “national” question in Iran into a question of 
rights, civil and democratic liberties.  
Abbas Vali’s (2011) detailed discussion of Kurdish nationalism from 1905 to 
1947 provides an in-depth analysis of the Kurdish nationalist discourse promoted by the 
Republic of Mahabad. However, Vali considers the relationship between the Kurdish 
movement and Iranian government largely within the framework of an ethnically and 
linguistically defined dichotomy between the Kurdish “self” and Persian “other,” which 
he sees as the main defining characteristic of Kurdish identity.365 In this respect, Vali 
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emphasizes the importance of the Kurdish Republic in terms of the Kurdish resistance to 
strategies of domination and control, which were expressed in terms of the struggle for 
the defense of ethnic and linguistic rights. Accordingly, he does not consider the demands 
for cultural rights and autonomy as part of the Kurdish political endeavor to challenge 
and transform the foundations of Iran’s body politic. Rather, he views the political 
requirements of the autonomist discourse emphasized in the founding manifesto of the 
Republic as incompatible with the ethnic-nationalist political project as defined in terms 
of political sovereignty of the Kurdish nation.   
Shortly before the declaration of the Republic, when asked whether it was true 
that the Kurds wanted separation and independence from Iran, Qazi Muhamad, the leader 
of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), responded, “No, it is not true, this 
is because we want the Iranian government to implement the constitutional law, we want 
to live autonomously under the Iranian flag.”366 He explained the position of the KDPI by 
stating, “The Kurdish nation in Iran should be free to administer its own affairs and live 
within the Iranian borders.”367 The political objectives expressed in Muhammad’s 
statements were also listed in the KDPI’s party program, declared on November 8, 1945. 
According to the program, some of the party policies were:  
1. The Kurds to be free and independent in the management of their local 
affairs and to receive Kurdish independence within the borders of Persia. 
 
2. Be allowed to study Kurdish and to administer their affairs in the 
Kurdish language. 
 
                                                      
366 Ghazi Muhammed’s remarks in conversation with the editors of the press in Tehran shortly before the 
declaration of the Republic. Kurdistan, No. 1, January 11, 1946.  
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3. Government officials definitely to be appointed from among the local 
population. 
 
4. Members of the Kurdistan Provincial Council to be elected immediately 
in accordance with the Constitutional laws, to supervise all public and 
Government works.368 
 
The autonomist discourse in the KDPI Program and the founding manifesto of the 
Republic of Mahabad is informed by a specific reading of the Iranian Constitution of 
1906, which provides the legal basis for advocating pluralism, the decentralization of 
political power, administrative and cultural autonomy, and respect for ethnic and 
religious differences. The Iranian Kurdish movement tied the realization of the ethnic and 
linguistic rights of the Kurds directly to the establishment of a genuine and lasting 
democratic political process in Iran through the “correct” implementation of the 
constitution. The Kurdish leadership referred to the institutional framework outlined by 
the constitutional provisions that regulate the Provincial and District Councils (anjumans) 
in providing their demands for self-government with legal legitimacy. The articles 
concerning the Provincial Councils in the Constitution of 1906 included:  
Art. 90. Throughout the whole empire provincial and departmental 
councils shall be established in the accordance with special regulations. 
The fundamental laws regulating such assemblies are as follows. 
 
Art. 91. The members of the provincial and departmental councils shall be 
elected immediately by the people, according to the regulations governing 
provincial and departmental councils. 
 
Art. 92. The provincial and departmental councils are free to exercise 
complete supervision over all reforms connected with the public 
advantage, always provided that they observe the limitations prescribed by 
Law. 
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The Kurdish leadership considered to the Provincial and District Councils to be 
democratic measures and devices for the decentralization of power in Iran, which could 
provide an appropriate venue for the recognition of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural 
structure of Iranian society. Thus, it became tantamount to revive the Provincial and 
District Councils in order to implement decentralized administration, which had been 
suppressed by the Pahlavi regime, and fulfill the Kurdish quest for cultural and 
administrative autonomy. 
Speaking as the leader of the KDPI at a press conference in Mahabad two weeks 
before the declaration of the Republic, Qazi Muhammad made it clear the Kurdish 
demands were based on the “implementation of the Constitutional Law by the Iranian 
Government and that the Provincial and District Council for Kurdistan, as stipulated in 
the Constitutional Law, should be established at once to administer and supervise all 
social and governmental affairs.”369 The Kurdish leadership’s articulation of the demand 
for regional autonomy not only underscores a legitimate, popular democratic right central 
to democratic governance in Iran as a whole, but also the ethno-cultural aspect of the 
movement that demanded the recognition of Kurdish identity and cultural and 
administrative autonomy.  
According to Vali, the popular-democratic presentation of the politics of regional 
autonomy marginalized Kurdish ethnicity and ethnic/national differences.370 He asserts 
that “early statements of the Kurdish position played down ethnic differences with 
Persians; they are subordinated to the necessity of a common Iranian cause, the struggle 
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for democracy in Iran.”371 Vali’s analysis of the discursive dynamics of Kurdish demands 
is driven essentially by his definition of Kurdish identity, which he characterizes 
primarily by the Kurdish community’s ethnic-linguistic difference and its “otherness” 
relative to the sovereign identity in Iran. Accordingly, for Vali, the Kurdish search for 
autonomy and cultural rights in the struggle for democracy in Iran marginalizes the 
Kurdish ethnicity and its ethnic and linguistic otherness in the Kurdish nationalist 
discourse.  
Consider, on the other hand, the democratic discourse promoted both in Qazi 
Muhammad’s statements and in KDPI’s party program, which principally targets the 
dictatorial apparatus in Tehran which is viewed as the primary obstacle to the recognition 
of the distinctiveness of the Kurds vis-à-vis the Persians and other ethnicities. For them, it 
is the ethnic and linguistic distinctiveness of the Kurds that underlies the conception of 
Kurdish independence, which is principally associated with the establishment of a 
democratic institutional framework to provide the Kurds with authority over the 
management of their local affairs. Qazi Muhammad, addressing a public meeting in 
Mahabad shortly after the declaration of the Republic, argues: 
The dictatorial apparatus in Tehran . . . for reasons that I have explained 
has not yet understood the affairs of the Kurds properly. Otherwise [it 
would have understood that] even after achieving our full independence, 
we would wish to make it clear to the central government and also show to 
the world that the Kurds have not done these things in order to deny their 
brotherhood with the Persians, or to be proved not to be Iranians, but 
rather to oppose the dictatorial apparatus [in Tehran] . . . .  Otherwise if 
freedom could be established in Iran there is no reason why all those who 
live in Iran could not hold hands in brotherhood.372 
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There is no doubt ethnic and linguistic differences played a role in the formation 
of the Kurdish identity not only in Iran, but also in other parts of Kurdistan. However, as 
confirmed by Qazi’s statements, if “otherness” is to be considered as a constitutive 
element in the formation of Kurdish identity, then it is not the “Persian” ethnicity per se, 
but the dictatorial apparatus of the Iranian central government that defines “otherness” for 
the Kurds. The presentation of the Kurdish cause as such does not serve to marginalize 
the Kurdish ethnicity as claimed by Vali. On the contrary, it promotes a discourse of 
“coexistence” between the Kurds and the Persians as two distinct ethnicities under a 
single democratic framework.  
Kurdish demands for the implementation of the 1906 Constitution focused on the 
need to implement the Provincial and District Councils, but the discourse of the Republic 
involved more than political and administrative decentralization. Implicit in the demands 
for the use of the Kurdish language in cultural, educational and administrative realms and 
the appointment of government officials in the Kurdistan Province from among the local 
population was a demand for a reformulation of the constitutional concept of citizenship. 
The demand for local administrative autonomy not only involved political 
decentralization, but also sought recognition of the multi-ethnic nature of Iranian society.  
The autonomous governments established by the Kurdish and Azerbaijani 
movements in 1945-46 implemented various reforms in the fields of education, economy, 
agriculture, women’s and minority rights, which were seen by opposition forces 
throughout Iran as a model of progress under a democratic regime.373 The emergence of 
Kurdish and Azerbaijani autonomous regimes transformed the crucial problem 
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confronting the various collectivities co-existing under the same political rubric in Iran. 
The national question was no longer defined merely as a question of national identity and 
national rights, but also as a constant reminder of the deficiencies and shortcomings of 
the citizenship, democracy, and democratic political process within the juridico-political 
framework of Iranian sovereignty. In other words, the focus of the national question in 
Iran became less of an identity issue – “Who is an Iranian?” – and more of an 
institutional matter – “How can the Iranians of all colors and ethnicities build a common 
political life and effective institutions of government?”374   
The Kurds and the State After the Islamic Revolution 
After the collapse of the Mahabad Republic, the Kurdish movement in Iran 
suffered serious setbacks. The KDPI continued its presence mostly as a clandestine 
organization. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Kurdish political activists sought safe 
haven in Iraqi Kurdistan, which made it practically impossible to effect change in Iran.  
Since the autonomous governments in Mahabad and Tabriz were crushed by the 
central government of Tehran in 1945-1946, successive governments saw any ethnic-
related demands as a security issue and threat to Iran’s territorial integrity. These 
autonomous movements remained largely in the background until they reappeared in the 
antimonarchy push that precipitated the 1979 Revolution. As the Iranian regime was 
facing serious unrest in the late 1970s, the political conditions provided the KDPI an 
opportunity to come back and raised hopes it could once again be a legal political party. 
The end of the monarchy was viewed by the Kurds as a unique opportunity to push for 
autonomy and recognition of their cultural rights by the new government in Iran. 
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Therefore, the Kurds enthusiastically supported the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and 
broadly participated in the revolutionary process from the outset. However, Kurdistan 
and Tehran quickly became antagonistic as it became apparent the goals of the Kurds 
were not compatible with Ayatollah Khomeini’s objective of establishing a strong and 
centralized Islamic state.   
Although the purpose of ridding Iran of the Pahlavi Dynasty’s rule mobilized the 
entire Iranian population and brought together diverse political interests, from clerics to 
communists as well as democrats and human rights activists in 1979, the democratic and 
republican interests were soon subsumed by the more conservative, theocratic rule of 
Ayatollah Khomeini. A renewed opposition to the Islamic government in Iran began to 
form shortly after the revolution. Having toppled the Shah, the former revolutionaries 
were soon being challenged by groups thirsting for change. 
In post-revolutionary Iran, religion became a major divisive factor. The 1979 
revolution created an Islamic state with a Shia leadership and marked a shift from a 
linguistic nationalism to a religious one. The new Iranian nationalism gained great 
strength from having the majority of the people from a single sect, but for those outside 
the Shia orbit, identification with this nationalism became difficult.375 Sunni Muslims 
made up about ten percent of the population in Iran and majority of Kurd, Baloch and 
Turkmen populations are of this sect. As non-Persian speakers in Sunni Muslim 
communities, the Kurds found their relationship vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic similar to 
their relationship with the Pahlavi state.  
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After the fall of the Shah’s regime, Kurdistan was among the first areas to rise up 
against the new Islamic Republic. The reasons were easily discernible. When the Kurds 
put their demands before the Islamic Republic, they were told all Iranians are Muslim and 
ethnic identification is not to be emphasized. As individuals of non-Persian Muslim 
background, one might expect the Kurds to have been integrated into the Islamic 
Republican state more easily than into the Pahlavi state. However, according to Article 
12 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the official religion of Iran is Islam and 
the Twelver Ja'fari School, which emphasizes the Shia nature of the state and establishes 
Shia Islam as the principle of unity. The article states, “this principle will remain 
eternally immutable.” If the Kurds could not be distinguished as an ethnic minority, then 
a majority of them might have been able to invoke minority status as Sunnis. However, 
Article 13 of the Constitution recognizes only the Zoroastrian, Jewish and Christian 
Iranians as religious minorities. Consequently, the Islamic Republic’s Shia 
exceptionalism as well as its binding ideology of pan-Islamism, which dismisses ethnic 
identification, the Kurds remain marginalized with respect to the state either as Kurds or 
as Sunnis.  
The first official Kurdish challenge to the new government occurred on April 1, 
1979, when a national referendum was held in Iran concerning the name and form of the 
new government. The Kurds, at the decision of the major Kurdish parties, KDPI and 
Komala, and many other secular groups in the country boycotted the referendum. When 
the referendum resulted in an overwhelming victory for the new Islamic regime, the 
Kurds shifted the focus of their political struggle to the drafting of Iran’s new 
constitution.  They took part in the election of Assembly of Experts on August 18, 1979, 
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a group responsible for writing the new constitution. However, the Kurds were denied 
seats at the Assembly of Experts gathering in 1979, when Dr. Abdul Rahman 
Ghassemlou, the elected representative of the Kurdistan region, was prevented from 
participating in the Assembly’s first meeting.376  
Although the draft constitution contained democratic provisions to safeguard the 
rights of all Iranians, the Kurds as well as many other nationalist and secularist groups 
felt the constitution did not address their demands adequately. For example, Sheikh 
Ezzeddin Hussein, the spiritual leader of the Sunni Kurds in Mahabad, argued since Iran 
was a multinational state, its constitution must legally recognize the cultural, economic, 
and sociopolitical rights of all ethnic and religious groups in the country.377 Having no 
identity as Kurds or as Sunnis, according the constitution, the Kurds saw no point in 
voting for the new constitution after the proclamation of the Islamic Republic. They 
abstained almost unanimously.  
Because of their numbers, the Kurds’ actions had little effect in hampering the 
project of the Islamic government, but they were strong enough to present a localized 
threat to the fledgling regime. The new leadership ignored the Kurdish demands and 
opted to crush unrest through military means. Regular clashes between the Kurds and 
government forces continued until the late 1980s with occasional interruption for peace 
negotiations. In 1988, following the Iran-Iraq war, several negotiations took place 
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between the Iranian government and the Kurdish side, led by the KDPI and Dr. Abdul 
Rahman Ghassemlou. Ghassemlou was ultimately assassinated by the armed diplomats of 
the Iranian government in Vienna on July 13, 1989, and three years later his successor, 
Dr. Sadiq Sharafkandi was also assassinated in Berlin on September 17, 1992.378 The 
deaths of the two leading Kurdish figures dealt a heavy blow to the Kurdish nationalist 
movement in Iran and evidenced the determination of the Islamic government to silence 
any opposition to its authority and.    
Towards the First Wave of Reform 
The wave of reform that emerged in Iran in the 1990s was a result of pressure 
coming from social forces such as students, women, and secularist and nationalist groups, 
who were seeking to change Iran’s authoritarian political system and foster a 
democratized polity that respects fundamental human rights and freedoms. The reform 
movement played a significant role in crystallizing the power struggle among the 
contending forces within the Iranian regime: those who favored the democratization of 
the state, expansion of civil society and the creation of a legal order versus the 
conservative opposition. The reformist faction’s popular quest for democracy, human 
rights and civil society posed a crucial challenge to the status of the Velayat-e Faqih and 
questioned its legitimacy.379  
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The source of power struggle between the reformist and conservative factions 
within the regime was rooted in the two conflicting and competing conceptions of 
sovereignty enshrined in the Iranian Constitution. One is the “popular sovereignty,” 
which is derived from the indivisible will of the Iranian nation. The other one is the 
“divine” conception of sovereignty as derived from God’s will. According to Article 5 of 
the constitution, the divine concept of sovereignty is by definition indisputable, 
unquestionable and absolute. It defines the predominance of the living "faqih" as the 
supreme source of authority and legitimacy whose absolute will defines the boundaries of 
political power and the juridical-political framework for the conduct of the state.380 
The reform movement underscored the antagonism between the popular and 
divine conceptions of sovereignty in Iranian politics and tried to marginalize the divine 
conception of sovereignty in order to give the popular-democratic conception its due 
place in the constitution.381 The contentious relationship between the conservatives and 
reformists also gave rise to a conflict regarding the question of national identity in Iran. 
The religio-national identity promoted by the conservatives maintained a continuity from 
the Pahlavi state’s focus on territorial centralism as the foundation of a nation-state and a 
uniform Iranian national identity, but based on the Shia culture. The reformists, on the 
other hand, emphasized liberal nationalist ideas identified with popular nationalism, 
which is distanced from strict Islamic morality and emphasizes instead the development 
of civil society, basic freedoms and human rights.  
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Many reformist intellectuals moved beyond the old paradigms of secular Aryan-
centered and religious Shia-centered homogenized Iranian identity.382 As the next 
revolution came of age, the reformist ideas showed an awareness that the experience with 
the Islamic Republic had made Islam, from a political standpoint, part of the problem and 
not the solution.383 The Iranian youth who comprise a large portion of the country’s 
population became the main force behind the reform movement. The restrictive social 
conditions under which they lived increasingly alienated the youth from the conservative 
clerical establishment and led young people to distance themselves from religion and 
turned them, instead, into proponents of democracy and human rights. Nonetheless, 
despite the rights-based language of the pro-democracy forces in Iran, the status of 
religious and ethnic minorities continued to be a neglected in the movement’s human 
rights discourse. The reformist goal to democratize the Iranian political culture did not 
question the state-sponsored notion of national identity that was based on the Shia 
Islamist exclusionary discourse of the conservatives.  
Activists concerned with ethnic minority rights argue their ethnic-related demands 
are inseparable from national demands for greater democracy and socioeconomic 
development for all people of Iran.384 However, tension and distrust exist between many 
of the Iranian pro-democracy and human rights activists, and the ethno-nationalists who 
emphasize ethnic and minority rights.385 The tension derives from the fact that many 
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politically active minority groups bear the stigma of separatism. On many occasions, 
human rights activists, intellectuals, and political organizations in the opposition were 
criticized by the minority groups on grounds they have been hesitant to speak out in 
support of ethnic and religious minorities of Iran or to condemn government repression of 
minorities.386 According to the proponents of ethnic minority rights, the democratic 
discourse of the Iranian opposition does not aim genuine political change in Iran, but 
serves to preserve the status-quo. In this respect, they accuse the opposition forces of 
making common cause with the regime’s efforts to concentrate power in the central state 
and deny the political and cultural rights of minorities in Iran.  
In challenging the state-sponsored notion of national identity, the ethnic 
movements emerged as “the third force” within the reform movement in Iran. While 
minority demands were congruent with the reformists’ goals for greater democracy, 
economic progress and an end to clerical control over law and behavior, they also 
advocated for pluralism and multiculturalism, and criticized the reformist intellectuals for 
their failure to recognize Iran’s multiethnic reality. In their attempt to shift the question of 
Iranian identity from its “national” perspective to its component peoples, minority groups 
speak not of an Iranian nation, but of Iranian peoples who are made up of different 
nationalities with distinct ethnic and cultural characteristics. Implicit in this notion is the 
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promotion of Iranian nationalism as a political force that is pluralistic and inclusive rather 
than homogeneous and exclusive.  
The atmosphere of distrust is particularly strong between the Kurdish political 
parties and Iranian opposition groups because of the old suspicions of secessionism and 
autonomy-phobia among the Persian population. Similar to the successive regimes in 
Iran, the Iranian opposition groups including liberals, republicans, moderate Islamists and 
leftists, often showed indifference to Kurdish demands by rebutting the idea Iran is a 
multinational country. Given the continual socio-economic disparity between central Iran 
and its provincial peripheries, which are predominantly populated by ethnic minority 
groups, the interests of the minorities are linked with those of the Persian underclasses. 
Accordingly, the Marxist and socialist groups in Iran often had a closer association with 
the Kurdish cause than other opposition groups. However, even the Marxist-inclined 
Tudeh Party, which the KDPI relied on after the collapse of the Mahabad Republic, 
avoided the term “nationalities” in referring to the minorities in Iran in its program.387 
Other opposition groups such as the National Front and Iranian National Republicans 
accused the KDPI leadership of separatism and argued that the idea that Iran is a 
multinational country was incompatible with the structure of the Iranian society and 
would cause the possible partition of Iran.388 
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Concerns over territorial integrity and the external threat of exploitation of ethnic 
tensions in Iran date back to the Kurdish and Azerbaijani movements of 1946-47. Kurds 
are only one-third the size of the Azeri community, which is the largest ethnic minority 
group in Iran. However, after the proclamation of the Islamic Republic, while the 
relationship between the Kurds and the Iranian state became strained, the Azeri 
community ceased to constitute a threat in the eyes of the new regime. Although Azeri 
aspirations for cultural rights continued, the Azeri people as a Shia community were 
better integrated into the religio-national identity promoted by the Islamic Republic. In 
this regard, despite the persistence of cultural, regional and linguistic differences, Azeri 
integration to the social and political system in Iran was smoother than other minorities, 
and they enjoyed representation at all levels of the political, military, intellectual and 
religious hierarchy.389  
After the Islamic revolutionary regime established power, Iran’s Turkmen, 
Baloch, Arabs, and Kurds staged revolts. The demands, despite their diversity, had much 
in common. Autonomous peoples in Kurdistan, Turkman Sahra, Balochistan or 
Khuzestan should exercise power in their own social, cultural, linguistic and economic 
affairs while the federal government managed foreign policy and economic, financial and 
defense issues at the national level.390 With the exception of the Kurdish challenge, the 
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regime put each down relatively quickly.391 While the Islamic Republic was able to 
suppress the autonomous movements in Turkman Sahra, Khuzistan and Balochistan, it 
lost control to the Kurds in much of Kurdistan, especially in Mahabad.392 Although the 
regime eventually won the battle militarily in 1985, it lost the ideological and political 
war against Kurdish nationalism and there has been little support for the Islamic state, its 
ideology and politics in Iranian Kurdistan.  
The Iranian state feels less threatened by Kurdish aspirations than Turkey, Iraq or 
Syria. However, from the perspective of the central government, the Kurds are more 
threatening than other ethnic groups in Iran not only because they are more 
geographically concentrated and a border minority, but because they are not demanding 
minor changes to the state framework, but a major reorganization.393 The major Kurdish 
opposition groups in Iran, KDPI and Komala, not only underscore the necessity of 
democratizing the political process in Iran, but also stress the need to accommodate the 
demands of the Kurds and other national minorities in a decentralized structure. The 
Kurdish call for democratization includes demands for rights and freedoms, and an 
examination of the rules and institutions Iranian society requires in order to achieve a 
more inclusive democracy. This articulation of Kurdish demands generates a new 
discursive terrain whereby the “ethnic” question becomes one of important arenas in 
which democratic and civil liberties in Iran and the struggle to build effective institutions 
converge with one.  
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The Kurdish political forces in Iran have managed to continue their activities and 
maintain their organizational capacity to revive and challenge the regime time and again 
since 1946, despite the repression they have suffered. Although they lack the power to 
independently influence the course of events within Iran, the Kurds remained active in 
voicing the political, cultural and economic demands of minorities and played a crucial 
role in instigating public discussion of the ethnic minority issues in Iran. In sum, the 
Kurds became pivotal players with respect to the emergent role of the minorities as a 
“third force” in oppositional politics and in the movement for change in Iran.  
The Kurdish movement’s ability to sustain its capacity for struggle has led to 
recognition by the Islamic regime that should Kurds be joined by similarly situated 
minorities and/or by Shia Persian forces intent on the establishment of a secular state and 
a confederacy, the regime’s support could be severely undermined.394 Given the fact the 
minorities make up a significant portion of the population, the Kurds had the potential to 
become key actors in achieving political change in Iran. Although the situation of the 
Kurds remained stagnant in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war, as the reform movement 
unfolded during the mid-1990s, the Kurds’ potential to wield power was a factor difficult 
to dismiss by either the regime or the opposition.  
The Reform Movement and the Kurdish Challenge   
Muhammad Khatami’s presidential election victory on May 23, 1997, was 
unexpected for the conservatives who had monopolized politics since the Islamic 
Revolution. The subsequent defeat of the conservatives in the February 2000 
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parliamentary elections further increased expectations of political change. Khatami’s 
election not only heightened hopes he would take Iran in new directions both at home and 
abroad, but also showed the genuine public demand for democratization in Iran. 
Whether President Mohammad Khatami and his administration were truly 
advocates for reform and whether they lived up to the Iranian society’s expectations of 
change are complicated questions to answer. Khatami’s campaign promises did not 
materialize during his two terms in office and even though his policies opened up cultural 
and political space to a degree not previously witnessed in the Islamic Republic, he was 
harshly criticized by some opposition groups who claimed he was part and parcel of the 
clerical establishment that had ruled Iran with ferocity in the past two decades. They 
believed his presidency failed to bring major changes to any of the fundamental policies 
of the theocratic regime, particularly in terms of executions and the assassination of 
dissidents as well as women’s rights.395 For these groups, Khatami’s victory was nothing 
more than an extension of the internal factional fighting of the Shia political elite and 
genuine change in Iran could only come through the organization of a general uprising to 
overthrow the regime completely. 
Regarding the question of minorities in Iran, Khatami’s campaign put 
considerable emphasis on the inclusion of all Iranians in the political decision-making 
process with a specific focus on greater social and political freedoms for religious and 
ethnic minorities. Feeling deeply unhappy about the hardline Islamic regime, the Kurds 
and a majority of other ethnic groups, supported Khatami and his reform movement. 
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After taking office in 1997, Khatami appointed Abdullah Ramazanzadeh to be the first 
Kurdish Governor General of Iranian Kurdistan. Ramazanzadeh, himself a Shia, 
appointed many Sunni Kurds to key roles in the government.396 In the sixth parliament 
(2000-2004), the Kurdish members of the Iranian Parliament organized themselves into a 
single faction representing the Kurdish provinces of Kurdistan and Kermanshah.397    
Despite the relative cultural and political freedom enjoyed by the Kurds during 
Khatami’s administration, political tensions and cultural grievances remained high in 
Iranian Kurdistan. The situation deteriorated following Khatami’s failure to do anything 
about the violent suppression of the Kurdish demonstrators in February 1999, when 
Iranian Kurds staged mass protests against Turkey’s arrest of the PKK leader Abdullah 
Öcalan. The President was exposed to harsh criticisms by the Kurdish parliamentarians 
who complained the central government did not apply same attention to the legal matters 
of the Kurds as it did in the capital.398 In 2001, the Kurdish representatives resigned en 
masse from the parliament, accusing Khatami’s government of discrimination against the 
Kurds.399 Khatami’s credibility further decreased when over half of the Kurdish MPs 
were prevented from participating in the February 2004 parliamentary elections. The 
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election was boycotted by over seventy percent of the Kurds, and civil unrest occurred in 
Kurdish cities to protest the unfair elections.400 
While Khatami enjoyed unprecedented public support, he had to work under 
certain institutional and operational constraints intrinsic to the complex nature of the 
Iranian political system, which is based on an uneven distribution of power divided 
between institutional political power and religious power. By the end of Khatami’s eight 
years in office, the Iranian public was greatly disappointed with him and the reformist 
process. Similarly, the Iranian Kurds expressed dissatisfaction with the government, 
believing that Khatami’s reformist platform fell far short of the promised improvement in 
integration and participation and had failed to engage the Kurds in a political process 
with the regime.401 
 Despite the overall dissatisfaction of the Iranian society with the Khatami 
government, the movement for change in Iran gained enormous momentum during the 
reformist process. The reformist ideal of advancing human rights, democracy and 
freedom in Iran had important effects on Iranian society. It is important to note, however, 
that reformist ideas derived from within the society itself, which had gradually became 
vigorous in initiation and agency after the revolution and eight-year war against Iraq. 
Therefore, although Khatami significantly influenced the grassroots movements in Iran, 
the changes promoted during his presidency were shaped by the social transformations 
that took place over a few decades that led to growing social pressure for democratic 
change. 
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During the election that culminated in Khatami’s victory, the ethnic factor 
emerged as one of the important aspects of the movement for change in Iran. This was 
particularly important in the context of the Islamist authorities’ portrayal of Iran as a 
cohesive Shia state and its policy of denying recognition of ethnicities. As the rise of 
ethno-nationalism clearly influenced the reform movement, the power struggle between 
the reformist and conservative factions within the regime entered into a new phase. 
Challenging both the conservatives’ portrayal of the ethnic problem in Iran as “artificial” 
and “foreign instigated,” and the opposition’s concerns about ethnic issues and 
“separatism,” minority groups in Iran played a significant role in influencing Khatami’s 
election campaign and the presidential election of 1997.  
The focus of Khatami’s presidential campaign was on the rule of law, democracy 
and inclusion of all Iranians in the political decision-making process. Khatami made a 
concerted effort to reach out to non-Persian and non-Shia constituencies. His supporters 
distributed election materials in Kurdish and Azeri, and Khatami campaigned on a pledge 
to expand the language rights of Iran’s non-Persian minorities.402 This theme of 
inclusiveness and respect for differences featured prominently in his campaign slogan, 
“Iran for all Iranians,” which implicated a major re-articulation of Iranian nationalism. 
Indeed, the support of minority groups was crucial to his two electoral victories. 
Alongside the youth and women, who were the primary supporters of Khatami, the ethnic 
minority participation in the 1997 elections showed the potential of these groups to make 
a difference in the democratic process in Iran. The support for Khatami in Iranian 
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Kurdistan as well as in the other minority provinces was overwhelming and was clearly 
reflected in the election results. 
One of the striking aspects of 1997 presidential elections in Iran was the 
overwhelming increase in the voter turnout compared to previous elections. The total 
voter turnout in 1997 elections was around eighty percent compared to 50.66 percent in 
the 1993 presidential elections, and 54.59 percent in 1989.403 Seventy percent of the 
voting population, roughly twenty million out of twenty-nine million voters, cast their 
votes in favor of Khatami, that is, in favor of democracy, civil rights and liberties. Both 
the increase in voter turnout over previous years and the margin of support for Khatami 
were significant indicators of the potency of the pro-democracy movement in Iran. 
In the presidential election of 1997, more than seventy percent of the population 
of ethnic regions voted for Khatami. This vast participation was a record in these areas.404 
The level of popular participation in the elections in Kurdistan was itself very significant. 
The Kurds refused to participate in the referendum to ratify the Islamic identity of the 
post-revolutionary state, did not vote for the constitution of the Islamic Republic in 1979, 
and basically boycotted the previous presidential elections. The KDPI, which had 
boycotted the elections for about twenty years, encouraged the Kurdish people participate 
in 1997, and the change in Kurdish political participation behavior was remarkable. In the 
1997 presidential elections, the voter turnouts in West Azerbaijan, Ilam, Kurdistan and 
Kermanshah – the provinces inhabited primarily by the Kurds in Iran – were 73.71 
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percent, 87.16 percent, 79.04 percent and 75.15 percent, respectively. The voter turnout 
in these provinces in the presidential elections of 1993 and 1989 was much lower.405 
A quick look at the voting behavior in other major minority provinces in 1997 
elections shows similar results. Sistan and Balochistan, where the Iranian Balochs live, 
showed a voter turnout of 65.28 percent in the 1997 election, compared to 42.87 percent 
in the 1993 presidential election and 38.68 percent in the 1989 elections. Khuzestan, 
which is inhabited by a number of ethnic minorities, particularly the Arabs, showed a 
voter turnout of 74.08 percent in the presidential election of 1997, compared to 45.60 
percent in the 1993 presidential election and 59.02 percent in the 1989 election.406 
The high participation in the 1997 elections in the minority provinces was the 
response of ethnic groups to Khatami’s campaign mottos and inclusive statements. 
Although his support of ethnic rights might be viewed as a strategy to attract voters, 
Khatami’s emphasis on democracy, rule of law and political participation was the result 
of ongoing pressure from minority political groups and political and civil rights activists 
in the ethnic regions. Even before the 1997 election, Iranian ethnicities were an important 
force for change in the status quo in Iran.  
In their open letters to presidential candidates, both Azeri and Kurdish groups 
focus on the failure of the state to properly implement the Article 100 of the Constitution, 
which regulates the establishment of Provincial Councils for the management of local 
affairs. Although the idea of “councils” and administrative decentralization had been in 
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Iranian constitutions since the constitutional revolution of 1906, it was never 
implemented because of the centrist approaches of both the Pahlavi and Islamic 
Republican states. The implementation of city and village councils was one of the most 
important of Khatami’s campaign mottos. Moving towards decentralization and in 
response to the minority demands to run their own local social, cultural and economic 
affairs, Khatami announced the elections for the city and village councils less than one 
year after he took office. A national election, with active participation in the minority 
provinces, led to the creation of the councils in 1999.  
The unelected power organs of the state, which were dominated by the 
conservatives, and internal conflicts within many city councils left them deprived of 
power, authority, and effectiveness.407 Despite their councils’ marginal status in the 
decision making and administrative organs of the country, the implementation of the 
councils was very significant and an important first step towards the establishment of 
democratic institutions in Iran. The decision to strengthen local administration not only 
showed Khatami’s strong will to respond to the minority demands but also the ethnic 
movements’ capacity to shape state policies and improveme of the ethnic groups’ 
participation in power.  
After the election of hard-line Islamist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency 
in 2005, the meager concessions of the Khatami era for ethnic minorities disappeared. 
Nonetheless, the ethnic factor never disappeared from the landscape of Iranian politics. 
Presidential candidates continued to place special emphasis on their slogans and promises 
concerning ethnic and religious minorities in the 2005, 2009 and 2013 presidential 
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elections as the ethnic movements continued to be an influential force in shaping the 
political agenda. Although the election of Ahmadinejad was seen as a sign that the 
movement for change in Iran had sunk into lassitude, civil unrest and opposition to the 
regime’s policies continued in the ethnic regions, which became an increasingly 
important component of the growing civil society. Minority politics and ethnic 
mobilization provided a crucial social and political outlet for the growth of the pro-
democracy oppositional movements in Iran. The vitality of developing a more inclusive 
approach to democracy that would address minority demands became evident again as 
another wave of reform emerged in the aftermath of 2009 presidential elections, showing 
signs that it would make a stronger push to achieve political change in the country.  
2009 Presidential Election and the Second Wave of Reform 
The reform process that culminated in Khatami’s presidency played a significant 
role in infusing democratic thoughts into society and strengthening liberal demands even 
though he had failed to realize many of his democratic promises. Iranian civil society had 
experienced an important period of rejuvenation during Khatami’s presidency from 1997 
to 2005. Preserving the advances of this period of reform became increasingly difficult 
after Ahmadinejad’s rise to power, but the voices of civil society that had been gathering 
steam over the previous decade proved resilient and nudged the reform movement along 
even under conservative rule.   
The 2005 presidential election closed the window of opportunity for democratic 
reforms. Events since then, however, suggest that the forces for democratic change in 
Iran continued to display considerable dynamism. Disputed results of the presidential 
election in 2009 triggered pro-democracy protests, but the protest movement had been in 
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the making since the 2005 election. Developments on the minority rights front were 
particularly stirring. 
In April 2005, the oil-rich Khuzestan province became the scene of severe ethnic-
related clashes. The uprising was against a government plan to alter the Arab composition 
of Khuzestan by transferring a great number of Arabs to other parts of Iran and replacing 
them with non-Arab ethnic groups, and changing the Arab names of various places and 
streets in the province to Persian names.408 Following the election of Ahmadinejad, the 
appointment of a Shia from Sistan as the governor of Balochestan, Habibollah 
Dehmordeh, who was known for his hard-line anti-Sunni Islamism, resulted in outrage 
among the Baloch and two Baloch deputies in the parliament resigned in protest.409 The 
same year, the Kurds took to the streets when the security forces killed and dragged the 
body of a Kurdish activist, Shawaneh Ghaderi, throughout Mahabad. Mass 
demonstrations took place in Kurdish towns and villages in July and August 2005, which 
resulted in an untold number of arrests and the deaths of at least seventeen people at the 
hands of security forces.410 In May 2006, a widespread campaign was organized by the 
Azerbaijanis following the publication of an insulting article by a state-sponsored daily. 
In February 2007, the Azerbaijanis marched in massive numbers in observance of the 
International Mother Language Day to protest the state-sponsored suppression of their 
heritage and language. 
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Similar to the Khatami era, ethnic factors continued to influence the presidential 
campaigns of the candidates in 2005. The fact that massive riots and confrontations 
occurred in Khuzestan only two months before the election played an important role in 
prompting the candidates emphasizing the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in 
their slogans and promises. Both conservative candidates, such as Ali Larijani and 
Mohsen Rezai, and reformist candidates, such as Mustafa Moin and Mehdi Karrubi, 
visited the minority regions and made promises to implement the articles of the 
constitution regarding the cultural rights of the minorities and provincial councils. 
The results of the 2005 election indicate the ethnic-related promises of the 
candidates were not received as favorably as they were in the presidential election of 
1997. In the first round, the five provinces with the lowest turnouts were either Kurdish 
or Azeri regions.411 The rate of participation in the Kurdish cities was the lowest: nine 
percent in Mahabad, eleven percent in Bukan, twenty percent in Sanandaj, and fifteen 
percent in Mariwan.412 Increasing signs of alienation among the ethnic and religious 
minorities was one of the significant challenges Ahmadinejad had to cope with as 
president. Nevertheless, after a year in office, Ahmadinejad’s intention to roll back the 
little progress that had been made during Khatami’s presidency on minorities’ rights and 
freedoms was clear. Banning Kurdish newspapers and imprisoning Kurdish activists 
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became a common occurrence during Ahmadinejad’s presidency.413 Following the 2005 
demonstrations, the Iranian government forcibly closed down or banned more than 43 
Kurdish publications, detained several Kurdish journalists and human rights, activists and 
forbid the study of the Kurdish language in universities.414 
The post-presidential election protests in Iran in 2009 erupted against the 
officially declared victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and grew into a major popular 
opposition movement, posing a great challenge to the country’s power structure. This was 
a unique phenomenon not seen since the Iranian revolution that took place nearly 30 
years ago. Just as the show of popular will and resistance through street protests brought 
down the Shah’s regime in 1979, so the new protest movement, called the green 
movement, cast the divine authority of the Islamic Republic into a shadow of perpetual 
doubt.415 The green movement emerged as a result a sense of agency among different 
strata in Iranian society. While it was an important step in terms of moving the reform 
process forward in Iran, the green movement also underscored significant developments 
concerning the relations between diverse actors that constituted the pro-democracy 
movement. 
First, the green movement crystallized the fact that the reformist leaders were no 
longer the only actors to shape the reform agenda in Iran. Different from the reform 
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process during Khatami era, Iranian people who took to the streets in June 2009, were 
ahead of the political leaders of the green movement and reflected the increasing strength 
of Iran’s emerging civil society. The leaders of the reform movement of the 1990s 
remained loyal to the Islamic movement, but rejected the conservatives’ Islamic 
orthodoxy and fundamentalism and demanded, instead, the consolidation of democratic 
institutions. Given the absence of any discourse of democracy for nearly twenty years, 
Khatami’s electoral campaign had led people to view him as the leader who could signal 
change and liberalize the political system.  
The democratic discourse surrounding the green movement, on the other hand, 
was shaped by a sharper rejection of the existing political system and a deeper demand 
for structural changes. It explicitly underscored the contradictions associated with 
demanding democratic change within the framework of the many anti-democratic 
institutions fundamental to the Islamic Republic. Although they were recognized as 
leaders of the green movement, Mir Hussein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, who were 
former high-ranking officials of the Islamic Republic, did not have a significant role in 
creating and organizing the movement and were only swept into power by a spontaneous 
wave of activism and the grass-roots movement.  
Second, the loss of momentum the green movement suffered in the months 
following the election highlighted the drawbacks in the opposition’s failure to develop an 
agenda that includes the demands of the ethnic minorities. Although the inhuman 
crackdown by the government security forces played a major role in suppressing the 
protests, a significant deficiency of the movement was its lack of widespread support 
from Iran’s ethnic minorities, including the Kurds, Balochs, Arabs, Turkmen and others. 
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The fact the protests remained limited to the northern areas of Tehran and a few more 
Persian cities considerably limited the green movement’s struggle for power. As the 
ethnic minorities make up almost half of Iran’s population, their reluctance to figure 
significantly in the protests restricted the green movement’s potential to become a 
nationwide movement and painted it mostly an internal struggle or factional divisions of 
the Shia political elite. 
The green movement was largely limited to Tehran and the peripheral ethnic 
minority-dominated areas that were under more pressure and exposed to greater 
discrimination remained silent. The green movement’s unsuccessful campaign outside of 
Tehran was due in large part to the movement’s leaders’ lack of plans to include the 
Arabs, Azeris, Kurds and the Baloch, as well as the pro-democracy opposition groups’ 
historical tendency to steer clear of direct contact with minority political groups. Wary 
about their status in the future of the movement, ethnic groups kept their distance from 
the protest movement despite the fact that they share most of the goals of the green 
movement such as increasing popular representation in government and opening Iranian 
society for greater internal political dialogue.    
The discourse on ethnic politics expanded drastically during the 2009 presidential 
campaigns. Both of the reformist candidates, Mousavi and Karroubi, campaigned 
intensely in the minority regions to gain support from Iran’s large ethnic and religious 
minority voting blocs. Mousavi, in particular, campaigned widely in the minority-
dominated provinces of Azerbaijan, Khuzestan, Kermanshah, Mazandaran and Golestan 
and proposed detailed policies to address minority grievances in addition to standard 
assurances of respect for cultural rights and greater minority incorporation in 
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government. Given the failure of the Khatami administration to bring about any 
sustainable changes to the status of ethnic groups in Iran, expectations remained low 
among Kurds and other ethnic groups that either reformist would have the political 
capital to implement the full range of their promises and change the authoritarian bent of 
the regime. The fact that pro-democracy reformists did not pay much attention to the 
human rights abuses of the Kurds during the first term of President Ahmadinejad played a 
significant role in dissolving the last remaining ties between the reform movement and 
ethnic minority demands.  
Although demonstrations were not as widespread as in Tehran, minorities outside 
the capital did participate in protests pressing for their specific demands along with the 
green movement. However, given that no known formal or informal ties were ever 
established between the green movement’s prominent politicians and minority political 
groups, it makes more sense to view the participation of ethnic minorities as a 
continuation of their long-term grievances and active opposition to the regime rather than 
a commitment to the green movement. The security and militarized atmosphere of the 
ethnic regions and the vulnerability of these areas to repressive activities by the regime 
are also factors that influenced the degree of minority participation in protests.  
After the start of the protests in June 2009, many minority political groups 
expressed reluctance to put any faith in the Green Movement. The Kurdish Globe, an 
Erbil-based website affiliated with the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, declared 
that the dispute between opposition leaders and the government was simply the latest of 
many internal power struggles among the political elites of Tehran, which have existed 
since the early years of the Islamic Republic. A new leader would not fundamentally 
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change the government’s position on minority rights or its human rights stand.416 The 
Kurdish political groups were reluctant to become involved with the green movement in 
any tangible way, opting instead for silence, or, at most, a statement of solidarity. In 
January 2010, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan issued a statement regarding the 
Kurdish movement’s stance on the future of the green movement: 
Democracy in its real form can only be obtainable when the national rights 
of the various nationalities are acknowledged explicitly. The Green 
Movement will succeed if it joins its cause with ethnic minorities. But 
that’s something we believe the Green Movement is, so far, afraid to do.417 
 
On June 7, 2010, Abdullah Mohtadi, secretary general of the Kurdish Komala 
Party, issued a statement aimed at forging solidarity between the Kurds and the green 
movement:  
The people of Kurdistan do not demand special rights or benefits for 
themselves. They do not demand separation from Iran. Their demands are 
not outside the common framework of contemporary democratic regimes 
and recognized standards of human rights. The people of Kurdistan rightly 
demand that the effective leaders and political and cultural figures of the 
Green Movement and the practical activists of the movement, approve and 
support the demands of the people of Kurdistan, and in so doing allay their 
rather legitimate fears.418 
 
Realization of the green movement’s goals, by definition, includes the goals of 
many Iranian minority groups for increased self-expression and cultural autonomy. The 
reformist arguments for democratization and constitutional change, however, have 
largely left out appreciation and respect for ethnic and religious differences in the 
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country. That said, throughout the green movement the Kurdish leadership was not very 
assertive in putting their case forward, but opted for silence. The green movement 
provided the Kurds with an opportunity to consolidate their position as the “third force” 
of democratization in Iran and integrate their demands into the emergent grassroots 
democratic front in the country. Although the Kurds criticized the green leadership’s lack 
of an inclusive discourse to satisfy Iran’s minorities, they did not make any real attempt 
to become a part of the protest movement by critically challenging the positions of both 
the regime and the reformists, and making their case.   
The Kurdish movement in Iran is strong, but realizes its fate is intertwined with 
the Iranian opposition, as the minorities cannot overthrow the regime alone. Building 
alliances between the Iranian opposition and ethnic political groups depends on the 
ability of green movement to develop a more inclusive leadership who would approach 
the ethnic groups while ignoring the discourse of separatism. The establishment of 
mutual trust is possible only if a common discourse is formed with a common democratic 
agenda that genuinely includes the demands of the minorities. 
The Kurds and the Iranian Opposition: New Horizons for Cooperation 
The green movement has done more to rock the foundation of the Islamic 
Republic than three decades of sanctions and containment imposed by the U.S. and the 
United Nations. Since its inception, the Islamic Republic pursued a policy of harboring 
nationalist sentiments in Iran by referring to the “external enemy” argument as a method 
of avoiding intractable internal problems. The reformist process that started with the 
Khatami era and continued with the 2009 green movement has significantly challenged 
this policy by bringing the internal problems of Iran to the attention of both domestic and 
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international actors. Although the regime managed to suppress the protests of June 2009, 
the green movement or the pro-democracy movement in Iran should be regarded as an 
ongoing political project rather than a failed attempt to challenge the government. In this 
regard, while the regime appears unyielding, the political and moral victories Iran’s 
reform movement has achieved is beyond dispute and are likely to propel further efforts 
for democratic change.  
While the regime’s violent crackdown on activists in 2009 widened the gap 
between ethnic minorities and the regime, the reformists’ failure to effectively confront 
the conservatives and challenge the status quo was disappointing for the minority 
political groups. Since the repression of the protest movement, the Iranian opposition and 
minority groups held a number of meetings under the name, “Unity for Democracy in 
Iran,” in an attempt to unite the opposition and strengthen the green movement. The first 
sitting of the conference took place on February 4-5, 2012, in Stockholm, Sweden, where 
the participants discussed the political conditions in Iran, and methods to establish 
democratic rule, free elections and the future of minorities. To implement the 
recommendations of the Stockholm conference, a second meeting of the movement 
convened in Brussels on July 7-8, 2012, which proposed a further extension of the 
membership of the conference. Finally, on November 17-18, 2012, a third conference 
was held in Prague, which addressed the issues of unity within the Iranian opposition, the 
plight of women, and the political demands of the various nations living within Iran’s 
borders.  
Kurdish opposition leaders stressed the importance of achieving a federal 
democracy in Iran in order to accommodate the political demands of the minorities living 
286 
 
within Iran’s borders. In the last meeting, which was held in Prague, Hassan Sharafi, the 
Deputy Secretary General of the KDPI, and Abdullah Mohtadi, leader of Komala Party of 
Iranian Kurdistan, highlighted the importance of genuine and frank dialogue among 
various opposition groups and underscored that denying the multinational character of 
Iran and describing it as a country consisting of one nation is contrary to reality.419 
Although the opposition groups showed a general reluctance to address and respond to 
the Kurdish demands for a democratic federalist state as an alternative to the Islamic 
Republic, the meetings provided the Kurds with a chance to express their views and show 
they are a strong and active part of the Iranian opposition. Considering the decades-long 
separatist stigma attached to the minority political groups in Iran – particularly, the 
Kurdish parties – the fact the Iranian opposition groups took part in the meetings and 
listened to the aspirations of the Kurds was itself a sign of progress and a growing 
awareness on the part of all groups that ethnic demands in Iran need to be addressed. 
After the protest movement of 2009, both the green movement leadership and the 
Iranian opposition showed signs of willingness to compromise and work with ethnic 
groups. As a daring move, Mir Hussein Moussavi released a statement on May 10, 2010, 
condemning the “unjust” executions of five Kurdish activists by the Iranian judiciary. 
Moussavi’s remarks particularly surprised the hardliners in the Iranian government who 
did not expect the leader of the green movement to take an anti-government position on a 
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topic deemed sensitive even by the members of the Iranian opposition.420 Likewise, in a 
statement issued on January 15, 2013, the Coordination Council of the Green Path of 
Hope, an important body within the opposition movement, voiced its criticism of 
government measures aimed at curbing the use of Kurdish at schools in the province of 
Kermanshah. The Coordination Council stated that the move was a clear breach of article 
15 of the Iranian constitution, which allows for the use of local languages in press, media 
and the education system, and such actions are against human rights norms and the will 
of the majority of Iranians from all ethnicities, languages and religions.421 
The eleventh presidential election in Iran, which was held on June 14, 2013, 
renewed hopes for the Kurds and the other ethnic groups for greater rights for Iran’s 
minorities. Newly elected President Hassan Rouhani’s election motto was “moderation 
and change.” He was the only candidate who promised to ensure the cultural and 
language rights of minority groups, and assist in the return of Iranian Kurds living 
abroad.422 Rouhani won the votes of seventy percent of fifty million eligible voters in 
Iran.423 His campaign pledge during to work for minority rights and include minorities in 
his administration resulted in a high voter turnout in favor of Rouhani in major Kurdish 
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populated provinces such as West Azerbaijan, Kermanshah and Kurdistan.424 However, 
the hopes of the Kurds and other minorities for greater rights in Iran were soon dashed 
when Rouhani, immediately following his election victory, stated in a television 
interview that Iran is “not a multi-ethnic state” and that “there is only one nation in Iran 
and that is structured by Islamic system.”425  
It might be too early to judge Rouhani’s attitude towards the ethnic question in 
Iran, but his rhetoric so far displays continuity rather than a break with the policies of 
previous administrations. Voting patterns since the establishment of Islamic Republic 
show that ethnic groups turn out to vote in higher numbers for the candidates who 
support their rights. The reformists, however, have failed to improve minority rights in 
Iran, and the Kurds’ already skeptical attitude towards the election system in the country 
has deepened and since the Khatami era, led to consistently lower rates of Kurdish voter 
turnout compared to other provinces in the country. Lower rates of turnout in provinces 
where non-Persian ethnic groups are concentrated indicate a strong “rejectionist” 
sentiment towards the political system in general. Before the 2013 elections, in an 
interview with BBC Arabic, Khalid Azizi, secretary general of the Iran’s Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (IKDP), said that: 
The elections and their outcome would not change anything for the 
people of Iran. These elections aren’t about human rights or the rights of 
the Iranian people. It is a way for the Iranian regime to come out of its 
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own crisis. People participate only to find a solution for the economic 
crisis the regime has got them into.426 
 
Unless the deep-rooted flaws embedded in the core institutions of representative 
democracy in Iran are eliminated, a regime change would be unlikely to change the 
political and social positions of ethnic or religious minorities in Iran. It has been shown 
time and again, be they reformist or conservative, successive regimes in Iran have refused 
to recognize the multi-ethnic reality of the country and the legitimate rights of the 
minorities. That is why it is imperative for the Kurds and other pro-democracy forces in 
Iran to collaborate under the common theme of systemic political change. Political 
developments since Mohammad Khatami’s presidential victory in 1997, and the 
corresponding rise of the reform movement reveal that the ethnic dimension of Iranian 
politics is the country’s most revolutionary force. Many Iranian officials, religious 
leaders, and intellectuals, particularly those associated with the reformist movement, have 
gradually come to realize that Iran’s ethnic minorities have significant potential to wield 
power in terms of challenging the regime. This growing awareness concerning the 
capacity of ethnic groups might propel further rapprochement between the opposition and 
the minority political groups. Within this framework, the incorporation of the 
perspectives of Iran’s different ethnic groups into the reformist agenda may constitute an 
important part of the evolution of the green movement. 
The International Dimension of the Kurdish Question in Iran 
The internationalization of the Kurdish issue that affected three parts of Kurdistan 
since the early 1990s, in Iraq, Turkey and Syria, may appear to have bypassed the Kurds 
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of Iran. Even though the Iranian Kurdish movement seems to be politically dormant in 
recent years compared to the Kurdish movements in Turkey, Iraq and Syria, the Kurds in 
Iran have never stopped opposing the country’s successive governments and have always 
maintained the potential for profound change in Iran.427  
The toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 2003, the EU accession 
process of Turkey, the expansion of the PKK movement beyond Turkey’s borders and the 
dramatic developments taking place in Syrian Kurdistan resulted in increased world 
attention to the Kurdish movements in Iraq, Turkey and Syria. The Kurds of Iran, on the 
other hand, have been isolated internationally, and lack allies outside the country. The 
establishment of political ties between external actors and Iran’s ethnic movements to 
support political change in Iran is not very likely at the moment. The sheer size of Iran, in 
terms of both territory and population, the stability of the regime, and the support base 
the regime has among the Shia conservatives make it quite challenging for any outside 
actor to intervene in Iran. Unlike Iraq and Syria, which are weak states and had been 
ruled by minorities, Iran is ruled by its largest ethnic and religious group, the Shia 
Persians, supported by the tradition of a strong and bureaucratic state.  
That said, the Iranian regime has its own vulnerabilities. Iran is extremely 
troubled by the regional uprisings, particularly in Syria. Given the long-term strategic 
alliance between Iran and the Assad regime, the prevalent view concerning the possible 
consequences of Assad’s overthrow in Syria is that “when Assad is defeated it is the turn 
of Iran.” Therefore, Iran has supported Bashar Al-Assad at all costs. Should Assad’s 
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regime collapse, Iran will lose its most important ally in the region with significant 
repercussions for its own Kurdish population. Should the upheavals reach Iran, the 
Iranian Kurds are likely to be the pioneers of change along with the other minority groups 
and pro-democracy forces in the country.  
In the meantime, the synergy of cooperation among the Kurds of Iran as well as 
with Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan is increasing rapidly. The Iranian Kurds have 
benefited from the pan-Kurdish spirit developing in the Kurdistan Regional Government 
of Iraq, closely watching the ongoing peace talks between the PKK and the Turkish 
government and following the inspiring developments taking place on the Syrian Kurdish 
political scene. In August 2012, two major Iranian Kurdish parties, KDPI and Komala, 
signed a cooperation agreement that raised hopes for a united Iranian Kurdish front. It 
was declared that the agreement would not only be the basis for collaboration between 
the two parties in policy, diplomacy and media, but also serve as a basis for more 
cooperation among the other Kurdish political forces in Iran.428  
A few months later, in December 2012, the KDPI and Iran’s Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (IKDP) met for the first time since splitting in 2006 for talks at possible 
reunification. At a 2006 convention, KDPI members elected Mustafa Hijri as the leader 
of the KDPI, which led to a split in the party that created IKDP under the leadership of 
Khalid Azizi.429 Although the meeting did not result in the conclusion of an official 
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agreement for reunification, it marked an important step towards reconciliation and 
reaching a common settlement. 
Finally, in July 2013, thirty-nine Kurdish political groups from all parts of 
Kurdistan gathered in Erbil, Iraq, under the auspices of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government for preliminary talks to organize a Kurdish National Conference. This 
became an important unifying factor for the Iranian Kurdish parties, particularly the three 
different branches of the Komala Party. Since its foundation, Komala has gone through 
several divisions due to ideological differences. The planned National Conference made a 
significant impact on bringing together Komala’s three factions to win a seat at the 
conference and improved the dialogue between all groups working under the name, 
Komala. The preliminary talks on the organization of the conference also played an 
important role in toning down the tension between the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan 
(PJAK) and the other Kurdish parties in Iran by creating a common ground of action. 
PJAK, since its establishment in 2004, gained significant popular support among the 
Kurdish youth in Iran and managed to capture the attention of the world with its guerilla 
actions against the Iranian regime. Nevertheless, the party’s affiliation with the PKK has 
always strained the relations between PJAK and the other major Kurdish parties in Iran.   
In an interview following his party’s cooperation agreement with Komala, 
Mustafa Hejri, Secretary General of the KDPI, observed that the agreement was made in 
preparation for the collapse of the Iranian regime.430 The creation of a common ground of 
action is crucial in order for the Kurdish political groups to effect change in Iran. 
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Overcoming internal divisions is important for the Iranian Kurds so they can enhance the 
status of the Iranian Kurdish movement as a strategic partner in the eyes of both the 
Iranian opposition and international actors. Considering the possibility that the ongoing 
revolutionary wave in the Middle East might reach Iran, it is imperative the Iranian Kurds 
reduce their own internal conflicts and develop a strategic plan to improve their situation 
in the event Iran, too, undergoes a process of political change in the future.  
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Since the early 1990s, the Kurdish national movements in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria have undergone important political and ideological transformations that created 
multiple and intertwined layers of domestic and foreign policy considerations in each 
country. The most significant aspect of this transformation process is the incorporation of 
“democratic discourse” into the movement’s objectives and the resulting 
reconceptualization of Kurdish nationalism. The democratic discourse is characterized by 
demands for recognition of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nature of the countries in 
which the Kurds live, and by requests for an inclusive definition of citizenship that would 
transform the ethno-national hierarchies and pave the way for redistribution of power and 
sovereignty on an equal basis. Within this framework, over the past two decades, the 
Kurdish national movement has acquired a dual character: it is at once an ethno-cultural 
struggle for the recognition of Kurdish identity and demands, and also a democratization 
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movement that seeks to redefine the concepts of governance and citizenship in Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq and Syria.  
There has been a significant realization within the Kurdish movement that the 
preservation of their ethnic identity and culture can be possible only within a democratic 
polity. From this perspective, the struggle for an ethno-cultural identity and the struggle 
for democracy have become closely intertwined and it is not possible to win one without 
winning the other. In line with this reconceptualization of Kurdish nationalism, the Kurds 
began to play an increasingly important role in shaping the debates on governance, 
human rights and democratization in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria starting in the early 
1990s. In this context, the Kurds’ role as ethnic actors has been largely transformed into 
one that is centered on the Kurds as “democratic agents” who influence the relationship 
of the Kurds to their respective central governments in significant ways. These 
observations raise four questions: (1) Under what conditions have the Kurds become 
agents of change for democratization? (2) Why did this role become particularly visible 
in the 1990s? (3) How does this role affect the political systems of the countries in which 
the Kurds live? (3) How does the adoption of the “democratic discourse” impact the 
transnational aspect of the Kurdish movement?  
While the Kurdish movements acting in the different parts of Kurdistan share a 
number of common characteristics, the answer to each of these questions unfolds 
differently in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria due to the fact that each of these countries has 
a distinct political and ideological structure, which interacts with the regional and 
international dynamics in different ways. Three factors have the strongest explanatory 
power in accounting for the first question: the size and geographical location of the 
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Kurds; the use of political violence for the accomplishment of Kurdish nationalist goals; 
and the definition of Kurdish question as a problem of “democracy” rather than a 
problem of “statelessness.” 
The Kurds comprise a sizable portion of the population in each of the four 
countries in question and this provides them with a the capacity to influence the domestic 
politics of the countries in which they live and put pressure on their respective central 
governments to effect political change. The Kurds are also a geographically concentrated 
group, mostly inhabiting a region known as Kurdistan. The fact that they live 
predominantly across the borders of each of the four countries in question creates an 
important opportunity for engaging in cross-border activity. This situation underscores 
the fact that the Kurds are not only a domestic, but also a foreign policy concern for 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.  
The size and geographical location of the Kurds become significant for their role 
as democratic agents particularly in the context of the Kurdish movements’ use of 
political violence to achieve their goals. Armed struggle was seen by the majority of the 
Kurds as the only viable way to create an effective political struggle and to force the 
central governments to a solution because of the highly authoritarian structure of all the 
four countries in which the Kurds live. In this respect, Turkey can be considered as an 
exception due to its more open political system as compared to the other three countries. 
This was the main reason why the Kurds in Turkey initially embraced political struggle in 
the 1960s and 1970s, yet felt obliged to turn to armed struggle when it became apparent 
there were no sufficient political avenues available to force the Turkish state to consider a 
negotiated settlement.  
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The link between armed struggle and democratization is more visible in Turkey 
and Iraq than in Iran and Syria because of the proportion of Kurds among the total 
population in Turkey and Iraq is considerably higher as compared to Syria and Iran. This 
situation influences not only the potential number of recruits for the guerilla forces, but 
also the number of people who can be politically mobilized through armed struggle. Both 
in Turkey and Iraq, masses followed the PKK, the PUK and the KDP because of their 
capacity to successfully challenge the military forces of their respective central 
governments. In both countries, armed struggle played a significant role in mobilizing the 
Kurds and opening space for the political struggle, which made it considerably difficult 
for both Turkey and Iraq to ignore the Kurdish demands. Given the strong military 
capacity of the Kurdish movements in both Iraq and Turkey, the armed conflict became 
protracted in both countries, which made the political costs of ignoring the demands of 
the Kurds increase and put pressure on the central governments to open negotiations to 
find a political solution. These processes of negotiation encouraged both democratization 
and the peaceful settlement of the Kurdish question in Iraq and Turkey.  
In Iran, on the other hand, the armed struggle of the Kurds did not bring the same 
results for a number of reasons. Iranian Kurds are a sizable minority in Iran like the 
Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, but the Kurdish parties in Iran never managed to develop a 
military capacity as strong as their counterparts in Turkey and Iraq. The armed 
confrontations between the Kurds and the Iranian regime often resulted in brutal 
suppression and the defeat of the Kurdish movement. While Iranian Kurds always 
maintained their organizational capacity to revive and challenge the regime, this only led 
to an intermittent war rather than the protracted battle that tormented the Turkish and 
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Iraqi governments and made it difficult to ignore the Kurds’ demands. In other words, the 
political costs of ignoring the Kurds’ demands never became high enough for the Iranian 
regime to open negotiations to implement concrete political changes.  
Armed struggle did not play a major role in mobilizing the Kurdish populations in 
Iran politically as it did in Turkey and Iraq. After each defeat, resources were used to 
revive the armed struggle, which prevented the emergence of a strong pro-Kurdish 
political opposition in Iran. Another factor that influenced the Kurdish movement in Iran 
is the Sunni-Shia divide – the most significant factor that determines the policies of 
inclusion and exclusion in the country. Different from the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey who 
were able to mobilize around the common theme of “ethnic unity,” the Kurds in Iran 
were vulnerable to the cooptation policies of the Iranian government on the basis of 
sectarian divides.  
In Syria, the relatively smaller number of the Kurds within the total population 
considerably reduced the capacity of the Syrian Kurds to develop a strong movement 
either politically or militarily. The cross-border activities between the Kurds worked both 
against and in favor of the Syrian Kurds. The fact the Kurdish movements in Turkey and 
Iraq cooperated with the Syrian regime worked against the formation of an autonomous 
Syrian Kurdish movement until the early 1990s. However, that the Kurdish parties of 
Turkey and Iraq had relative freedom of action in Syrian Kurdistan was a positive 
contribution to the development of national consciousness among the Kurds of Syria. 
This situation not only increased Kurdish political mobilization in Syria in the 1990s, but 
also prompted the emergence of the Kurdish movement as a key actor in the Syrian 
uprising since 2011. 
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The definition of the Kurdish question as a problem of “democracy” rather than a 
problem of “statelessness” considerably increases the chances of a negotiated settlement. 
The use of political violence, and the size and geographical location of the Kurds plays an 
important role in bringing the Kurdish question to the attention of the central 
governments of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. However, these factors also give the central 
governments the opportunity to disregard the Kurdish movements on grounds The Kurds 
are “separatists” and “terrorists.” The perception of the Kurds as separatists and terrorists 
automatically eliminates the possibility of reaching a negotiated settlement and prolongs 
the war. Therefore, it is considerably important that the “democratic discourse” be 
consistently incorporated into the official party programs and political activities so as to 
create incentives for the central governments to respond to the armed struggle and come 
to the negotiation table.  
The Kurdish movement in Turkey has repeatedly emphasized a democratic 
discourse in defining its goals since the early 1990s. Over the years, the goals of the PKK 
were defined and redefined in the official party programs through different formulations 
proposed by Öcalan, including “democratic unity,” “democratic civilization,” 
“democratic republic,” “democratic confederalism” and “democratic autonomy.”  Each of 
these proposed solutions was based on respect for the territorial integrity of Turkey and 
the idea of a peaceful coexistence between the Kurds and Turks on an equal basis within 
a democratic polity. Democratization in Turkey cannot be analyzed without giving due 
consideration to the role these concepts had in influencing both public opinion and the 
political agenda in Turkey. 
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In their negotiations with the successive regimes of Iraq, Iraqi Kurds always 
repeated their main motto, “autonomy for Kurdistan, democracy for Iraq.” This 
formulation became even more significant after the establishment of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government in 1991, as the external support for the Iraqi Kurds was, for the 
most part, tied to an international commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq. By 
remaining part of Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds not only consolidated their autonomous status, but 
also influenced the process of democratization in the country, especially after the 
American-led invasion in 2002.  
In a similar vein, both the Iranian and Syrian Kurds always mainstreamed the 
discourse of autonomy and cultural rights while defining their goals since the 1990s. 
Their demands played a significant role in influencing the agenda of a number of 
important political opposition movements in both countries such as the Damascus Spring 
and the 2011 uprising in Syria and the reformist movement and the 2009 Green 
movement in Iran.  
The role of the Kurds as “democratic agents” became particularly visible in the 
1990s. This dynamic can be explained by considering both regional and international 
factors. The Kurdish movements in each of these four countries were affected by socialist 
ideas throughout the Cold War due to the appeal of Marxism-Leninism by the oppressed 
and marginalized groups. However, socialism’s uneasy relationship with nationalism 
made it difficult for the Kurds to reconcile socialist ideology with their national liberation 
discourse. Moreover, the position taken by the Soviet Union as well as the post-Cold War 
Russia towards the Kurdish question was generally in the form of supporting the Kurds’ 
central governments because of strategic interests. This situation prevented the 
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establishment of strong alliances between the socialist groups and the Kurdish nationalist 
groups throughout the Cold War with the exception of Turkey. Until the end of the Cold 
War, although the majority of the Kurdish parties declared their commitment to the 
emancipatory values of socialist ideology, it was Kurdish nationalism that was the 
prominent ideological force in defining the movement’s goals. As a result, the Kurdish 
movement figured predominantly as an ethnic actor, which limited its appeal to ethnic 
Kurds.  
In the early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the global turn to 
“democracy” affected the Kurdish movement. As the center-left and socialist groups were 
left without an identifiable political project in the post-Cold War era, the discourse of 
human rights and democracy provided the Kurdish movement with an opportunity to add 
a universal appeal to its demands for decentralization and cultural rights. Throughout the 
twentieth century, the lack of international support was one of the biggest political 
handicaps of the Kurdish movement. By adopting the democratic discourse in the post-
Cold War era, the Kurds attempted to remove this handicap. The discourse of human 
rights and democracy contributed to the establishment of ties between the Kurdish 
movements and external actors, particularly in the case of Turkey and Iraq.  
The debate on Kurdish rights greatly influenced the political reforms implemented 
in Turkey within the framework of Turkey’s EU accession process. The Iraqi Kurds, on 
the other hand, have become the most ardent supporters of the promotion of democracy 
in Iraq after the establishment of the KRG in 1991, given the close relationship between 
Iraq’s democracy and consolidation of the autonomous status of the Kurds. Because of 
the highly authoritarian and closed nature of the political systems in Iran and Syria, the 
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Kurdish organizations there have not managed to gain direct access to external actors. 
However, a strong emphasis on the discourse of human rights and democracy enabled the 
Kurdish groups to establish alliances with other pro-democracy groups within their 
respective political environments, and expanded the appeal of the Kurdish movement 
beyond the ethnic Kurds.   
The greatest impact of the Kurds’ role as democratic agents in Turkey, Iran, Iraq 
and Syria has been the challenge it posed upon the nation-state system. The Kurds’ 
demands for the recognition of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural structure of the 
countries in which they live have shaped important debates on democracy, governance 
and citizenship in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria since the early 1990s. In Turkey, the 
Kurdish movement shapes such important debates as the strengthening of local 
administrations in accordance with the EU criteria, and changing the constitution to 
establish a more inclusive conception of citizenship and education in the mother tongue. 
In Iraq, the autonomous Kurdish rule not only translates into democracy for the people of 
Iraqi Kurdistan, but also offers the best way to keep Iraq together and democratic through 
decentralization and power sharing. In Iran, the Kurdish movement is the most influential 
actor in terms of the expression of minority demands in the country and has the strongest 
potential to successfully democratize Iran should similarly situated minorities and/or 
other pro-democracy forces join it. The Syrian uprising, which has been ongoing since 
2011, is the first serious possibility of democratic change in Syria. In the context of the 
fierce struggle for power between the Assad government and the Islamist forces, the 
Kurdish parties in Syria currently offer the best democratic alternative and are evidence 
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that democracy in Syria cannot be achieved without accommodating Kurdish identity and 
demands. 
How the Kurds’ emergent role as democratic agents affects the transnational 
aspect of the Kurdish question is crucial not only for the countries with sizable Kurdish 
populations, but also for the entire Middle East. It can be argued that since the 1990s the 
Middle East has witnessed the emergence of a new conception of “Greater Kurdistan” 
defined by the goal of establishing decentralized polities across Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria, which would strengthen the political and cultural interaction between the Kurdish 
communities living in different countries and render national borders less significant. The 
broader implication of the new conception of Greater Kurdistan is that it offers an 
alternative institutional framework to the current state system in the Middle East, a 
system that is more suitable to the current era of democratization. As an alternative to the 
highly centralized and elitist political structure that prevails in the Middle East, the 
Kurdish movement proposes a new political framework that would result in an open, 
participatory and plural democratic society.   
Today, the Kurdish political situation in the Middle East is largely dominated by 
political rivalry between Öcalan and Barzani. While this rivalry is usually portrayed in 
the scholarly and policy circles as an indication of the fragmented nature of the Kurdish 
movement, it actually suggests a growing understanding among the Kurdish parties 
regarding the rules of political competition. One of the major weaknesses of the Kurdish 
movement throughout the twentieth century was that the Kurds fought with each other as 
much as they fought with their central governments. Bloody episodes of civil war 
occurred in Iraq between the KDP and PUK, and armed confrontations between the PKK 
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and KDP played a significant role in damaging “Kurdish unity” in the Middle East. This 
new conceptualization of Greater Kurdistan not only offers an alternative institutional 
framework for the Middle East, but it redefines the concept of “Kurdish unity” within the 
framework of respect for the individual characteristics of Kurdish movements in each 
part of Kurdistan. Currently, the political competition between the Kurdish movements in 
Turkey and Iraq can be observed in the Syrian context. However, there has also been 
substantial agreement to avoid infighting among Kurdish groups and to resolve disputes 
through regional meetings. The Kurdish meetings that took place in Erbil during the 
course of the Syrian uprising should be seen in this light.      
The most significant manifestation of the Kurds’ increasing role as democratic 
agents in the Middle East is the emergence of the Kurdish movements as a “third force” 
in each of the four countries in question. Without the Kurdish dynamic within their 
respective political systems, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria have a lesser chance of 
becoming true democracies. The Kurdish movements in each country act as important 
opposition groups by shaping debates over political change. However, what makes the 
Kurdish groups key actors in this process is that instead of bandwagoning, they playoff 
both the regimes and the main opposition groups. The Kurdish movements take the “third 
player” position vis-à-vis the ongoing power struggles between the Shia and Sunni Arabs 
in Iraq, the moderate Islamists and Kemalists in Turkey, the conservatives and reformists 
in Iran, and the Assad regime and Islamist opposition in Syria.  
The Kurds’ position as the “third players” derives directly from the way they 
incorporate the democratic discourse within their political objectives. While the regime 
and opposition in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria are in a fierce struggle for power, they 
304 
 
make common cause regarding the protection of the nation-state and the denial of the 
ethnic diversity of their respective societies. Hence, from the perspective of the Kurds, 
regime change, defined as the replacement of one administration or government by 
another, will not lead to genuine democracy in any of the four countries as long as the 
exclusionary character of the nation-state system remains intact. What is suggested by the 
Kurdish movement instead is the need for a structural transformation of the political 
systems of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria that would transform the prevailing ethno-
national hierarchies by redistributing political power and sovereignty on an equal basis.  
A wave of popular pro-democracy protests has swept through the Middle East 
since late 2010 and led to important political transformations in the region. However, 
three years after the outbreak of what is now referred to as the Arab Spring, the fledgling 
democracies of the Middle East face great uncertainty. Despite the toppling of old 
authoritarian regimes in a number of Arab countries and the widespread aspiration for 
change, the state of human rights and democracy in the region remains dire. One of 
consequences of the disintegration of the authoritarian regimes is they set the stage for 
communal strife along ethno-sectarian lines as it was seen in Egypt, Libya, Yemen and 
increasingly in Syria. The long-term distrust and bitterness built up under the centralized, 
authoritarian nation-states of the Middle East has become a significant barrier to the 
establishment of genuine democracies in the region.  
The experience of the Kurds indicates that the Middle East’s multi-ethnic and 
multi-sect reality needs to be considered not as a “problem,” but as a matter of 
“pluralism” and “democratic participation.” By raising claims for a competing vision of 
culture, governance and political representation, the Kurdish movement rejects the 
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concept of nation-state.  Instead, it offers the establishment of decentralized governments 
as an alternative institutional framework to address the problems facing the multinational 
states of the region and to achieve open, participatory and plural democratic societies. 
Given that the nation-state constitutes a fundamental problem for the “identity” demands 
in the Middle East, such a perspective has important implications not only for the 
countries with significant Kurdish populations, but for the wider debate on regime change 
and democratic transition in the region.   
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